Barber v. Int'l Co. of Mexico

• Decision Date: 18 April 1902
• Citation: 74 Conn. 652,51 A. 857
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BARBER v. INTERNATIONAL CO. OF MEXICO.

51 A. 857

74 Conn. 652

BARBER

v. INTERNATIONAL CO. OF MEXICO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 18, 1902.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford county; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.

Action by Clarence L. Barber on a claim against the International Company of Mexico. There was a judgment for plaintiff, appointing him receiver of defendant; and from a subsequent order confirming his claim, and authorizing suit thereon, defendant appeals. Order modified.

This is the action reported in 73 Conn. 587, 48 Atl. 758. The original judgment of June 22, 1900, is sufficiently stated on page 604, 73 Conn., page 765, 48 Atl. Within four months from its date the plaintiff presented to himself, as receiver, his individual claim as assignee of the California judgment, and afterwards filed a detailed statement of it in court, and moved for its confirmation as a valid claim. The defendant thereupon filed a paper styled an "answer," setting forth (1) that the claim "did not accrue within six years next before" such presentation; and (2) denying "the facts set up in the claim." The plaintiff also moved for an order "that the receiver, in bringing suit against the Mexican Land & Colonization Company, Limited, as heretofore authorized by the judgment and order of this court, may commence such suit either in his own name as receiver, or in the name of the International Company of Mexico, as he may deem best, and to employ counsel to represent the American company, the above defendant, before the high court of justice, England." After hearing the parties on these motions and on a demurrer to the defense of the statute of limitations, which was overruled, the order appealed from was made. The material parts of it are as follows: "It is ordered that the said Clarence L. Barber, receiver, is hereby authorized and empowered to bring and maintain all actions and suits in any of the courts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in his name as receiver, or in the name of the International Company of Mexico, or otherwise, necessary to secure and collect a certain judgment rendered against said International Company of Mexico in the circuit court of the United States in and for the Southern district of California, in the Ninth judicial circuit, November 29, 1892, in favor of one Frank E. Bates, which was afterwards assigned and transferred to the said Barber. This authority shall extend to any suit or suits now pending or that may hereafter be commenced in said courts of Great Britain. In all such suits said Clarence L. Barber, receiver, may employ solicitors and counsel to represent himself as such receiver, and also to represent and act for the said International Company of Mexico when it is either plaintiff or defendant in any suits brought to collect said judgment, or to enforce any of the rights of the International Company of Mexico against the Mexican Colonization Company, Limited." And "it is adjudged that said plaintiff at the date of the commencement of this action, to wit, September 26, 1805, had a good, valid, and subsisting claim against said International Company of Mexico on account of said judgment for the sum of $121,282, and interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from November 20, 1892. And it is further ordered that the amount due on said judgment is subject to a deduction as a payment thereon on account of said duebill of the sum of $841.25, and interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent. per annum from January 18, 1892. And it is further adjudged that there is due said the International Company of Mexico from said plaintiff on account of said costs taxed against him in said high court of justice, and the order and judgment entered thereon, the sum of $1,520, and interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from December 20, 1899, which is hereby set off against the amount due on said judgment owned by him, and directed to be deducted therefrom. And it is further adjudged that no payments have been made on said judgment owned by the plaintiff, except said balance of duebill of $841.25, with interest from January 18, 1892, at eight per cent., and the amount of said bill of costs being $1,520, with interest at six per cent. from December 20, 1899; and the plaintiff is entitled to receive the amount of said judgment, with interest computed at six per cent. per annum from the date thereof, subject to the deductions aforesaid."

Edward D. Robbins, George A. Kellogg, and Andrew J. Broughel, Jr., for appellant.

Charles E. Perkins and Lewis E. Stanton, for appellee.

BALDWIN, J. (after stating the facts). All claims presented against a company which is in the hands of a receiver must be submitted to the court in which the receivership proceedings are pending for its approval, before any payment upon them from its assets can be ordered. The stage of the cause at which all or any of them shall be submitted is to be determined by the court. In view of the fact that the receiver of the defendant company held so large a claim against it, it was fully within the discretion of the superior court to hear his motion for an order of approval or confirmation before any assets had been collected which could be applicable to its payment.

It is contended that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations (Gen. St. § 1371), which provides that no action on any simple or implied contract shall be brought, but within six years next after the right of action shall accrue. We have no occasion to inquire whether the obligation arising from a foreign judgment, or one of a sister state of the United States, could be regarded as resting on a simple or implied contract See Hubbell v. Coundrey, 5 Johns. 132; Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162, 10 Am. Dec. 213; Little v. McVey (N. J. Sup.) 47 Atl. 61. The courts of the United States and those of the states are courts of the same country. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 137, 23 L. Ed. 833. A judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of California stands, in respect to its proof, and also to its essential nature, in any court of Connecticut, on the same footing as if it had been rendered by another court of this state. Adams v. Way, 33 Conn. 419, 429; Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418, 424, 24 L. Ed. 437; Morgan v. Association. 73 Conn. 151, 154, 46 Atl. 877. A domestic judgment is a contract of record. It is the highest form of obligation. In one sense, it may be termed a contract by specialty. 1 Pars. Cont *7; Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 248, 26 L. Ed. 729. In another, it may be regarded as raising an implied contract. Denison v. Williams, 4 Conn. 402, 403. But it is neither a contract under seal, nor an implied contract within the meaning of our statutes of limitation (Gen. St §§ 1370, 1371). Such statutes rest on two grounds,—the improbability that one having a valid demand against another will delay long to enforce it by suit; and the injurious consequences of such a delay, flowing from natural lapses of memory and loss of evidence. But there is seldom any reason why one who has put a claim into a domestic judgment should proceed otherwise than by execution, and never any danger that should no suit be brought upon it evidence as to the merits of the original demand may be lost, to the prejudice of the judgment debtor. The rule of the common law, therefore, by which a prima facie presumption of payment arises after 20 years, presents the only limitation of time to the collection of a domestic judgment which is recognized in this state. Boardman v. De Forest, 5 Conn. 1, 8. The California judgment was rendered in 1892, and irrespective of the effect if any, of the bringing of the present action in 1895, no presumption of payment had arisen when the defendant filed its answer in 1901.

It is assigned for error that the order appealed from is a...