Baranovich v. Horwatt

• Decision Date: 13 July 1934
• Docket Number: 96-1934
• Citation: 173 A. 676,113 Pa.Super. 467
• Parties: Baranovich, Appellant, v. Horwatt
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

173 A. 676

113 Pa.Super. 467

Baranovich, Appellant, v. Horwatt

No. 96-1934

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 13, 1934

Argued April 19, 1934

Appeal by plaintiff from order of C. P., Westmoreland County February T., 1933, No. 54, in the case of Mrs. Pauline Baranovich v. Tony Horwatt, alias Tony Harvath, alias Tony Horvath with notice to Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., garnishee.

Motion to quash attachment execution. Before Dom, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

The court made absolute the rule. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was the order of the court.

Affirmed.

John T Duff, Jr., and with him H. H. Fisher, for appellant.

Andrew G. Uncapher, and with him Carroll Caruthers, for appellee.

Before Trexler, P. J., Keller, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker and James, JJ.

OPINION

Baldrige, J.

"Are moneys due to the insured under a clause contained in a group life insurance policy providing for the payment of the face amount of the policy to the insured in the event of permanent disability subject to attachment at the instance of the insured's creditors?" is, as stated by appellant, the sole question involved in this appeal.

The insured executed a judgment note, dated October 13, 1931, payable to the appellant, in the sum of $ 460.70, on which a judgment was confessed, November 20, 1931. An attachment execution was issued, attaching the funds in the hands of the Aetna Life Insurance Company, which had issued a policy of group life insurance covering the employees of the United Engineering and Foundry Company, the employer of the insured. The policy provided that if the insured became totally disabled before the age of sixty, the company would pay the employee, in lieu of all other benefits, the amount of insurance in force upon such employee's life at the time disability commenced.

It is conceded that Tony Harvath, the insured, became permanently disabled by reason of tuberculosis, and that he is entitled to benefits in the sum of $ 4,000.

The learned court below made absolute a rule to show cause why the attachment should not be dissolved. This appeal followed.

The Legislature passed a general act of assembly, approved May 17, 1921, P. L. 682, entitled: "Relating to insurance; amending, revising, and consolidating the law providing for the incorporation of insurance companies," etc. Article 4 of that act was amended by the Act of April 26, 1929, P. L. 785, § 1, which includes in its title, "defining and regulating group life insurance, and exempting policies of group life insurance and the proceeds thereof from execution." Section 418 of the amending act (40 PS § 534) reads: "Exemption from Execution. No policy of group insurance, nor the proceeds thereof, when paid to any employee or employees thereunder, shall be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such employee, or his beneficiary, or any other person, who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment, nor shall the proceeds thereof, when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the employee for the payment of his debts."

The appellant contends that as the policy includes provisions for indemnity against disability, it is dual in its nature, and, as the rights of the insured depend upon the disability feature, the fund was not exempt from attachment until the passage of the Act of May 4, 1933, P. L. 276, entitled: "Exempting the net amount payable under policies of accident and disability insurance from the claims of creditors." This argument requires a consideration of the nature of the policy, and of our statutes.

The intent of the parties to the contract of insurance, undoubtedly, was to pay benefits to the employee or his beneficiary. It was never meant to be for relief of creditors. It is a matter of general knowledge that life insurance policies are termed, "general," "ordinary," "old line," "paid-up," "tontine," "assessment," "endowment," etc., -- dependent upon the terms and conditions of the different forms of contracts. The newer forms of policies and their broader provisions are designed to meet competition between the companies and to attract purchasers. Cooley on Insurance, Vol. 1, pp. 782, 783, states: "Life insurance is not, however, necessarily insurance for the full term of one's life. Some life policies are contracts of investments as well as of insurance." The addition of these new features does not divest the policy of its chief character, or make it other than a life insurance policy. We do not recall any policy of group life insurance that we have had to consider, and there have been a number of them, that did not contain a disability provision. In passing upon policies containing total disability provisions, the courts have expressly referred to them as life insurance policies: Elwood v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 505, 158 A. 257; Perlman v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 105 Pa.Super. 413, 161 A. 752.

In construing the Act of 1921, as amended, supra, to determine whether the appellee comes within its provisions, we must consider not only the origin of the act, but ...