Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review

• Decision Date: 06 January 1947
• Docket Number: 3488
• Citation: Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1947)
• Parties: Barclay White Co. (General Bldg. Contractors Assn., Intervener) v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Department of Labor and Industry (Seifing, Intervener)
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

50 A.2d 336

356 Pa. 43

Barclay White Co. (General Bldg. Contractors Assn., Intervener) v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Department of Labor and Industry (Seifing, Intervener)

No. 3488

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 6, 1947

Argued November 27, 1946

Appeal, No. 209, Jan. T., 1946, by employer, Barclay White Company, from judgment of Superior Court, Appeal No. 56, Oct T., 1945, affirming decision of the Board of Review reversing decision of referee who has sustained the Bureau in denying the claim of John Seifing, Appeal No. B-44-99-F-463; decision No. B-3865. Judgment reversed; reargument refused March 24 1947.

Same case in Superior Court: 159 Pa.Super. 94.

Judgment reversed, and the order of the referee affirming the bureau's decision disqualifying claimant from receiving credit for claims filed by him for compensable weeks ending February 27, March 5 and 12, 1944, is reinstated.

Albert Smith Faught , for employer, appellant.

Edward Paul Smith , for General Building Contractors Association, intervening appellant.

R. Carlyle Fee, Assistant Special Deputy Attorney General, with him Charles R. Davis , Special Deputy Attorney General, and James H. Duff , Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.

Frank B. Murdoch , with him James A. Sutton and Murdoch, Paxson, Kalish & Dilworth , for John Seifing, intervening claimant-appellee.

Before MAXEY, C.J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DREW

This is an appeal by Barclay White Company from the judgment of the Superior Court awarding compensation to claimant, John Seifing, under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law of December 5, 1936, P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended.

The question for decision is whether or not a member of a labor union is entitled to unemployment benefits when he has refused a referral to suitable work in an open shop, for the reason that to accept such employment would result in his suspension or expulsion from his union. In other words, we are called upon to determine whether claimant had good cause for his failure to accept suitable work when offered to him within the meaning of section 402(a) of the Unemployment Compensation Law of December 5, 1936, P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, May 21, 1943, P.L. 337, ^[1] and section 4(r), as amended May 27, 1943, P.L. 717. ^[2]

The following findings of fact are supported by the evidence and, there being no fraud, are binding on us (Unemployment Compensation Law, supra, section 510): Claimant, who had been a member of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America -- an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor -- for over thirty years, was in appellant's employ in Philadelphia, as a carpenter at the union scale of $1,58 an hour, for five weeks ending January 21, 1944. He was then laid off because of lack of work. He registered for employment, and, subject to two weeks' waiting period, filed claims for unemployment benefits for the weeks ending February 20, 27, March 5 and 12, 1944. He received a compensation check for the first of those weeks; but the Bureau of Employment and Unemployment Compensation denied his claims for the remaining three weeks, for the reason that he, on February 21, 1944, has refused to accept carpenter work, paying $1.01 1/2 to $1.20 an hour, at Sun Ship Company, a non-union plant located at Chester, Pennsylvania, to which he had been referred by the United States Employment Service. That company was then engaged in performing ship building contracts made with agencies of the United States government, in the war emergency, and was short of sufficient labor to perform the work. Claimant rested his refusal of employment with Sun Ship Company on the ground that to accept would cause his union to suspend or expel him (as its by-laws provided), and that would result in loss to him of all membership advantages, including sick, old age and death benefits. On appeal, the referee sustained the action of the bureau in refusing compensation; the board reversed and the Superior Court (with BALDRIGE, P.J., and HIRT, J., dissenting) sustained the board and declared claimant entitled to compensation for the weeks in question.

Upon petition of Barclay White Company, claimant's last employer, this Court allowed the present appeal and also permitted General Building Contractors Association, a non-profit corporation of Philadephia composed of union labor employers engaged in various branches of construction work, to intervene as a party appellant.

It is obvious that the employment offered to claimant was "suitable work", as those words are used in section 402 (a), and defined in section 4 (r) of the statute. Claimant was qualified, by prior experience as a carpenter, to perform the proffered work with Sum Ship Company, without any risk to his health or safety. The evidence showed that the distance between his home and the company's shipyard in Chester is less than that travelled in his former employment with appellant. The position offered him was not vacant because of any strike, lockout or other labor dispute. Claimant did not contend that he refused the referred because the pay, hours or other working conditions were less favorable to him than those prevailing for similar work in the locality. He was not required by Sum Company to join a company union or resign from, or refrain from joining a labor organization. The language "condition of being employed, the employe would be required... to resign from... any... labor organization", as used in section 4 (r)(3), obviously refers to a condition, in the offer of employment made by the employer, requiring the prospective employe to resign from a labor organization: Chambers v. Owens-A.-K. Co . 146 Ohio State 559, 67 N.E.2d 439; Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (Del.) 46 A.2d 137. Where, however, the offer of the employer is unconditional, it was not intended that the employe be eligible for compensation where he refuses the proffered position merely because of a condition imposed on him by others. If it had been the intent of the Legislature to cover a situation where the employe would be expelled by his union, it would have used language connoting both expulsion and resignation.

The decisive question in ascertaining whether or not claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits for the three weeks in question is -- Did he have "good cause", within the legislative intent, for refusing the "suitable work" to which he had been referred. The Unemployment Compensation Law contains no definition of "good cause", and, therefore, the duty devolves upon the courts to determine the intent of the Legislature in the use of those words.

A careful study of section 402 (a) has convinced us that "good cause" and "suitable work" are intended to be separate and distinct concepts, and that in determining eligibility for unemployment compensation each must be considered separate and apart from the other. It is well settled, that in construing a statute, effect shall be given, if possible, to all its provisions: See Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, section 51. It is impossible to give a general definition of "good cause". The meaning of those words must be determined in each case from the facts of that case. We are convinced that "good cause" was intended to cover reasons which are personal to the employe and extraneous to the employment if they are, as said by the learned Superior Court in Sturdevant Unemployment Comp. Case , 158 Pa.Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898, "real not imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable not whimsical, circumstances [which] compel the decision to leave employment" or to refuse suitable work. But in addition, "good cause" must be so interpreted that the fundamental purpose of the legislation shall not be destroyed.

The dominant intent of the statute can best be ascertained from Article I, section 3 thereof, which states: "Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker, and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of poor relief assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employes during periods when they become unemployed through no fault of their own .The principle of the accumulation of financial reserves, the sharing of risks, and the payment of compensation with respect to unemployment meets the need of protection against the hazards of unemployment and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own ." (Italics added).

Although the statute has been amended many times, the Legislature has not seen fit to alter this section in any way. As to this declaration of public policy, it was aptly said, by KELLER P.J., in Dept. L. & I., etc., v. Unemplmnt. Comp. Bd ., 148 Pa.Super. 246, 24 A.2d 667, that (p. 247): "It is not a mere preamble to the statute, but a constituent part of it and is to be considered in construing or interpreting it", and that (p. 248): "Subsequent provisions as to eligibility (section 401), or ineligibility (section 402), for compensation must all be read...