Barclay v. Castruccio
Decision Date | 30 June 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 30, Sept. Term, 2019,30, Sept. Term, 2019 |
Citation | 230 A.3d 80,469 Md. 368 |
Parties | Darlene BARCLAY v. Sadie M. CASTRUCCIO |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by David E. Sessions (Frederick R. Franke, Jr., Jack K. Beckett, Deborah F. Howe and Samuel C. Draper, Franke, Sessions & Beckett, LLC, Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Petitioner
Argued by Kenneth B. Frank (Kenneth B. Frank, P.A., Baltimore, MD) and Cynthia E. Young (Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Respondent
Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Sally D. Adkins, (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) Alan M. Wilner, (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
We are asked—again—to recognize the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift. Petitioner Darlene Barclay, the residuary beneficiary of the Estate of Dr. Peter A. Castruccio (the "Estate"), alleges that Respondent Sadie M. Castruccio,1 Peter's2 widow, maliciously depleted her inheritance by forcing the Estate's expenditure of attorneys' fees to defend against Sadie's groundless lawsuits and efforts to initiate criminal charges. Litigation surrounding the Estate has made its way to the Court of Special Appeals eleven times, and this is its second time in front of us.
The background facts—as stated in Darlene's complaint—illustrate the highly contentious nature of this litigation. The Castruccios had several business ventures together, and were wealthy. Darlene began working for Peter in 1984, before transitioning to working with the Castruccios' real estate business in the early 1990s, where she worked until Peter's death in 2013. According to the complaint, Peter, who had no children of his own, regarded Darlene as his daughter.
Sadie did not share the same affection for Darlene. For the final sixteen months of Peter's life, Sadie prevented Darlene from entering the family home, and allegedly refused to let Peter visit Darlene at the office. When Peter passed away, Sadie made clear that Darlene was not welcome at the funeral.
According to Darlene, Peter disliked his wife's extended family, and "did not want his share of [their] joint estate to pass to Sadie's extended family."3 He also did not want his share to pass to his extended family (except for a niece), and so he unsuccessfully attempted to convince Sadie to participate in a joint estate plan. Sadie, however, refused to participate in the planning, so Peter went forward with a plan to dispose of his portion of the estate. To further this goal, the Castruccios divided their joint assets, including eight pieces of real property, through seven deeds. After these conveyances, each spouse ended up with various solely-owned property, roughly equal in value.
Peter signed his last will and testament on September 29, 2010 (the "Will"), bequeathing $800,000 to Darlene, and $100,000 each to two other individuals. The remainder of the Estate was left to Sadie, provided that she: (a) survived Peter; (b) wrote and executed a will prior to Peter's death; and (c) filed that will with the Register of Wills in Anne Arundel County. If she failed to fulfill those terms, then the Will named Darlene as the residuary beneficiary.
Peter died on February 19, 2013, at which point Sadie had not fulfilled the Will's final requirement. Darlene, therefore, inherited the residuary Estate, worth approximately $6.7 million.4
Darlene claims that Sadie began interfering soon after Peter's death, "fil[ing] seven lawsuits in order to overturn [Peter's] estate plan," and "try[ing] to bring criminal charges against Darlene" by filing a 21-page memorandum with the Office of the State's Attorney for Anne Arundel County. Sadie brought: (1) a caveat action ("Caveat "), where she claimed that the Will was the product of fraud or undue influence; (2) an action to quiet title ("Deeds "), challenging the seven deeds and alleging that her signature on the deeds was forged; (3) a will construction action, despite knowing that she was not the residuary beneficiary of the Estate; (4–5) two "unsuccessful attempts" to have Peter's attorney, John Greiber, removed as the Estate's personal representative; (6) a negligence action ("Notary ") against Darlene for her notarization of the seven deeds; and (7) a challenge of the attorneys' fees and litigation costs incurred by the Estate.
In February 2017, Darlene filed the present complaint, alleging intentional interference with an expectancy, malicious use of process, and abuse of process in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Sadie's motion to dismiss. Darlene's appeal only challenged the dismissal of the intentional interference with an expectancy claim, which the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that "the complaint cannot support a claim for interference with expected inheritance, even if we were to recognize one." Barclay v. Castruccio , No. 2488, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 1308136, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. March 21, 2019). We are presented with the following questions:
For the reasons set forth below, we recognize the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift, but hold that the allegations in Darlene's complaint are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
We review a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, without deference, to determine whether it was legally correct. Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP , 451 Md. 600, 609, 155 A.3d 445 (2017).
Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 397 Md. 108, 121, 916 A.2d 257 (2007) (cleaned up). The granting of a motion to dismiss is proper only if "the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action." Id. at 121, 916 A.2d 257.
Darlene argues that we should recognize the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance or gift, and adopt its elements as stated in Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm.5 She asserts that the facts as stated in her complaint are sufficient to maintain the cause of action.
Maryland's history with the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance is not tabula rasa . We first considered whether to recognize it in Anderson v. Meadowcroft , 339 Md. 218, 224, 661 A.2d 726 (1995), in which we noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts classified the tort as an extension of a cause of action well-settled in the lawbooks of Maryland—the tort of intentional interference with economic contractual relations.
In Anderson , the decedent, Peter Paul Meadowcroft, left most of his estate to his cousin Francis as the residuary beneficiary; he also named Francis as the estate's personal representative. Anderson , 339 Md. at 220, 661 A.2d 726. The plaintiff, Meadowcroft's daughter Maxine, alleged that under her father's previous will she would have received one-third of the estate. She argued that after she moved out-of-state, her father's health began to deteriorate and "he fell under the influence of Francis X. Meadowcroft," who used "his influence and position as an attorney ... to unduly influence, coerce, and persuade" her father to change his will. Id. at 221, 661 A.2d 726. Meadowcroft's updated will left most of his assets to Francis, and none to his daughter. Id.
The complaint contained two counts, conversion and fraud. The circuit court granted Francis's motion to dismiss both counts. Id. at 221, 661 A.2d 726. Before this Court, Anderson sought to reframe the issue to be whether the complaint states a cause of action for tortious interference with an inheritance. We analyzed the tort as defined in Section 774B of the Second Restatement of Torts: "One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift." Id. at 222, 661 A.2d 726. Recognizing that we "have adopted the tort of wrongful or malicious interference with economic relations," we cautioned that we had not "expand[ed] the tort to apply to interference with gifts or bequests, nor, therefore, have we considered the compatibility of such an expansion with caveat proceedings." Id. at 224, 661 A.2d 726. Ultimately we declined to "decide whether or how far to extend our law to embrace this cause of action because ... the complaint did not adequately allege undue influence, which form[ed] the basis for [the intentional interference claim]." Id. at 227, 661 A.2d 726 (cleaned up).
After Anderson , the Court of Special Appeals took up the issue in Geduldig v. Posner , 129 Md. App. 490, 505–09, 743 A.2d 247 (1999), in which the claimants sought to set aside a will and revocable trust, impose a constructive trust, and be awarded damages. They alleged fraud and undue influence exercised upon the decedent. The intermediate appellate court considered Anderson , and decided that this Court would recognize the tort under certain circumstances. Id. at 509, 743 A.2d 247. It concluded that those circumstances were not present in Geduldig . Id.
A brief review of our jurisprudence on the related, umbrella tort—interference with contractual or economic relations—is helpful. That cause of...
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