Barannikova v. Town of Greenwich

• Decision Date: 14 June 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 14857,14858,s. 14857
• Citation: 229 Conn. 664,643 A.2d 251
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2013 Nadejda BARANNIKOVA v. TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.

Page 251

643 A.2d 251

229 Conn. 664, 63 USLW 2013

Nadejda BARANNIKOVA v. TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.

Nos. 14857, 14858.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 24, 1994.

Decided June 14, 1994.

Phyllis E. Hyman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Hugh Barber, Asst. Atty. Gen., John K. Wetmore and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellants (defendants).

James D. Henderson, with whom were Shirley Bergert and David B. Blaber, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

In this appeal, the commissioner of the department of income maintenance (commissioner), ¹ Audrey Rowe, appeals from the trial court's judgment setting aside the commissioner's denial of general assistance benefits to the plaintiff, Nadejda Barannikova, on the ground that the statute ² and the implementing regulation ³ on which the denial was based violated the plaintiff's right to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. The commissioner argues that the trial court improperly determined that the state statute and the regulation constituted an invidious distinction based on alienage and improperly subjected them to strict scrutiny. The commissioner contends that because the state law parallels a federal law it did not constitute an invidious state classification and, like its federal counterpart should have been rationally reviewed. Alternatively, the commissioner asserts that the state law and the regulation do not classify on the basis of alienage. Conversely, the plaintiff claims that the statute and the regulation are purely state welfare eligibility requirements that affect only aliens and, as such, are inherently suspect. The plaintiff further contends that the state action in this case should not be treated as though it was federal action because it is neither required nor authorized by federal law. We agree with the plaintiff and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, her husband Vladimir Barannikova, and their three children emigrated from the former Soviet Union to this country in October, 1989. At that time, they were lawfully admitted as resident aliens through the sponsorship of Lida Klever, the plaintiff's sister-in-law. As a condition of the Barannikovas' admission to the United States, Klever signed an affidavit of support by which she pledged to support the family for a period of three years following their entry.

In February, 1990, the plaintiff separated from her husband and, later that summer, filed for divorce in California. In September of the same year, the plaintiff and her two minor children moved from California to Greenwich, where they took up permanent residence. The plaintiff's divorce from her husband was finalized in January, 1991. Since the finalization of the divorce, neither the plaintiff nor her children have received any support from Klever, who resides in Los Angeles, California, or from Vladimir. On March 24, 1992, the plaintiff filed an application for general assistance benefits on behalf of herself and her two minor children with the town of Greenwich (town). The application was granted subject to receipt by the town of financial information from Klever.

On April 9, 1992, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-273(d) and General Assistance Policy Transmittal, G.A. 91-6, § 5, ⁴ the town sought financial information from Klever in order to determine whether the plaintiff would be eligible for general assistance benefits. Because Klever refused to cooperate, the plaintiff's application for general assistance was denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff requested and was granted two fair hearings to protest the denial of her application. Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17-292d ⁵ and 17-292e, ⁶ the plaintiff first had a hearing receipt before the town and then before the state department of income maintenance (department). The hearing officers at each hearing upheld the town's denial of the plaintiff's application on the ground that she had failed to submit information necessary to determine eligibility. The missing information was Klever's income data, which Klever had refused to provide as a result of hostility that had developed between herself and the plaintiff. ⁷

The plaintiff appealed from the decisions of the hearing officers to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17-2b ⁸ and 4-183. ⁹ The plaintiff challenged the decisions on the grounds that General Statutes § 17-273(d) and § 17-3a-14(D)(8) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies are unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. ¹⁰ She requested that the trial court reverse the administrative decisions of the state and town hearing officers, and remand her application to the town for a determination of eligibility and provision of benefits, including retroactive benefits.

The trial court concluded that the statute and the regulation at issue determined eligibility for general assistance benefits using classifications based on alienage. The court rejected the commissioner's claim, reviewed on this appeal, that the general assistance sponsor income deeming scheme should be subjected to rational basis review because it parallels the federal sponsor income deeming scheme enacted under a federally sponsored welfare program, namely Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1991). ¹¹ Noting that federal law regarding aliens is deferentially reviewed "due to the broad constitutional power of Congress to regulate immigration; see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85-87, [96 S.Ct. 1883, 1894-1895, 48 L.Ed.2d 478] (1976)"; see also footnote 24; the trial court determined that the state statutory and regulatory provisions are subject to strict scrutiny because they discriminate on the basis of alienage. Applying strict scrutiny, the trial court concluded that the governing statute and the regulation violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and remanded the case for a determination of eligibility.

The commissioner appeals directly to this court from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b), ¹² claiming that: (1) the trial court improperly subjected General Statutes § 17-273(d) and § 17-3a-14(D)(8) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies to strict scrutiny; and (2) the statute and the regulation are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. ¹³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

General assistance is a state run program designed to aid individuals and their families who have insufficient income or assets to meet their essential needs. ¹⁴ See General Statutes §§ 17-272 through 17-292f. It is locally funded and managed by the 169 cities and towns of the state. General Statutes § 17-273(a). ¹⁵ The department oversees the administration of the program and reimburses 85 percent of the towns' program costs without any federal matching funds or assistance whatsoever. ¹⁶ Regs., Conn.State Agencies § 17-3a-11(D). The commissioner is authorized by General Statutes § 17-3a to adopt regulations establishing standards for the granting of general assistance benefits and the level of financial assistance to be provided. Currently, the level of benefits is set at $314 per month for a single employable person and $356 per month for a single unemployable person. General Statutes § 17-3a(a).

An applicant must be needy in order to qualify for general assistance benefits. For purposes of general assistance eligibility, a person is in need if his or her available income and assets are insufficient to meet his or her essential needs. See footnote 14. When determining what income and assets are available to the applicant, the income and assets of every member of the unit applying for aid are applied against budgeted needs, including the income and assets of minor children. In addition, certain other income and assets not actually in the possession of the members of the applicant unit are deemed available to the applicant. Regs., Conn.State Agencies § 17-3a-14(B)(4). General Statutes § 17-273(d) provides that when an applicant for general assistance who is admitted to the United States under color of law has an individual sponsor, the income of the sponsor is deemed to be available to the applicant for purposes of determining eligibility for a period of three years from the date the applicant enters the country. See footnote 2. Section 17-3a-14(D)(8) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies implements the statutory deeming policy. See footnote 3. The regulation provides that if the sponsor fails or refuses to provide information to the town on the sponsor's income, the application for general assistance will be denied for failure to provide information necessary to determine eligibility. Although the federal government requires such a pledge for admission to the country in certain instances, ¹⁷ the parties in this case agree that the affidavit does not constitute a legally enforceable promise of support. ¹⁸ The general assistance deeming scheme, thus, treats a portion of the sponsor's income as available to the applicant regardless of whether the income is actually received by or available to the applicant.

Against this legal background, the commissioner's principal claim is that the trial court improperly subjected General Statutes § 17-273(d) and § 17-3a-14(D)(8) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. The commissioner argues that the statute...