Barajas v. Bermudez

• Decision Date: 23 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-17030,92-17030
• Citation: 43 F.3d 1251
• Parties: 129 Lab.Cas. P 33,188 Ubaldo BARAJAS, Tito Peneda Davila, Alberto Media, and Ramon Murillo, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Elias BERMUDEZ and Dora Bermudez; Natalia Medina; Jesus Jose Bermudez, Marcos J. Flores, husband, Enriqueta Bermudez Flores, wife and Albert S. Medina; Centro de Progreso, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1251

43 F.3d 1251

129 Lab.Cas. P 33,188

Ubaldo BARAJAS, Tito Peneda Davila, Alberto Media, and Ramon Murillo, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Elias BERMUDEZ and Dora Bermudez; Natalia Medina; Jesus Jose Bermudez, Marcos J. Flores, husband Enriqueta Bermudez Flores, wife and Albert S. Medina; Centro de Progreso Defendants-Appellees.

No. 92-17030.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 14, 1994.

Decided Dec. 23, 1994.

David Alan Dick, Larry Ruhl, and Hannah E.M. Lieberman, Community Legal Services, Inc., Tolleson, AZ, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Elias Bermudez, Natalia Medina, Jesus Jose Bermudez, Centro de Progreso, pro se and for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before: D.W. NELSON and BEEZER, Circuit Judges, and LETTS, ^* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge D.W. NELSON; Dissent by Judge BEEZER.

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs, seasonal agricultural workers, appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaint, which alleges violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1801 et seq. ("AWPA" or "the Act"). The district court borrowed Arizona's one-year statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute and held that plaintiffs' action was untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action was brought in federal district court on February 18, 1992 by seasonal agricultural workers who had been employed by Taplett North Orchards during the autumn of 1989. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under the AWPA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and general contract principles. This appeal concerns only plaintiffs' claims under the AWPA.

The AWPA is the successor statute to the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2041-2053 ("FLCRA") (enacted in 1974). The FLCRA was "the first major federal effort to improve the lot of agricultural laborers who 'have long been among the most exploited groups in the American labor force.' " Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1295, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6441, 6441-43); see also De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.1983). As one commentator emphasized, passage of the FLCRA was motivated by congressional recognition that "[b]ecause of [a] virtually insurmountable wall of economic, social, educational, language, and cultural barriers facing [most migrant and seasonal agricultural workers,] their reliance upon [the farm labor] In 1983, Congress replaced the FLCRA with the AWPA, seeking to redress perceived shortcomings in the implementation of the substantive provisions of the FLCRA. ¹ The policy objectives of the new statute were identical to those of the FLCRA, and Congress emphasized in passing the new bill that its primary concern was to ensure more effective implementation of those objectives. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 97-885, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4550 (1982) (hereinafter, "House Report") (noting the failures of the FLCRA and emphasizing the "desperate[ ] need" for redoubled efforts to enforce the protections originally embodied in the FLCRA); see also House Report at 4548 ("[e]vidence ... confirms that migrant and seasonal agricultural workers remain today, as in the past, the most abused of all workers in the United States").

                contractor is extraordinarily heavy, and in many cases, total."   W. Gary Vause, The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 11 Stetson L.Rev. 185, 198 (1982) (quoted in Caro-Galvan, 993 F.2d at 1505-06)
                

The AWPA imposes a variety of requirements on employers and recruiters of migrant and seasonal agricultural workers. The central protections for workers are set forth in the "Wages, Supplies, and Other Working Arrangements" provisions of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1822 (applicable to employers using migrant workers) and Sec. 1832 (applicable to employers using seasonal workers), and in the "Information and Recordkeeping Requirements" provisions of the Act, id., Sec. 1821 (applicable to employers using migrant workers) and Sec. 1831 (applicable to employers using seasonal workers). In addition, the Act imposes health and safety requirements relating to housing, id., Sec. 1823, and motor vehicle transportation, id., Sec. 1841. Finally, the Act provides a private right of action for "[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or any regulation under this chapter." Id., Sec. 1854(a). The AWPA does not, however, contain a limitations period within which aggrieved parties must bring their actions.

Plaintiffs allege that Taplett North Orchards and the agents at Centro de Progreso who recruited them for employment at Taplett (collectively, "the employers") violated the AWPA by failing to comply with the terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, they allege that the employers violated the "Wages, Supplies, and Other Working Arrangements" provisions of the AWPA by failing to pay them the promised rate of $11.00 per bin or $3.35 per hour, by failing to provide return transportation after the end of their period of employment, and by failing to pay their wages when due. They also allege that the employers violated the "Information and Recordkeeping Requirements" provisions of the Act by knowingly providing false and misleading information concerning wage rates and other terms of employment.

Certain defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, ² arguing that the AWPA claims were barred by Arizona's one-year statute of limitations for liabilities created by statute based on our decision in Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.1984). In Rivera, the plaintiffs had brought claims alleging violations of the "registration, disclosure, recordkeeping Although the present action arose in Arizona rather than California and the plaintiffs here rely primarily on the "Working Arrangements" provisions of the AWPA whereas the plaintiffs in Rivera relied exclusively on the FLCRA's disclosure and "Information and Recordkeeping" provisions, the district court ruled that Rivera was controlling and dismissed the suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that the plaintiff's claims were barred because A.R.S. Sec. 12-541(3), the Arizona equivalent of the California statute relied on in Rivera, contains a one-year limitations period. The court did not consider the potential applicability of Arizona provisions other than A.R.S. Sec. 12-541(3).

and posting" provisions of the FLCRA. Like the AWPA, the FLCRA lacked an explicit limitations provision. We first stated that, in the absence of a congressionally-mandated limitations period, the appropriate period should be determined by reference to state law. We further held that, under California law, the limitations period for a claim alleging violations of "registration, disclosure, recordkeeping, and posting" requirements would be that for "[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." Id. at 569 (citing Cal.Civ.Pro. 338(1) (West 1982)). Rivera arose in California, where the statute of limitations for such a claim is three years. Under Arizona law, the statute of limitations for such a claim is one year. See A.R.S. Sec. 12-541(3) (providing that an action "[u]pon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture," must be brought within one year).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 655, 121 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992).

III. DISCUSSION

The AWPA does not include a statute of limitations. "It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand." ³ Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (internal citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has offered a general framework for ascertaining the appropriate limitations period for claims under a federal statute when Congress has not supplied one. "[T]he initial inquiry is whether all claims arising out of the federal statute 'should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case.' " Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2762, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)).

If the court determines that Congress intended a uniform characterization, "the next inquiry is whether a federal or state statute of limitations should be used." Id. If, however, the court determines that Congress did not intend a uniform characterization, the court should look to the facts and legal theories presented in the case before it, characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case, and borrow the limitations period of the state statute that provides the most closely analogous cause of action. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942-43. In no circumstance, however, should a court adopt a limitation period that would frustrate the policies of the federal statute. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) ("State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts

to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the...