Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n

Decision Date01 December 2006
Docket Number1050625.,1050857.
Citation960 So.2d 599
PartiesDavid BARBER, in his capacity as District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama v. JEFFERSON COUNTY RACING ASSOCIATION, INC., d/b/a the Birmingham Race Course; and Innovative Sweepstakes Systems, Inc. David Barber, in his capacity as District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama v. Jefferson County Racing Association, Inc., d/b/a the Birmingham Race Course; and Innovative Sweepstakes Systems, Inc.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Matthew H. Lembke, Michael R. Pennington, and Marc James Ayers of Bradley Arant Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellant.

Wyatt R. Haskell, William M. Slaughter, J. Michael Rediker, Michael K.K. Choy, Michael C. Skotnicki, and Peter J. Tepley of Haskell Slaughter Young & Rediker, LLC, Birmingham; J. Mark White, Augusta S. Dowd, and William M. Bowen, Jr., of White Arnold Andrews & Dowd, P.C., Birmingham; John M. Bolton III of Sasser, Bolton, Stidham & Sefton, P.C., Montgomery; and G. David Johnston of Johnston, Hinesley, Flowers & Clenney, P.C., Dothan, for appellee Jefferson County Racing Association, Inc., d/b/a the Birmingham Race Course.

H. Hampton Boles, Alan T. Rogers, Ed R. Haden, Bingham D. Edwards, Jr., Matthew F. Carroll, and J. Eric Getty of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, for appellee Innovative Sweepstakes Systems, Inc.

Kenneth D. Wallis II and Scott L. Rouse, Office of the Governor, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Governor Bob Riley, in support of the appellant.

Roy S. Moore, Gregory M. Jones, and Benjamin D. Dupré, Foundation for Moral Law, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Foundation for Moral Law, in support of the appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., Kevin C. Newsom, deputy atty. gen., and Keith S. Miller, chief deputy atty. gen., for amicus curiae Attorney General Troy King, in support of the appellant.

Thomas W. Sorrells and Mike O'Dell, Dothan, for amicus curiae Alabama District Attorneys Association, in support of the appellant.

WOODALL, Justice.

David Barber, in his capacity as District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, appeals from a judgment in favor of the Jefferson County Racing Association, Inc., d/b/a the Birmingham Race Course ("the JCRA"), and Innovative Sweepstakes Systems, Inc. ("Innovative") (referred to collectively as "the owners"), in the owners' action for injunctive and declaratory relief as to allegations that they are operating illegal gambling devices at the Birmingham Race Course ("the race course"). We reverse that judgment and render a judgment for Barber.

I. Procedural Background

On December 15, 2005, the owners began operating at the race course an activity they advertised as a "Quincy's MegaSweeps" ("the MegaSweeps"). The activity was interrupted on December 22, 2005, when Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale began executing a warrant authorizing the seizure of all records and computer equipment related to the operation of the MegaSweeps. That same day, the JCRA filed a complaint against Sheriff Hale seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the seizure. The JCRA alleged that it was "conducting a sweepstakes promotion at the race course to promote the race course and its lawful activities as well as the opening of an internet café and digital communications center." (Emphasis added.) The JCRA sought a judgment (1) declaring that its MegaSweeps operation was lawful and (2) enjoining Sheriff Hale from interfering with its MegaSweeps operation. It also sought a judgment declaring that the "Alabama gambling statutes ... upon which the ... search and seizure [were] based" are "unconstitutionally vague." It more specifically challenged the constitutionality of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-12-20(4), which defines gambling. By consent of the parties, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining further seizure of equipment and ordering the return of all property that had been removed from the race course. The court, however, also enjoined operation of the MegaSweeps pending resolution of the underlying dispute.

On December 29, 2005, Innovative, as the owner of the computer equipment and system at issue in this case, moved to intervene. That motion was granted on January 4, 2006. On January 17, 2006, Barber moved to intervene and filed a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Barber sought a judgment declaring (1) "that the components of the [MegaSweeps] operation ... are in fact illegal gambling devices that are subject to forfeiture" and (2) "that the operation ... is an illegal lottery under Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama Code § 13A-12-20, et seq." He also sought an order permanently enjoining the operation of "such gambling devices and/or a lottery in Jefferson County." That same day, the trial court granted Barber's motion to intervene. The Alabama Attorney General appeared in the case and filed a memorandum in opposition to the owners' constitutional challenge.

