Barajas v. City of Rhonert Park, Case No. 14-cv-05157-MEJ
| Decision Date | 17 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-cv-05157-MEJ |
| Parties | RAUL BARAJAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF RHONERT PARK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Pending before the Court are the parties' renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. See City Mot., Dkt. No. 111; Barajas Mot., Dkt. No. 112. The Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court maintains its prior conclusions.
This case is based on allegations that police officers conducted a suspicionless search of probationer Edgar Perez's residence in November 2014 over the objection of his parents and co-residents, Plaintiffs Elva and Raul Barajas. Plaintiffs assert a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the illegal search of their residence. See Compl.
The Court issued two prior orders on the parties' original cross-motions for summary judgment. See Barajas v. City of Rohnert Park, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1022 (2016) ("Barajas I"); Barajas v. City of Rohnert Park, 2016 WL 4208279 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) ("Barajas II").1 Itbears repeating that "it is not Perez's privacy interests that matter here—rather, it is the privacy interests of his [non-probationer] co-habitants that are of consequence to this case." Barajas I, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1022. The Court summarizes its prior holdings here.
In its first order, the Court held Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), potentially applied, despite the existence of a probation search condition and where physically-present occupants not subject to a search condition objected to the search:
[T]he Court finds the Randolph rule is properly applied to the facts in this case as the government's limited interests in conducting this search do not outweigh Plaintiffs' continued interest in the privacy in their home. . . . A reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs can prove Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home and conducting a warrantless and suspicionless search of their joint premises over their express objections. Consequently, in light of Randolph, the Court cannot grant Defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground that their search was constitutional.
Barajas I, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1033. The Court found that if Officer Tatum entered Plaintiffs' home before they objected, the probationer's consent justified a suspicionless search of the home he shared with his parents. Id. at 1037. Thus, the Court could not grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the ground that reasonable suspicion was categorically required to perform this search. Id. Surveying the existing authorities, the Court also found reasonable officers at the time of the search "could have concluded the issue of whether objecting co-residents could stop a probation search was not yet resolved" and thus found the Defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of conducting the probation search over Plaintiffs' objections. Id. at 1034.
The Court could not grant summary judgment to Defendants because a reasonable jury could conclude it was unreasonable for Officer Tatum to enter the home through the back door while officers at the front door were explaining who they were. Id. at 1037-38. The Court alsocould not grant summary judgment to Plaintiffs because they cited no authority supporting their contention that Officer Tatum's actions violated the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law, and "tacitly ask[ed] the Court to assume the role of factfinder and determine the reasonableness of Officer Tatum's conduct." Id. at 1038. The Court found that Officer Tatum was not entitled to qualified immunity because, under Plaintiffs' version of the facts, a reasonable officer would be on notice that his conduct was an unreasonable method of entry. Id. at 1038-39.
The Court found a triable issue existed as to whether Defendants conducted the search for purposes of harassment rather than related to probation or other legitimate law enforcement purposes. Id. at 1040. If a jury found this to be the case, Defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in 2014 would have understood harassment violated Plaintiffs' rights to be free from unreasonable searches. Id.
The Court found Plaintiffs had not created a triable issue of fact that a City policy or custom allowing officers to harass citizens through searching their homes was the moving force behind the officers' potential decision to search the home to harass, and granted summary judgment to Defendants on this issue. Id. at 1042. The Court found Plaintiffs had created a triable issue of fact that the City trained officers to enter probationers' homes in the manner at issue in this case, and that it was Defendants' custom to do so. Id. at 1043. It therefore denied summary judgment to Defendants on this issue. Id. The Court also denied, without prejudice, summary judgment to the City on the issue that a City policy or custom was the moving force behind the potential Randolph rule violation. Id. ().
The City renewed the motion for summary judgment on the limited issue of its Monell liability for any potential violation of the Randolph rule. See Barajas II, 2016 WL 4208279, at *2-4. The Court again could not "find a basis to grant the City summary judgment on its theorythat uncertainty about the law at the time of the alleged constitutional violation immunize[d] municipalities from liability under § 1983." Id. at *4. The Court also found Plaintiffs demonstrated a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the City had a policy or custom that caused the potential Randolph rule violation, and thus denied summary judgment to the City on this issue as well. Id.
The Court certified for interlocutory appeal two issues: (1) whether the Randolph rule applies to the probation search conducted in this case, and (2) whether reasonable suspicion was required to conduct the search in this case. See Barajas II, 2016 WL 4208279 at *6. The Ninth Circuit denied the parties' petitions for review. See Status Report, Ex. A, Dkt. No. 92.
The Court ordered the parties to file renewed cross-motions to aid the Court in determining whether it should exercise its inherent authority to reconsider its prior interlocutory orders regarding the two issues previously certified for appeal. See Briefing Order, Dkt. No. 108. The parties filed the instant cross-motions addressing these two issues, as well as other parts of the Court's prior decisions not certified for appeal. The Court only analyzes the issues on which it ordered further briefing. This Order does not alter the Court's previous findings in Barajas I and Barajas II regarding the reasonableness of entry, the motive for the search, or Monell liability.
The Court incorporates by reference its earlier analysis on these topics, and only discusses the parties' new arguments. Ultimately, the Court maintains its prior conclusions for the reasons set forth below.
"[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show thatpermission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); see also Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1129 (2014) (); People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789, 795-96 (2000) (). Conversely, a "co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, [and] his invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114; id. at 120 ().
In reaching its decision in Randolph, the Supreme Court invoked the "centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home" and the "ancient adage that a man's house is his castle to the point that the poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown." 547 U.S. at 115 (). These principles led the Supreme Court to conclude that, in the balancing of competing individual and governmental interests, "the cooperative occupant's invitation adds nothing to the government's side to counter the force of an objecting individual's claim to security against the government's intrusion into his dwelling place." Id. "Disputed permission is thus no match of this central value of the Fourth Amendment, and the State's other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it." Id.
Defendants do not address the philosophical underpinnings of the decision, and...
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