Barber v. Town of La Veta
| Decision Date | 08 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No 14-cv-03273-RBJ |
| Parties | WILLIAM CAREY BARBER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF LA VETA, a Statutory Town; and LOREN YOUNGERS, BRIAN HOLLAND, and CHERYLE JOHNSTON, individually and as agents, employees, and/or representatives of the Town of La Veta, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. For the reasons discussed in this Order, defendants' motion is granted.
On December 3, 2013, defendant Deputy Town Marshal Brian Holland arrested plaintiff William Barber for public intoxication in the Town of La Veta, Colorado. ECF No. 8 at ¶ 11; ECF No. 9 at 1. Barber contends that he was arrested without probable cause. ECF No. 8 at ¶ 11. Furthermore, Barber claims that Holland subsequently detained him, interrogated him without an advisement of his rights, and tried to solicit a confession from him without a valid waiver of his rights. ECF No. 8 at ¶ 13. Defendants insist that following his arrest, Barberadmitted that several days prior he had driven his vehicle into a fire hydrant and a house while intoxicated. ECF No. 9 at 1.
Barber alleges that Holland or Defendant Town Marshal Loren Youngers attempted to file a Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") citation in Municipal Court against Barber. ECF No. 8 at ¶ 16. Municipal Court clerk Laurie Erwin informed the officer that the Municipal Court could not hear a DUI charge. Id. Holland returned to the Municipal Court later that day and told Erwin that Youngers had ordered him to file a Driving While Ability Impaired ("DWAI") charge against Barber. Id. Again, Erwin informed Holland that the Municipal Court could not hear a DWAI charge. Id. Thereafter, Erwin presented the DWAI citation to Defendant Municipal Judge Cheryle Johnston and advised Johnston that the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the state charge. Id. at ¶ 17. After consulting legal materials, Johnston incorrectly surmised that the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to hear the DWAI charge. Id. at ¶ 18.
Barber was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in Municipal Court for DWAI, a violation of Colorado Revised Statute section 42-4-1301(1)(b). Id. at ¶ 19. He was also convicted of other state violations including Failure to Notify Police of Accident, Careless Driving, and Duty Upon Striking a Vehicle or Property. Id. Barber claims that the Municipal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the state charges, and that Johnston, Holland, or Youngers should have referred the charges to the Walsenburg, Colorado County Court. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. Furthermore, two members of the Town of La Veta Board of Trustees, Logan Taggart and Shane Clouse, attended the trial and made no effort to stop the trial or admonish Johnston for presiding over state charges. Id. at ¶ 21. Barber's sentence consisted of a $1,500 fine; $3,963.52 of restitution for damage to the fire hydrant; $300 of restitution for the damage to the house;$1,550 in court costs; 14 points against Barber's driving privilege; an order revoking his driver's license; and sixty days in the Huerfano County jail. Id. at ¶ 23. Barber's conviction and sentence were vacated by the Municipal Court a few weeks later. ECF No. 9 at 1.
Barber also claims that aspects of his arrest and trial violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). ECF No. 8 at ¶ 22. Barber is severely hearing impaired. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 15, 22. He alleges that defendants never accommodated for his hearing loss. Id. Defendants did not provide Barber with a sign language interpreter or any other form of nonverbal communication to ensure that Barber understood what was being said. Id. at ¶ 22. Barber wears hearing aids, but he still needs to read lips to fully understand verbal communication. Id. During the trial he could not understand Johnston or Holland when they were not facing him, which happened frequently. Id.
On December 2, 2014, Barber filed his Complaint against the Town of La Veta, Youngers, Holland, and Johnston. ECF No. 1. He filed an Amended Complaint on December 19, 2014 alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Town of La Veta for a failure to adequately train its employees, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Johnston for presiding over his trial where her court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and a violation of tort law by Youngers, Holland, and Johnston. ECF No. 8. Subsequently, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Barber's claims should be dismissed on the following grounds: 1) Barber's claims against Youngers, Holland, and Johnston in their official capacities are redundant; 2) Barber's first claim for relief against the Town of La Veta for a failure to train its employees fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 3) Johnston is entitled to absolute judicialimmunity and qualified immunity; and 4) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to retain Barber's third claim for relief for violations of tort law. ECF No. 9.
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While the Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Robbins v. Wilkie, 300 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002), purely conclusory allegations are not entitled to be presumed true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). However, so long as the plaintiff offers sufficient factual allegations such that the right to relief is raised above the speculative level, he has met the threshold pleading standard. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008).
Both parties agree that because Barber names the Town of La Veta as a defendant, his claims against Johnston, Youngers, and Holland in their official capacities are redundant and should be dismissed. ECF No. 9 at 5 (citing Davoll v. Webb, 943 F.Supp. 1289, 1295 (D. Colo. 1996)); ECF No. 11 at 9. The Court therefore dismisses Barber's claims against Johnston, Youngers, and Holland in their official capacities.
To begin, as defendants note, it is a misnomer to assert a "violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. It is the basis on which an individual can seek "relief against those who, acting under color of law, violate federal rights created elsewhere." Reynolds v. School Dist. No.1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's First (failure to train) and Second (improper assertion of jurisdiction) Claims for Relief do not clearly identify the federal rights on which they are based. In his Amended Complaint plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADA. ECF No. 8 at ¶1, 24. However, in his response to the motion to dismiss plaintiff clarifies that he is asserting a violation of his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as a violation of Title II of the ADA. ECF No. 11 at 7. While inartful, the Court gives him the benefit of the doubt and finds that he has asserted a "§ 1983 claim" for violation of his right to due process and a violation of Title II of the ADA.1 Fdf
Barber alleges that the Town of La Veta's failure to train its law enforcement and judiciary about the jurisdictional limitations of its Municipal Court and communicating with the hearing impaired rises to the level of deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens. ECF No. 11 at 7, 11. Defendants argue that Barber's § 1983 failure to train claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 9 at 5-10.
A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for its employees' actions on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). "Rather, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom, and 2) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged." Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff may show the existence of a municipal policy or custom in the form of 1) an officially promulgated policy, 2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice, 3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority, 4) the ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of their subordinates, or 5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010).
A municipality's decision not to train its employees regarding their legal duty to avoid violating its citizens' rights may constitute a municipal policy or custom for purposes of § 1983 in limited circumstances. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (). A municipality's failure to train its employees must amount to a deliberate indifference to the rights of the citizens with whom the employees come into contact. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). "A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train." Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted). A pattern of similar violations demonstrates that the municipality's policymakers were on notice that a deficiency in their training...
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