Subsequently, on January 31, 2006, following a bench trial, the trial court — without specifically referring to Barber's counterclaims — entered a judgment declaring that the MegaSweeps operation was not a lottery and that it did not involve the use of slot machines or gambling devices. The court permanently enjoined Sheriff Hale "from further actions against [the MegaSweeps] operations at the [race course], provided [the owners] operate the [MegaSweeps] as represented."

Sheriff Hale did not appeal. However, on February 14, 2006, Barber filed a notice of what purported to be an interlocutory appeal in case no. 1050625, challenging the injunctive aspect of the trial court's judgment. Specifically, the issue, as Barber framed it on his docketing statement, was "[w]hether the trial court properly enjoined law enforcement from seizing equipment used in such operation or otherwise taking action against the MegaSweep[s] operation at the Birmingham Race Track." Concurrently, he filed a motion in the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, or to grant a new trial. In that motion, Barber contended, among other things, that the January 31 judgment was not final because it did not refer specifically to his counterclaims. That same day, the owners moved this Court to dismiss Barber's interlocutory appeal. They contended that the January 31, 2006, judgment was, in fact, a final judgment, effectively disposing of Barber's counterclaims and precluding an interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, they argued, Barber's pending postjudgment motion rendered an appeal of a final judgment premature.

On March 21, 2006, the trial court denied Barber's post-judgment motion. The following day, the owners apprised this Court of that order and asserted that Barber's interlocutory appeal merged with the final judgment, from which he had a right to appeal. On that ground, they urged us to dismiss the appeal in case no. 1050625. Also, on March 22, 2006, Barber appealed from the postjudgment order, in case no. 1050857. The appeals were consolidated for briefing. Various amici curiae filed briefs in support of Barber, namely, (1) Governor Bob Riley, (2) Attorney General Troy King, (3) the Alabama District Attorneys Association, and (4) the Foundation for Moral Law ("the Foundation").

The parties now agree that all the issues presented in this dispute are subsumed in case no. 1050857. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal in case no. 1050625 as moot.

II. Case No. 1050857

Two dispositive issues are presented: (1) whether the MegaSweeps operation at the race track involves the use of slot machines and, if so, (2) whether the definition of gambling in § 13A-12-20, Ala.Code 1975, is unconstitutionally vague.

A. Standard of Review

Our review of a declaratory judgment is ordinarily governed by the ore tenus standard. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 894 So.2d 643 (Ala. 2004); Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Small, 829 So.2d 743 (Ala.2002). However, the standard "is not applicable where the evidence is undisputed, or where the material facts are established by the undisputed evidence." Salter v. Hamiter, 887 So.2d 230, 234 (Ala.2004). Neither does the ore tenus rule apply to the trial court's legal conclusions or misapplications of the law to undisputed facts. Eubanks v. Hale, 752 So.2d 1113, 1144-45 (Ala.1999).

The material facts in this case are undisputed or uncontroverted and the questions presented are legal ones, as the trial court expressly acknowledged. Therefore, our review is de novo. Brown, 894 So.2d at 647.

B. Slot Machine

Barber contends that the MegaSweeps operation involves the use of slot machines, in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-12-27. Section 13A-12-27 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits the crime of possession of a gambling device if with knowledge of the character thereof he manufactures, sells, transports, places or possesses, or conducts or negotiates any transaction affecting or designed to affect ownership, custody or use of:

"(1) A slot machine; or

"(2) Any other gambling device, with the intention that it be used in the advancement of unlawful gambling activity."

A "slot machine" is defined as follows:

"A gambling device that, as a result of the insertion of a coin or other object, operates, either completely automatically or with the aid of some physical act by the player, in such a manner that, depending upon elements of chance, it may eject something of value. A device so constructed or readily adaptable or convertible to such use is no less a slot machine because it is not in working order or because some mechanical act of manipulation or repair is required to accomplish its adaptation, conversion or workability. Nor is it any less a slot machine because apart from its use or adaptability as such it may also sell or deliver something of value on a basis other than chance."

Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-12-20(10) (emphasis added).1

"A person engages in gambling if he stakes or risks something...

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