Baralt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-2421 (PG).,95-2421 (PG). |
| Citation | 86 F.Supp.2d 31 |
| Parties | Manuel A. BARALT, Lizette Pena-Aviles, and their marital partnership, Juan Gonzalez-Perez, Monserrate Canabal-Duran, and their marital partnership, Plaintiffs v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE, CO., Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., Nationwide Life Insurance Co., Nationwide General Insurance Co., Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Co., Nationwide Group of Companies., and William P. De-Meno, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
James D. Noel-High, McConnell Valdes, San Juan, PR, for plaintiffs.
Arturo Diaz-Angueira, Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Diaz, San Juan, PR, for defendants.
After a five day trial, the jury found that Defendants Nationwide Insurance Co., Nationwide Mutual Fire, Insurance Co., Nationwide Life Insurance Co., Nationwide General Insurance Co., Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Co., Nationwide Group of Companies., and William P. De-Meno ("Nationwide") discharged both Manuel A. Baralt and Juan González Pérez in violation of both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and Act No. 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146, et seq. The jury also determined that Nationwide discharged Baralt and González without just cause and in violation of Act No. 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185a, et seq., awarded Plaintiffs Manuel A. Baralt, his wife Lizette Peña Avilés, Juan González Pérez, and his wife Monserrate Canabal Durán a total of $ 4,400,000.00.1
Defendants made several motions for judgment as a matter of law, one at the close of Plaintiffs' case and again at the close of evidence, which the Court took under advisement. After the jury verdict, Defendants also made a motion for directed verdict, which the Court denied. Defendants now renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to Defendants' Motion Requesting Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Remittitur of the Damage and Back Pay Awards or the Celebration of a New Trial.2
The Court also has in front of it motions by Plaintiffs for Attorney's Fees (Dkt.55), for Double Indemnity under Act No. 100 (Dkt.56) and for Prejudgment Interest (Dkt.67). Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' motions in several motions of their own. (Dkts. 66 & 76)
The evidence, seen in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, is as follows: Juan González Pérez ("González") worked for Nationwide for over 28 years. Manuel Baralt worked for Nationwide for over 24 years. Nationwide fired Baralt on April 28, 1994 and fired González on May 10, 1994. Each was replaced by a younger employee. Each was escorted out of the Nationwide premises through the back door by security personnel.
Nationwide presented four reasons why González and Baralt were fired, and why age was not a factor. Nationwide first alleged that each knew of Mr. Enrique Lopez' son's use of a pool car.3 Both employees admitted such, as did virtually every other employee Nationwide interviewed. It was no secret.
Second, Nationwide alleged that Baralt and González were involved in "irregularities" surrounding a salvage car-a British Sterling. Again, the misuse was performed by Enrique Lopez and again, many employees knew of the car and its situation. González merely drove the car from Lopez' home in Dorado back to Nationwide during business hours. Baralt knew of the car and its whereabouts. Beyond this, it is unclear what Nationwide is alleging he did wrong.4
Third, Nationwide discovered an insurance policy issued to Lopez' family for a Plymouth Sundance. The car was purchased in Cincinnati, Ohio. Lopez called González to tell him to fill out an application for him on the car. Lopez told González he was bringing the car to Puerto Rico and wanted it insured there. The application listed the principal driver as Lopez' wife, when in fact it was his son. The car also remained in Ohio. Several employees saw and worked on the policy besides González and ultimately it was not González' decision whether to issue the policy. After González and Baralt were fired, the policy was renewed by Nationwide.
Fourth, Nationwide alleged that both González and Baralt interfered with an investigation by a Nationwide investigator and intimidated several employees. Additionally, Nationwide alleged that Baralt and González breached an unwritten confidentiality understanding. The jury disbelieved Nationwide's allegations, and the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of a jury's when, as here, the jury's finding is amply supported by facts.
Before the Court is Defendants' Renewal of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). Rule 50(b) provides that a Rule 59 motion for a new trial may be joined with or in the alternative to the Renewal. The Court has the discretion to "allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). Rule 50 only applies in cases tried to a jury with the power to return a binding verdict. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2523 n. 1 (2d ed.1994) (citing Schlitt v. Florida, 749 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir.1985)).
Whether the evidence presented at trial will permit the Court to enter judgment as a matter of law is solely a question of law for the Court and the party seeking to overturn a jury verdict faces an uphill battle. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. L.P., 151 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir.1998). See also Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731 (D.C.Cir.1998). The Court will not overturn the jury's verdict so long as there is evidence upon which the jury properly could find a verdict for that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "A trial judge may not upset the jury's verdict merely because he or she would have decided the case differently," Coastal Fuels of P.R. v. Caribbean Petroleum, 79 F.3d 182, 201 (1st Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927, 117 S.Ct. 294, 136 L.Ed.2d 214 (1996) (quoting Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 427 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993, 114 S.Ct. 553, 126 L.Ed.2d 454 (1993)), for it is not what the judge believes but rather what the jury "could have found." Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 734 (1st Cir.1999). In its review, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943); Cardona Jimenez v. Bancomercio de Puerto Rico, 174 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.1999); Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d at 731.
A Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R., 152 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1778, 143 L.Ed.2d 806 (1999). On the other hand, a Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 635 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1276, 117 S.Ct. 2457, 138 L.Ed.2d 214 (1997). A fundamental principle to be followed is that there must be a minimum of judicial interference with the jury. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524 n. 14.
The ADEA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of his age. In a wrongful discharge case, such as this, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that he would not have been fired but for his age. See Cardona Jimenez v. Bancomercio de P.R., 174 F.3d at 40 (citing Serrano-Cruz v. DFI P.R. Inc., 109 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1997)). Without direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting sequence controls. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Cardona Jimenez v. Bancomercio de P.R., 174 F.3d at 40-41; Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R., 152 F.3d at 24.
McDonnell Douglas directs the Court to follow a three step sequence for age discrimination cases. First, the plaintiff must present a prima facie age discrimination case. This modest burden requires a showing by the plaintiff that (1) he was a member of a protected age group, i.e., he is 40 years old or older; (2) he was performing his job adequately; (3) he was fired; and (4) the employer had a continuing need for the same services, and/or he was replaced by a person with the same or similar qualifications as the plaintiff. See Cardona Jimenez v. Bancomercio de P.R., 174 F.3d at 41. Once a plaintiff meets this burden, a presumption of discrimination attaches. See Id. The employer then must articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for firing the employee. Id. If the employer sets forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the presumption of discrimination vanishes and the employee must prove that the reason is a sham and that the real reason for the firing is age. See Id. The burden of persuasion remains with the employee at all times. See Id.
Defendants concede that Plaintiffs proved their prima facie case. Defendants presented its alleged non-discriminatory reasons for the dismissals of Baralt and González, in an attempt to...
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Baralt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., CIV.95-2421 (PG).
...plaintiffs and their wives and awarded them a total of more than $6 million in damages and attorney's fees. Baralt v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 86 F.Supp.2d 31, 42 (D.P.R.2000). The wives' award that is the subject of the present motions was reduced by the Court to $100,000 each from the ......