Barber v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 02 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–2562.,12–2562.
• Citation: 725 F.3d 702
• Parties: Terrence BARBER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

725 F.3d 702

Terrence BARBER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–2562.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 11, 2013.

Decided Aug. 2, 2013.

Edward M. Fox, Attorney, Ed Fox & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Martha M. Pacold, Attorney, Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar & Scott LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge.

This suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stems from the December 14, 2005, arrest of then–14–year–old Terrence Barber by Chicago police officers Michael Malaniuk and Michael Shields. Barber claims that the officers arrested him without probable cause and that Officer Malaniuk used excessive force in gratuitously shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny these allegations and say that Barber's head injury occurred because he was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. A jury sided with the defendants, and the district court denied Barber's motion for a new trial. Barber appeals, claiming that several of the district court's evidentiary rulings and other actions prejudiced his case. Though some of Barber's claims are baseless, his contentions that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction both have merit. We therefore reverse the district court's order denying Barber's motion for a new trial, vacate the judgment, and remand for a new trial.

I

The parties offer drastically different accounts of the events surrounding Barber's arrest. The general rule is that on appeal from a jury verdict this court will view the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. See Common v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.2011). This standard of review is sensible in many instances, such as when the issue is whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. But it does not make as much sense when the issue on appeal is whether the district court committed reversible error in admitting or excluding evidence, because whether there was reversible error turns on an analysis of the evidentiary ruling in the context of the entire trial record, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761–65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Indeed, we routinely set out the conflicting evidence in appeals challenging a district court's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bell, 694 F.3d 817, 819–20 (7th Cir.2012); Guzman v. City of Chicago, 689 F.3d 740, 742–44 (7th Cir.2012). We do the same here, beginning with Barber's version of events.

According to Barber, after he got home from school (he was in the eighth grade) on the day of the incident he played video games with his brother in the family's apartment at the Marshall Field Gardens housing project. At some point that evening, Barber's mother called and asked him to go downstairs and wait for her outside the building so that he could help her with the groceries. While Barber waited outside for his mother, his friend Michael Jones walked up, followed by Barber's girlfriend and one of her friends. The youths stood off to the left of the building and chatted for a while. They were not blocking any entrances, were not bothering anyone, and were not drinking.

At some point Malaniuk and Shields arrived in their marked police car. Officer Malaniuk got out of the car, spoke with a security guard, and then went into the building. Meanwhile, Officer Shields approached Barber and his friends and asked Barber for his name and the reason he was standing outside; Barber gave his name and said that he was waiting for his mother. Shields “started to use profanity, like F you and your mother and get the F out of here”; Barber responded, “F you, too,” and did not move. Shields grabbed Barber's shirt and began searching his sweatshirt, pants, and back pockets. Shields threw Barber's possessions into the snow, shoved him, and told him to “get the F out of here.” Shields and Malaniuk then got back into their car and began driving away, but the officers abruptly executed a U-turn and returned. The officers got out of the car and told Barber and Jones “to get the F on the wall”; Barber and Jones complied. Both were handcuffed and placed into the police car. Barber testified that he was not drunk, that he was not unsteady on his feet, that he was not swaying in the backseat of the car, and that neither he nor the car smelled of alcohol.

Barber and Jones were transported to the station house. Once there, Malaniuk yanked Barber out of the car by the hood of his sweatshirt, causing him to stumble over a brick and land on his back. Barber did not get up, so Malaniuk dragged him by his hood for about 12 to 14 feet to a holding cell. At the holding cell's entrance, Malaniuk stood Barber up and forcefully pushed his upper back while he was still handcuffed (behind the back), which launched him across the cell face first into a hard surface—Barber blanked out momentarily and woke up bleeding. A female officer came by, saw Barber bleeding, and decided to help him—she gave him napkins, called a janitor to clean up the blood, took Barber to the restroom, uncuffed him, let him go into the restroom to clean himself, and returned him to the holding cell.

A while later, Malaniuk and Shields returned and saw that Barber was injured; two hours after Barber sustained the injury, the officers took him to the hospital. Barber testified that he did not tell the nurse or the physician at the hospital that he had lost consciousness because Malaniuk and Shields pulled them out of the room before he had a chance to do so, and he could not remember if the nurse even asked him whether he had lost consciousness. He also testified that he was not drunk at the hospital, was not fighting, and was not struggling, though he could not recall whether he had refused to give his mother's phone number to hospital staff. Barber received twelve stitches to seal wounds on his face and was given medication. He was then returned to the station house, booked, and placed in the youth room until his mother arrived, at which point he was permitted to leave with her.

Malaniuk and Shields have a considerably different version of events. According to them, on the evening of December 14, 2005, they responded to a 911 call from security guards at the Marshall Field Gardens housing project. When they arrived, there was a group of teenagers congregated on the sidewalk near the building. The security guards informed the officers that two members of the group—namely, Barber and Jones—were blocking the building's entrance and attempting to start fights with people entering and leaving the building. The guards signed preprinted criminal complaints alleging disorderly conduct, and on the basis of those complaints the officers placed Barber and Jones under arrest. Barber was a bit uncooperative but was successfully handcuffed without much resistance. According to Malaniuk, Barber did not fall but was “a little uneasy on his feet.”

The officers transported Barber and Jones to the station house. During the short trip, a strong odor of alcohol filled the squad car and Barber was swaying side to side as he sat in the back seat—the officers testified that Barber told them that he had been drinking Martell, a brand of cognac, all day. Officer Shields dropped off Officer Malaniuk in the sally port of the station house, along with Barber and Jones, and then went to park the car.

Malaniuk escorted Barber and Jones into the holding area of the station house. Barber was still unsteady on his feet and at one point fell to the ground as he walked down a hallway. Malaniuk asked Barber to get up, but Barber did not comply so Malaniuk picked him up and got him back on his feet. Barber resumed walking down the hallway under his own power, though “[h]e was walking kind of side to side.” Barber then walked into a holding cell and because of his intoxicated state tripped over his own feet and fell again. This time he struck his head on a metal bolt that secured a partition within the holding cell to the floor, causing his head to bleed. Malaniuk again helped Barber to his feet then took him to the restroom and helped him clean up. Barber never requested medical attention, but the officers agreed that they would take him to the hospital for treatment after they finished processing Jones into lockup—Barber's head had stopped bleeding and the officers figured it was a minor injury that did not require immediate medical attention. About two hours after the injury, the officers took Barber to the hospital where his wounds were stitched up. The officers testified that medical staff had relayed to them that Barber was being difficult while at the hospital.

Barber subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Malaniuk and Shields, asserting claims of false arrest and excessive force. Though Barber's poor briefing makes it difficult to ascertain, his false-arrest theory appears to have been that the security guards never actually signed a complaint and that the officers forged the complaint after the arrest. His excessive-force theory was based on Malaniuk's gratuitous shove, and it was stressed during trial that at the time of the incident Barber had been approximately 5'1? tall and had weighed approximately 120 pounds, whereas Malaniuk had been approximately 6'5? tall and had weighed approximately 240 pounds. In addition to his federal claims, Barber asserted supplemental state-law claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the City of Chicago. Prior to trial, Barber voluntarily dismissed all but the assault claim against the City, and after the close of plaintiff's evidence the...