Barbknecht v. Golden Employment Group, No. 07-4852.

Decision Date26 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-4852.
PartiesAlvin Barbknecht, Karen Barbknecht, Plaintiffs, v. Golden Employment Group, Defendant.
CourtMinnesota District Court

Gary Manka, Esq., appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.

Gregory Johnson, Esq., appeared for and on behalf of Defendant.

ORDER

GARY LARSON Judge.

The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Gary Larson, Judge of Hennepin County District Court, on September 4, 2007, on Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Based upon all files, records, and proceedings herein, together with the arguments of counsel,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Golden Employment Group's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2. That the attached memorandum shall be made a part hereof.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY
MEMORANDUM
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 3, 2001, at Americ Disc USA ("Americ"), Alvin Barbknecht ("Barbknecht") was standing on a forklift removing pallets from shelves in the company's warehouse, when another forklift, driven by Sergio Romero ("Romero"), clipped the forklift that Barbknecht was standing on. This caused Barbknecht to fall to the ground. The fall was serious enough that he does not remember anything from that day.

Romero was a temporary worker that Americ obtained through Golden Employment Group ("Golden"). Golden is in the business of supplying temporary employees to clients, who then pay Golden based on the hours worked by the temporary workers. Golden then pays the temporary workers for the hours that they work for the clients. Thus, while working at Novartis and Americ, Romero was paid by Golden.

As part of providing temporary workers, the clients request workers of certain capabilities and descriptions. Although Golden does not train their employees, they provide employees of certain specified qualifications. Romero, through a similar arrangement with Golden, had previously worked for Novartis Nutrition ("Novartis"). Romero was at Novartis from November 7, 2000 to March 30, 2001. While at Novartis, Romero apparently underwent powered industrial lift truck training, and apparently received a forklift certification. On April 15, 2001, Golden assigned Romero to work at Americ. On May 3, 2001, the day of the accident, Romero and Barbknecht were both working as order pickers at the Americ distribution center.

Barbknecht filed a Summons and Complaint with this Court on March 15, 2007. In it, Barbknecht alleges that Golden was "negligent, careless and reckless in supplying Sergio Romero for the temporary employment at Americ Disc USA [because] he was improperly trained or experienced to perform the duties specified and required by Americ Disc USA... ." On August 1, 2007, Golden moved for Summary Judgment. In their Motion they seek judgment on these four grounds: 1) Golden has no legal duty to ensure that Romero was competent to operate the Americ forklift; 2) Golden did not breach any legal duty; 3) the Barbknechts cannot establish that Romero was negligent; and 4) the Barbknechts claims are barred by the Common Enterprise Doctrine.

II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that:

Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.03.

In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must demonstrate at the time of the motion that specific material facts are disputed, creating a genuine issue for the finder of fact to resolve at trial. Hunt v. IBM Mid America Emp. Fed. Cr. Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Minn. 1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is exclusively a question of law involved. French v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 372 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Evidence presented at a motion for summary judgment must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Concord Co-Op v. Security State Bank of Claremont, 432 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient; rather there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). "While summary judgment is intended to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition, it is not designed as a substitute for a trial where there are issues to be determined." Vieths v. Thorp Fin. Co., 305 Minn. 522, 525, 232 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. 1975). A material fact is one that will affect the result or outcome of the case, depending upon its resolution. Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (Minn. 1976). Thus, "summary judgment is proper when the non-moving party fails to provide the court with specific facts indicating that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Emp. Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Minn. 1986) citing Erickson v. General United Life Ins. Co., 256 N.W.2d 255, 258-59 (Minn. 1977).

Whether a genuine issue of material fact is presented is determined by asking if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Material facts are understood in light of the substantive law: "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

B. Americ has a non-delegable duty to ensure that each powered industrial truck operator has successfully completed training and evaluation and is competent to operate a powered industrial truck safely.

In defense of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant has alleged that they are not liable because they have no legal duty to furnish Americ with a competent employee. Defendants justify this on two grounds: first, Americ has a non-delegable duty to ensure that all powered industrial truck operators are competent; and second, Plaintiffs reliance on Ismil v. L.H. Sowles Co., as holding that an employer may be held liable for providing an incompetent employee, is misplaced. 203 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. 1972). Plaintiffs, however, contend that Ismil is on point and provides instruction for this Court's order.

Minnesota law has recognized that certain duties, by virtue of their stemming from a special relationship or because of public policy considerations, are non-delegable. Nichols v. Metropolitan Bank, 435 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Brasch v. Wesolowsky, 138 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1965) (stating that contractors owed their contractees a nondelegable duty of due care in the performance of their obligations.) The Minnesota Supreme Court, in discussing an employer's non-delegable responsibilities, stated:

If, however, the office of the rule is to provide a method for the discharge of some nondelegable obligation, the duty of the employer to see that the rule is observed is absolute and nondelegable, for `the liability resting upon him for the proper performance of the ... duty is not shifted by the adoption of rules or regulations providing for the performance of the act or duty by the agent of the master.'

Arveson v. Boston Coal, Dock & Wharf Co., 150 N.W. 810, 811-12 (Minn. 1915) (quoting Hankins v. New York, L.E. & W.R. Co., 37 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1894); see also Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 1992) (stating that a principal,...

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