Barbara J., In re

• Decision Date: 08 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 13735,13735
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re BARBARA J. et al. *

Page 203

574 A.2d 203

215 Conn. 31

In re BARBARA J. et al. ^*

No. 13735.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 28, 1990.

Decided May 8, 1990.

Sara R. Martin, New Haven, for appellant (respondent).

Mary-Anne Mulholland, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Judith Merrill Earl, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (petitioner).

Gail S. Kotowski, Guilford, for the minor children.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17-43a(a), ¹ the commissioner of the department of children and youth services (DCYS), on April 6, 1988, filed three petitions to terminate the parental rights of Maureen J. to her children, Barbara J., Walter J. and Margaret J. In a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found that the allegations in the petitions had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the best interest of each child that the parental rights of the mother be terminated. We find no error.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found that the petition pertaining to each child alleged that the reasons for the termination of the mother's parental rights had existed for not less than one year, and that the mother's parental rights should be terminated for three of the four grounds specified in § 17-43a(b), ² namely (1) that each child had been abandoned by the mother; (2) that each child in a prior proceeding had been found to have been neglected or uncared for, and that the parent had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of each child, she could assume a responsible position in each child's life; and (3) that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship.

The birth dates of the children named in the petitions are as follows: Barbara, October 14, 1980; Walter, January 1, 1983; and Margaret, November 21, 1984. The children were committed to DCYS on November 2, 1985, as uncared for and neglected, and the commitment was extended for an eighteen month period on October 22, 1987. The termination of parental rights petitions were filed on April 6, 1988. On April 28, 1988, counsel for the respondent mother appeared and denied the allegations in each petition. Hearings on the merits of the petitions were held on July 20, 27 and 28, 1988. ³ At the hearings, the petitioner presented the testimony of three DCYS treatment workers, Patricia Williamson, Annette Rizzolo and Theresa Polverari, to whom the cases of the children had been successively assigned prior to the filing of the termination petitions. The petitioner also presented the expert testimony of Ellis A. Perlswig, a child psychiatrist. Exhibits included a report containing a psychological evaluation of the family by Perlswig, and four letters written to DCYS by Barbara's foster mother.

Williamson was the treatment worker from the date of commitment until April, 1986. During that time, the respondent, who had a history of mental illness, began counseling, and a weekly schedule of visitation was established with Barbara at the DCYS office, and with Walter and Margaret at their foster home. In her visits with Barbara, the trial court found that on some occasions the respondent would promise to make a home for her, and on other occasions she would make critical comments about her appearance. These events caused such a disturbance in Barbara that her foster mother could not control her. The respondent did not visit Barbara in December, 1985, and when she resumed visitation with her in January, 1986, Barbara again evidenced control problems. As a result, DCYS requested and obtained a suspension of the respondent's visits with Barbara for three months beginning on February 14, 1986. Barbara began counseling at this time.

Rizzolo was the treatment worker from April, 1986, until August, 1987. She testified that, when she took over, visits with the children were arranged at the office of DCYS. The respondent's visits with Barbara were reinstated in June, 1986, once per month, and semi-monthly with Walter and Margaret. The trial court found that, at these visits, the respondent paid little or no attention to the children. Instead, she spent most of the time talking to the treatment worker. In response to the suggestion of Barbara's therapist, the respondent's visitations with Barbara were suspended again in January, 1987, because of Barbara's disruptive behavior after the visits, which led to her admission to Highland Heights for day treatment. In April, 1987, Barbara's behavior deteriorated to the point where she was admitted to Highland Heights for in-patient treatment.

In August, 1987, the case was assigned to Polverari. She testified that the respondent's visits with Barbara continued once per month, and semi-monthly for Walter and Margaret. Polverari provided the respondent with transportation for visitations, although the respondent would not disclose her residence to Polverari. The trial court found that visitations continued reasonably well until November, 1987, when the respondent disappeared and refused to disclose her whereabouts to DCYS. She reappeared in February, 1988, and, thereafter, until the filing of the petitions, had several visits with the children.

The trial court found that, from the date of the commitment to the time of trial, the respondent had lived in a variety of housing accommodations in New Haven. In July, 1985, she lived on Davenport Avenue. In November, 1985, she lived at a family shelter on Sylvan Avenue. Thereafter, she moved to Read Street. When she was evicted from there, she moved to Downing Street in the late spring of 1986. She lived at the YWCA shelter in the winter of 1986-87, and, in the summer of 1987, she moved to Hallock Avenue. The trial court found that, when the petitions were filed, the respondent's whereabouts were unknown, and service on her was by publication.

The trial court found further that, during the period between the commitment and the filing of the petitions, the respondent had attended several counseling sessions. She terminated counseling, however, and refused to continue after November, 1986. The trial court also found that, in the year prior to the filing of the petitions, the respondent had been employed at a pet store, and that she had maintained contact with the Hallock Avenue address. She did not, however, inform DCYS as to how she could be contacted, and visitations occurred only when she contacted DCYS.

The petitioner also presented the testimony of Perlswig. The trial court admitted into evidence a report prepared by Perlswig, which contained a psychological evaluation of the respondent and the children. This report, dated February 2, 1988, referred to interviews with the respondent and the children that had been conducted by Perlswig from April 27, 1987, through June 24, 1987. The report also included an evaluation of Margaret by Linda C. Mayes, a pediatrician, that was conducted in June, 1987, and an evaluation of Walter by Fred Volkmar, a physician, that was conducted in May, 1987. Perlswig stated in his report that he had also reviewed eight other reports on the family dating back to 1982.

The trial court noted that Perlswig concluded that the respondent "suffers from a severe mental disorder that seriously interferes with her capacity to care for, nurture, and protect the children. She has a diagnosis of schizophrenia which is expressed in fragmentation of her thinking, with delusional and paranoid ideation. Her illness prevents her from providing safe and appropriate care for her children.... [the respondent] is in need of psychiatric treatment and medication which she has refused." He described schizophrenia as a disruption of the thinking process, and opined that, at the time of commitment, it had been important for the respondent to be in treatment and take medication, but that now it was probably too late. He also noted that, in his interviews with the respondent and the children, the children did not recognize the respondent as their mother. The trial court found further that Perlswig was of the opinion that the chaotic environment in which the children had spent their early lives had retarded the development of their intellectual and motor skills to the extent of possibly permanent damage. In the opinion of Perlswig, the respondent was unable to parent children, and has never been able to provide the continuity and consistency of care that is required by young children.

After the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearings, the trial court, on January 24, 1989, filed a memorandum of decision wherein it found that the petitioner had, pursuant to § 17-43a(b), "established each ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence." On May 2, 1989, the trial court filed a second memorandum of decision wherein, after making the six specific findings required by § 17-43a(d), ⁴ it found that it was "in the best interest of each of the children that the parental rights of the [respondent] be terminated." The trial court then rendered judgment terminating the parental rights of the respondent in and to Barbara J., Margaret J. and Walter J.

On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court erred: (1) in admitting letters from Barbara's foster mother as business records; (2) in admitting the report of Perlswig as a full exhibit without examining the portions that were based on hearsay evidence; (3) in finding abandonment without sufficient evidentiary support; (4) in not using the findings prescribed by § 17-43a(d) to establish a failure to rehabilitate; and (5) in finding no ongoing parent-child relationship without sufficient evidentiary support.

I

The respondent's first claim is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence letters from Barbara's foster mother to the DCYS treatment worker. We disagree. Specifically, at the hearings, the...