Barbee v. Sysco Conn., LLC.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36564.,36564.
• Citation: 114 A.3d 944,156 Conn. App. 813
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Pamela BARBEE v. SYSCO CONNECTICUT, LLC.

156 Conn.App. 813

114 A.3d 944

Pamela BARBEE

v.SYSCO CONNECTICUT, LLC.

No. 36564.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 5, 2015.

Decided April 28, 2015.

Mark S. Loman, Bloomfield, for the appellant(plaintiff).

Albert Zakarian, with whom, on the brief, was Ashley L. Harrison, Hartford, for the appellee(defendant).

SHELDON, PRESCOTT and PELLEGRINO, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

This appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiff, Pamela Barbee, in which she asserts that her former employer, the defendant, Sysco Connecticut, LLC, wrongfully suspended her and then terminated her employment in violation of General Statutes § 31–290a¹ because she had filed for workers' compensation benefits.The sole issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that causally connected her suspension and termination to the filing of her workers' compensation claim.We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists that should have precluded the granting of summary judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts and procedural history.The defendant is a wholesale food distributor.The plaintiff was employed in various positions in the defendant's company beginning in August, 1995, until her termination from employment on October 3, 2011.For the last eight or nine years of her employment, she worked as a warehouse credit supervisor.In that position, she was responsible for processing products that were returned to the warehouse by the defendant's delivery drivers because the products were damaged or otherwise were rejected by the customer.The plaintiff was responsible for determining whether such returned products could be restocked and whether the customer should receive a credit to its account.If the returned product could be resold, the plaintiff would label the product for return to regular inventory.If products were no longer saleable, the plaintiff would discard them in the trash, put them on a food share board, give them to another employee, or keep them for herself.

On August 31, 2011, the plaintiff experienced pain and stiffness in her knees and legs while performing her work duties.She reported the incident to the defendant on September 12, 2011.That same day, she also filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and was sent by the defendant to a health care provider for a medical evaluation and treatment.The plaintiff was released to return to work starting on September 28, 2011.On that day, the plaintiff was suspended for removing a returned, nonsaleable product from the warehouse.The plaintiff's employment was terminated on October 3, 2011.

The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because of her unauthorized removal of damaged products from the defendant's warehouse, although, prior to that date, she had never been disciplined or reprimanded in any manner for removing damaged returned products.The plaintiff believed that she had been suspended and subsequently terminated as a result of her having filed her claim for workers' compensation benefits on September 12, 2011.Removing damaged products from the warehouse was a common practice amongst the defendant's employees, including the plaintiff's supervisor, although shortly after the plaintiff's termination, the plaintiff's supervisor held a meeting with employees to warn them that that practice would not be permitted.

The plaintiff commenced the present action in December, 2011.The complaint contained two counts.The first alleged that the plaintiff was wrongfully suspended from work in retaliation for filing for workers' compensation benefits, and the second alleged that she was wrongfully terminated from employment in retaliation for filing for workers' compensation benefits.On September 30, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum of law in support of the motion.In the motion, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had no evidence to substantiate the allegations of her workers' compensation retaliation claims, and, therefore, that the court should grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment on both counts of the complaint.The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and the defendant filed a reply memorandum.

Following a February 10, 2014 hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court issued an order that same day, granting the motion and rendering judgment on the complaint in favor of the defendant.The entirety of the court's order is as follows: “The plaintiff may well have a claim for wrongful termination.By taking used products from her employer, she violated a policy, but it is an issue of fact as to whether she was authorized [to do so] and/or whether it was a common practice.The complaint alleges in paragraph 24, that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.If taking used goods home was not a valid reason for termination, then is there a reasonable inference that she was terminated for some other reason?The plaintiff has failed to provide any factual basis for the termination being because of her filing the workers' comp[ensation] claim.Even though it may seem a reasonable inference, the plaintiff lacks any evidence to connect her termination with the filing of the workers' comp[ensation] claim.”This appeal followed.

We first set forth the relevant standards that govern our review of a court's decision to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment.“Practice Book § [17–49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law....In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party....The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact....[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure....[T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment....[Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist....Our review of the decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary....We therefore must decide whether the court's conclusions were legally and logically correct and find support in the record.”(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Himmelstein v. Windsor,116 Conn.App. 28, 42–43, 974 A.2d 820(2009), aff'd, 304 Conn. 298, 39 A.3d 1065(2012).

“It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that, pursuant to Practice Book§§ 17–45 and 17–46, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact....[T]ypically [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred....

“An important exception exists, however, to the general rule that a party opposing summary...