Barats v. Weinberger, Civ. A. No. 73-959.
Decision Date | 18 October 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 73-959. |
Parties | Thelma L. BARATS v. Caspar WEINBERGER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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Anthony J. Mazullo, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Walter S. Batty, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert E. J. Curran, U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
This is an action under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (the Secretary). The Secretary's decision held that, due to an improvement in plaintiff's medical condition in May 1970 ending a previously compensable period of total disability, plaintiff was only entitled to payment of disability benefits from March 1968 until July 1970, and not thereafter.1 This determination by the Administrative Law Judge, rendered on July 25, 1972, became the final decision of the Secretary when affirmed by the Appeals Council on April 2, 1973. The matter is before us on cross motions of the parties for summary judgment.
The plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits on January 25, 1971, alleging that she became unable to work in March 1968, at age 42, due to a back injury. In 1966, while working for R. D. Can Company in Philadelphia, plaintiff had slipped and fallen on icy ground during performance of her duties in loading a trailer. Due to the ensuing injuries, she was not able to return to her job in the can factory although she was able, in the fall of 1967, to take a part time job as a receptionist. After a short time at this job plaintiff experienced frequent back pain and poor circulation in her legs. These symptoms grew progressively worse so that by March 1968 she had almost no feeling in her legs and had to stop working. In the fall of 1968 this disability was apparently under control, and Mrs. Barats was ready to try returning to work, when she was involved in an auto accident and re-injured her back. She continued having trouble with her back and on November 6, 1969, surgery was performed during which two discs were removed and a spinal fusion was done.2 The Secretary determined that the plaintiff was totally disabled in March 1968 and remained so until May 1970. Benefits for this period are not at issue herein. However, the plaintiff contends that she did not recover sufficiently to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity by May 12, 1970, as was determined by the Secretary.
In reviewing the Secretary's decision, the court's role is narrowly circumscribed. The sole question is whether there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the finding of the Secretary that the claimant was not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits after July 1970. "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976, 91 S.Ct. 1680, 29 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971). A careful review of the record and briefs leads us to conclude that, due to the inadequacy of the record before the Administrative Law Judge, the Secretary's determination was not based on substantial evidence; therefore, the case will be remanded for further hearing.
To qualify for disability insurance benefits and for a period of disability under sections 223 and 216(i) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423 and 416(i), an individual must meet the insured status requirements of these sections, be under age 65, file an application for disability insurance benefits and for a period of disability, and be under a "disability" as defined in the Act.
The term "disability" is defined in section 223 to mean:
For purposes of establishing a period of disability under section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, as amended, the same disability provisions as contained in section 223(d)(1)(A), (2)(A), (3) and (5) of the Act, quoted supra are applied.
Following the surgical procedures performed upon plaintiff in November 1969 (see n. 2), she was seen in followup examinations by Drs. Lin and DeVincent. Since her postoperative progress (and particularly that after May 12, 1970) is central to the outcome of the case, a more complete review of the medical and vocational evidence must be made.
Dr. Lin saw the claimant for purposes of treatment from December 8, 1969, through November 23, 1970. On December 8th, he noted that she had the same amount of back pain, and that the leg pain seemed to be less on the right side. By February 2, 1970, the back pain had improved slightly, but it was noted by Dr. Lin that he doubted plaintiff's ability ever to be able to do her usual household chores on a full-time basis. Indeed, on November 23, 1970, six months after the date on which the Secretary had determined that her disability had ceased, Dr. Lin reported that plaintiff had periodic leg pain of sciatic distribution aggravated by standing, that some signs of L5 root pain remained, and that nothing more from a surgical therapeutic point of view was thought possible.
At the hearing, reports from the orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Henry DeVincent, were also presented. For instance, on May 12, 1970, the day on which the Secretary determined that plaintiff had ceased to be disabled, Dr. DeVincent reported that the plaintiff was "coming along quite nicely". She had some complaints over the region of the fusion area and digital palpation revealed some tenderness, but that appeared to be subcutaneous. Her range of motion was good above the fusion site. Straight leg raising was basically negative and neurologically she was within normal limits to knee and ankle jerks. At a later examination on November 24, 1970, Dr. DeVincent found that orthopedically the plaintiff complained of discomfort in the midline, but that for functional activities of every day living she was doing well. She was not wearing any garment. Furthermore, he found that she exhibited good motion above and below the fusion site and was able to stand on her heels and toes. Straight leg raising was negative and the areas of the fusion were solid.
Dr. DeVincent again examined the plaintiff on May 4, 1971. At that time, however, he reported that plaintiff had only 45 degrees of flexion at the lumbosacral spine and 0 degree of extension in the standing position. The fusion site had no point tender areas, and seemed to be stable; plaintiff was able to stand on her toes and heels, and the heel jarring test was negative as was straight leg raising. On the other hand, she showed some depression of the Achilles reflex and some diminution in the S1-L5 dermatome by pinprick on the left side. Dr. DeVincent's diagnosis was degenerative spondylosis with spondylolisthesis grade I; status post laminectomies and fusion L4 through the sacrum. The May 4, 1971 report concluded with Dr. DeVincent's agreement as to "the disability being at least a year with a reevaluation at that time for a rehabilitation program." That rather cryptic statement (i. e., "one year" from when?) was not further explained. Further in the same report, Dr. DeVincent revealed that the claimant had been requested by her neurosurgeon not to return to work as this would aggravate her nerve condition. On examination that same day, she stated that she could not work because of pain in the left hip and leg.
Reports from Dr. Anthony G. Borden, a Board certified radiologist, were introduced at the hearing. Dr. Borden had examined Mrs. Barats in February, May and November 1970, and in May 1971. On February 6, 1970, he reported that the lumbosacral spine and pelvis revealed status following successful postero-lateral...
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