Barachkov v. Chief Judge Sebastian Lucido of the 41B Dist. Court
| Decision Date | 03 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04–CV–73957,Case No. 04–CV–73977 |
| Citation | 151 F.Supp.3d 745 |
| Parties | Patricia Barachkov, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Chief Judge Sebastian Lucido of the 41B District Court, in his official capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Deborah L. Gordon, Sarah Prescott, Deborah L. Gordon Assoc., Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Peter W. Peacock, Plunkett & Cooney, Mount Clemens, MI, Timothy S. Ferrand, Cummings, McClorey, Clinton Township, MI, for Defendant.
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs Patricia Barachkov, Nancy Englar, and Carol Diehl's (“Plaintiffs”) Emergency Motion for Reinstatement (Case no. 04–73957, ECF No. 225).1 Defendant Chief Judge Sebastian Lucido (in his official capacity) has responded to this motion through his attorney Peter Peacock and Plaintiffs filed a reply. (Case no. 04–73957, ECF Nos. 244, 245).
The Court previously held oral argument on this motion and Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Proper Party in Interest on March 24, 2015. (Case no. 04–73957, ECF No. 231). Then Defendant Judge Linda Davis' attorney Timothy Ferrand had responded to both Plaintiffs' motion to substitute and their Emergency motion for reinstatement. However, after oral argument and briefing the Court granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion to substitute, finding that the current Chief Judge of the 41B District Court, Judge Sebastian Lucido, was the proper party in interest, striking then Defendant Judge Davis' responses to Plaintiffs' motion for reinstatement, (see case no. 04–73957 ECF No. 243, Court Order granting Motion to Substitute), and providing Defendant Chief Judge Lucido (“Chief Judge Lucido”) the opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement. (Id .). Defendant Chief Judge Lucido filed his response on April 27, 2015. (Case no. 04–73957, ECF No. 244). Thereafter, in accordance with the Court's order, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental reply. (Case no. 04–73957, ECF No. 245).
Oral argument on this issue was held on July 29, 2015. For all the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Reinstatement.
The Court recently summarized the long procedural posture of this case in its April 6, 2015 Opinion and Order reopening this action and granting in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Proper Party in Interest and therefore adopts that summary here. (See case no. 04– 73957, ECF No. 243 at 2–4).
Relevant to the issues before the Court now, the Sixth Circuit held in its most recent decision in this case2 that (1) the Plaintiffs' constitutional right to procedural due process was violated because the they received no pre-termination process and there was “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude the Employees had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment”, Barachkov v. Davis (Barachkov II ), 580 Fed.Appx. 288, 296 (6th Cir.2014) ; and (2) former Defendant Judge Davis in her individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity for the decision to fire the Plaintiffs without a pre-termination hearing because she “made an objectively reasonable determination that the Employees served at will”, Id . at 298. The Sixth Circuit also recited the well-settled law that “[q]ualified immunity shields a defendant sued in his or her individual capacity from monetary liability; it does not shield a defendant from official-capacity claims for equitable relief, Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 430 (6th Cir.1997), nor does it shield a defendant form individual-capacity claims for equitable relief, Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir.2001).” Barachkov II, at 294.
Also pertinent to the issues before this Court are those issues that the Sixth Circuit did not address, overturn, or mention in its most recent treatment of this case. Most notably, Barachkov II did not disturb or implicate the Jury's finding (as set forth in the verdict form) that there was not “just cause” to terminate any of the Plaintiffs. Indeed, relevant to this motion, Barachkov II only addressed issues relating to whether there was sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated ( the affirmative) and whether Defendant Judge Davis' determination that the Plaintiffs served at-will was a reasonable determination given the facts such that qualified immunity was appropriate ( the affirmative).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs now come before this Court in a legal scenario where a jury has determined that their constitutional right to due process was violated and that there was no “just cause” to terminate them, but are not entitled to the compensatory or punitive damages because former Defendant Judge Davis was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs now renew their request for prospective injunctive relief against the proper party in interest, Defendant Chief Judge Lucido, and seek “an Order compelling Defendant to remove negative information relating to their terminations from their personnel files, reinstating the Plaintiffs to the same or similar positions as the ones from which they were illegally removed, and issuing a declaratory judgment in their favors.” (Case No. 04–73957, ECF No. 225, at 3).
Defendant Chief Judge Lucido opposes Plaintiffs' request for reinstatement for a number of reasons. The Court will address each in turn.
It is a “well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation, means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) ; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (); see also Brody v. Village of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir.2003) (). In this action, Defendant Chief Judge Lucido argues that reinstatement is not “appropriate” in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim in part because such a remedy would not address the constitutional violation that occurred. Rather, Defendant Chief Judge Lucido contends that Plaintiffs are only entitled to have him provide a “notice and hearing” to determine whether good cause existed for their terminations. (Def.'s Resp. at 13).
Defendant Chief Judge Lucido's current argument is without merit. First, the Sixth Circuit in Barachkov I already indicated that equitable prospective relief was a possible available remedy in this action. Barachkov v. Davis (Barachkov I), 311 Fed.Appx. 863, 872–73 (6th Cir.2009). Indeed, in Barachkov I, the Sixth Circuit specifically reversed this Court's previous holding that prospective relief “e.g., injunction against further retaliation and reinstatement” was not available, and clarified that “[i]t is settled law that “[a] state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.’ ” (citations omitted)).
Moreover, this Court has previously addressed the issue of damages and potential remedies. . More specifically, after the first remand this Court addressed and rejected former Defendant Judge Davis' argument that reinstatement was not a proper remedy against her in her official capacity because it amounted to an end-around sovereign immunity. (Case no. 04–73975, ECF No. 84, at 4–7). In its April 14, 2011 Order this Court stated that “Plaintiffs' claims for prospective injunctive relief against Defendant Chief Judge Linda Davis [in her official capacity] should be allowed to go forward—but not Plaintiffs' claims with regard to damages and back pay.” (Id . at 7). After the jury trial in this matter, this Court also rejected former Defendant Judge Davis' arguments that only nominal damages (if any) were appropriate. (See Case no. 0473975, ECF No. 200).
Not only is Defendant Chief Judge Lucido's current argument (and former Defendant Judge Davis' previous argument) one in which it appears the Sixth Circuit and this Court have already previously addressed, but Defendant Cheif Judge Lucido's argument is not supported by law.
The touchstone for damages in procedural due process cases is Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). In Carey, the Supreme Court held that compensation for injuries flowing from the deprivation of a constitutional right “should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question”. Id . at 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042. In Carey, the Supreme Court held ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
John Doe v. Alger, Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-00035
...the standard remedy of a new hearing does not apply. (Pl.'s Mem. Remedies 28.) For support, he relies primarily on Barachkov. v. Lucido, 151 F. Supp. 3d 745 (E.D. Mich. 2015) and footnote 6 of Shaw v. Gwatney, 604 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Ark. 1985), vacated in part on other grounds, 795 F.2d 135......