Barber v. Magnum Land Servs., LLC
| Decision Date | 14 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV86,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV89,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV64,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV74,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV85,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV40,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV34,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV66,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV45,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV33,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV113,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV55,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV46,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV39,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV57,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV59,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV115,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV44,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV87,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV61,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV56,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV92,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV35,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV88,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV47,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV42,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV73,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV65,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV36,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV98,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV94,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV99,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV93,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV49,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV41,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV63,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV70,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV95,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV90,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV43,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV51,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV91,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV80,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV67,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV68,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV72,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV114,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV77,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV78,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV69,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV97,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV54,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV50,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV58,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV84,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV48,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV62,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV96,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV79,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV100,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV38,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV75,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV76,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV52,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV37,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV81,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV53,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV71,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV83,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV60,CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV82 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | FLOYD BARBER, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. MAGNUM LAND SERVICES, LLC, ET AL., Defendants. and RICHARD BELL, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. MAGNUM LAND SERVICES, LLC, ET AL., Defendants. |
(Judge Keeley)
Pending before the Court are three motions for summary judgment, one filed by each of the three defendants, Magnum Land Services, LLC ("Magnum"), Belmont Resources, LLC ("Belmont"), and Enerplus Resources (USA) Corporation ("Enerplus"). For the reasonsdiscussed in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motions.
This case involves the mineral rights underlying approximately 8000 acres of land located in Preston County, West Virginia. Because the mineral rights had not been severed from the surface rights, the 129 individuals who owned or co-owned the parcels comprising the total acreage likewise owned or co-owned the underlying mineral rights. Between 2007 and 2008, those individuals leased their mineral rights to Magnum, resulting in seventy-six individual leases. The transactions between the lessors and Magnum, as well as the resulting leases now held by Enerplus, are the subjects of this dispute. On summary judgment, the Court must determine if genuine issues of material fact exist regarding (i) whether Magnum fraudulently induced the lessors to execute the leases, and (ii) whether the lessors are entitled to rescission of the leases based on unconscionability.
The Marcellus Shale, which runs through the Appalachian Basin, is one of the largest sources of natural gas in the United States. Although the energy industry has long been aware of pockets of gas within the formation, extraction was impracticable and non-economical until the early 2000s. During that period, companies developed cost-effective means of collecting and producing thenatural gas -- to include hydraulic fracturing -- and quickly realized the potential for enormous profits.1
As with all rapidly emerging industries, however, information about the growth potential remained tightly controlled by the companies that intended to capitalize on their insight. Of course, the extent of their profits depended largely on the perceived value of the rights to the natural gas. The owners of those rights were, oftentimes, rural landowners in Appalachia with limited knowledge of the oil and gas industry. It is within this context that the events giving rise to these cases occurred.
In 2007, Edward Walker ("Walker"), a Michigan businessman with experience in the oil and gas industry, formed Belmont for the purpose of oil and gas exploration, specifically, the acquisition of oil and gas leaseholds. (Dkt. No. 115-2 at 6-7).2 Based on his experience, he was keenly aware of the Marcellus natural gas play in Appalachia. He was also familiar with other players in the industry, including Magnum, which performed "basic land work," such as "title, takeoff mapping, leasing, leasing activities, [and] right-of-ways." Id. at 25.
Around the same time he formed his new company, Walker contacted Magnum with the goal of "[p]ut[ting] together acreage" in Preston County; he asked Magnum to perform the title work and buy the leases. Id. at 27. Belmont would front the money for the leases, and Magnum would execute them in its name and eventually assign them to Belmont. Id. Belmont authorized Magnum to pay owners twenty-five-dollar bonus payments per mineral net acre3 with a one-eighth royalty on all gas extracted from their acreage. Id. at 38. Terence Goodell ("Goodell"), the founder of Magnum, would receive a five percent stake in Belmont, a one percent overriding royalty in the lease profits, fifty dollars per landman for every day of work, and five dollars per acre with good title. Id. at 31-36.
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Magnum acquired leases covering the rights to 7562.63 mineral net acres in Preston County.4 Id. at 57. Per their agreement, Magnum assigned the leases to Belmont in 2010. That same year, Belmont sold its interest in the leases to Enerplus, realizing a gross profit of about $1666 per acre. Id. at 20.
Shortly after the landowners signed leases with Magnum, word spread that residents of surrounding counties were signing leaseswith substantially higher bonus payments. (Dkt. No. 115-3 at 115). For example, David Colebank leased sixty-one mineral net acres to Magnum in August 2007 for twenty-five dollars per acre. (Dkt. No. 109-1 at 6). He later testified that, in the fall of that year, he discovered that family members in neighboring Tucker County had leased their mineral rights for upwards of two-thousand dollars per acre. (Dkt. No. 109-1 at 84-85).
After discussions with one another about their negotiations with Magnum's landmen, the Preston County lessors discovered a common theme. In their sales pitches, the landmen had advised the lessors that oil and gas companies could still collect gas under non-leased acreage by drilling wells on neighboring properties.
In 2008, several of the lessors met with counsel to discuss their leases and the representations made by the Magnum landmen. As a result of that meeting, their attorney sent a letter to counsel for Magnum, explaining the following:
(Dkt. No. 109-1 at 8). Days later, the attorney sent Magnum another letter, stating: "Most of my clients . . . were paidembarrassing low amounts for their valuable oil and gas rights after being threatened with the loss of their natural gas if they did not sign the leases." Id. at 9.
In November 2012, the lessors sued the defendants in the Circuit Court of Preston County, West Virginia, alleging nine counts. The circuit court grouped related plaintiffs and divided the case into seventy-one separate cases. The defendants then removed the cases to this Court, invoking its mass action jurisdiction. The Court subsequently dismissed six of the plaintiffs' claims, including their claim for unconscionability.5 Remaining are the plaintiffs' claims for (i) fraud in the inducement, (ii) civil conspiracy between Magnum and Belmont, and (iii) a declaration that the leases be rescinded due to unconscionability.
On July 3, 2014, each of the three defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. They argue that the evidence does not support a prima facie claim for fraudulent inducement, and that the claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They contend that, without an underlyingtort claim, the civil conspiracy claim also should fail. Finally, the defendants urge the Court to reject the plaintiffs' declaratory claim for rescission of the leases because such a claim is time-barred by laches, and because the leases are not unconscionable as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v....
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