Barajas v. Blue Diamond Growers Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 April 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-0679 JLT SKO
• Parties: LUIS BARAJAS, MARIA VARGAS, and ELBA VIZCAINO on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. BLUE DIAMOND GROWERS INC.; DENISE HORN, individually; RESHAM KLAIR, individually; and DOES 1 through 40, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

LUIS BARAJAS, MARIA VARGAS, and ELBA VIZCAINO on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. BLUE DIAMOND GROWERS INC.; DENISE HORN, individually; RESHAM KLAIR, individually; and DOES 1 through 40, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-0679 JLT SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 13, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION

TO DISMISS

(Doc. 16)

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

Luis Barajas, Maria Vargas, and Elba Vizcaino assert they suffered violations of wage and hour laws as employees of Blue Diamond Growers. Plaintiffs seek to hold Blue Diamond Growers, Denise Horn, and Resham Klair liable under federal and state law stating claims on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated, non-exempt employees. (See generally Doc. 12.)

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims in the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Doc. 16 at 2.) Defendants also request that the Court strike portions of the pleading, including Plaintiffs' request for disgorgement, pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing they “met the pleading threshold.” (See Doc. 17 at 5.) The Court finds the matter suitable for decision without oral arguments, and no hearing date will be set pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) and General Order 618. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the First Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

I. Background and Procedural History

Plaintiffs were non-exempt employees of Blue Diamond Growers, which owns and operates almond processing plants in California. (Doc. 12 at 4-5, ¶¶ 13-17.) Luis Barajas was employed by Blue Diamond Growers from March 2005 until August 15, 2018. (Id. at 8, ¶ 28.) Maria Vargas worked for Blue Diamond Growers from January 1, 2008 to March 25, 2018. (Id.) Elba Vizcaino was employed from August 1997 to March 12, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiffs assert that during their employment, Denise Horn and Resham Klair were agents of Blue Diamond Growers. (Id. at 15, ¶ 53.)

Plaintiffs assert Blue Diamond Growers failed to provide compensation “for all hours worked.” (Doc. 12 at 8, ¶ 26) [internal quotations omitted].) According to Plaintiffs, Blue Diamond Growers “routinely requires and/or suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees to work more than 40 hours per week.” (Id. at 13, ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs contend Blue Diamond Growers “failed and refused to pay all overtime premiums to Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees for their hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.” (Id., ¶ 43; see also id. at 16-17, ¶¶ 61-67.)

Plaintiffs contend also that Blue Diamond Growers, Horn, and Klair are liable for failure to pay minimum wage to employees. (Doc. 12 at 14-16, ¶¶ 51-60.) Plaintiffs allege they and other employees of Blue Diamond Growers “were routinely required to work prior to their scheduled shifts ... and after their scheduled shifts, without compensation.” (Id. at 15, ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs allege they were instructed by Blue Diamond Growers, Horn, and Klair “to prepare for their shifts by putting on their work/protective equipment prior to clocking in.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also assert the employees “were required to doff their work/protective equipment after clocking out at the end of their shift.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege Blue Diamond Growers “failed to provide timely and uninterrupted” rest and meal periods, “or pay premium wages in lieu thereof.” (Doc. 12 at 9, ¶ 31; see also id. at 18-21, ¶¶ 7187.) Instead, Plaintiffs contend “they were routinely required to work during their meal periods, ” though “[they] and the Class did not voluntarily or willfully waive” their meal and rest periods. (Id. at 19-20, 22, ¶¶ 76, 82, 87.) According to Plaintiffs, they were “required to wear radios in the ‘on' position during their meal periods and were required to respond to their radios for work related matters without compensation.” (Id. at 15, ¶ 53.) Similarly, Plaintiffs contend they “were not relieved of all duties during their rest periods and were required to respond to calls on the radio during their rest period.” (Id. at 19, ¶ 77.)

Finally, Plaintiffs assert they “were not paid all earned wages at the time of end of the employment relationship with [Blue Diamond Growers].” (Doc. 12 at 22, ¶ 93.) Plaintiffs allege, “On information and belief, [other similarly situated employees] were not paid all wages earned at the time of termination or resignation.” (Id.) “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' custom, practice, and/or policy was not to pay for previously earned minimum, overtime, or unrecorded time spent under Defendant's control, at the time that final wages were paid.” (Id.)

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants “maintained and enforced unlawful labor policies against employees that revolve around Defendants' compensation policies and their record-keeping procedures.” (Doc. 12 at 7-8, ¶ 25.) Thus, Plaintiffs seek to bring claims on their own behalf “and others similarly situated, ” with “a Rule 23 opt-out California class and as an opt-in FLSA Collective Action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216 (b).” (Id. at 9, ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs propose the classes be defined as:

California Class: All persons who are employed or have been employed by Blue Diamond Growers in the State of California who, within four (4) years of the filing of the Complaint in this case, who have worked as non- exempt hourly employees and were not paid all lawful wages or not paid statutory penalties; and

FLSA Collective: All persons who are employed or have been employed by Blue Diamond Growers in the State of California who, within three (3) years of the filing of the Complaint in this case, who have worked as non- exempt hourly employees and were not paid all lawful wages.

(Id. at 9, ¶ 33.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint on May 13, 2020, which Plaintiffs amended on June 8, 2020. (Docs. 1, 12.) Plaintiffs identify the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.; (2) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1197, 1194(a), and 1194.2; (3) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2 and IWC Wage Order 8; (4) failure to provide rest periods or premium wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 558, and IWC Wage Order 8; (5) failure to provide meal periods or premium wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512, 558, and IWC Wage Order 8; (6) failure to pay all wages at termination or resignation in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 558.1; and (7) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. (See generally Doc. 12.) Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of all wages; declaratory relief; compensatory damages; “restitution ... due to their unfair competition, ” and “premium pay wages, and penalties.” (Id. at 25-26.)

Defendants filed the motion to dismiss and strike portions of the First Amended Complaint on August 21, 2020. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion on September 9, 2020 (Doc. 17), to which Defendants file a brief in reply on September 15, 2020 (Doc. 18).^[1]

II. Motions to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b), the Court “may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when “the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court explained,

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations made in the complaint as true. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). A court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolve all doubts in favor of the plaintiffs. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true when “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003).

“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 236 (1974). The Court “will dismiss any claim that, even when...