Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, SC07-261.

Citation975 So.2d 1116
Decision Date07 February 2008
Docket NumberNo. SC07-261.,SC07-261.
PartiesPaul J. BARCO, Petitioner, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PINELLAS COUNTY, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Samuel R. Mandelbaum of Mandelbaum, Fitzsimmons, Hewitt, and Metzger, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

Matthew C. Lucas and Brian A. Bolves of Bricklemyer, Smolker, and Bolves, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

Paul Barco seeks review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Barco v. School Board of Pinellas County, 946 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), in which the court certified conflict with the decisions of the other district courts of appeal in Martin Daytona Corp. v. Strickland Construction Services, 941 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), Byrne-Henry v. Hertz Corp., 927 So.2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 945 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 2006), Swift v. Wilcox, 924 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), review denied, 949 So.2d 199 (Fla.2007), and Norris v. Treadwell, 907 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review dismissed, 934 So.2d 1207 (Fla.2006). The conflict issue involves the proper interpretation of the time deadlines governing the service of motions for costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 as it existed in 2004.1 All of the district courts of appeal, except the Second District, have construed the rule as setting an outside deadline in which the motion for costs or fees is untimely only if served more than thirty days after the filing of the judgment. The Second District, however, has held that the rule creates a narrow window for serving the motion that begins only after the filing of the judgment and closes thirty days later. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the rule sets only an outside deadline and accordingly quash the decision of the Second District.

BACKGROUND

Barco owned real property that was the subject of an eminent domain proceeding instituted by the School Board of Pinellas County ("School Board") pursuant to chapters 73 and 74, Florida Statutes. The property was needed for expansion of an elementary school. The issue of compensation for the property taken was resolved through mediation, with the agreement that the court would retain jurisdiction to resolve attorneys' fees and costs, although no final judgment was entered at that time. Disputes arose between the parties that resulted in Barco serving a "Motion to Enforce Settlement, with Request for Interest, Attorneys Fees & Costs." As its name indicates, in addition to seeking an order enforcing the settlement, the motion also set forth the attorney's fees and costs to which Barco asserted he was entitled.

At the hearing on Barco's motion to enforce settlement, the trial court ruled that the School Board should pay the agreed sums, including statutory attorneys' fees, and that the court would reserve jurisdiction on any contested costs and on the question of interest, which the School Board also contested. The trial court then entered a final judgment which required the School Board to pay both the compensation that had been agreed to in the Mediated Settlement Agreement and statutory attorneys' fees.2 The judgment reserved jurisdiction to determine any and all issues regarding reasonable costs, interest and any additional attorneys' fees.

More than three months after the filing of the judgment, Barco filed and served a Motion to Tax Costs in the amount of $12,411.21 relating to costs of real estate appraisers, court reporters, plats, maps, express delivery, and document services. These were the same costs sought in the earlier motion, with the addition of a court reporting bill related to the motion to enforce the mediated settlement agreement. A hearing was held on the Motion to Tax Costs at which the School Board objected to the award of any costs on the ground that the motion to tax costs was served more than thirty days after the judgment. Barco countered with the explanation that his first motion for costs had been included in the Motion to Enforce Settlement, which was served November 9, 2004 — twenty-three days prior to entry of the final judgment on December 2, 2004. The School Board then contended that the early motion was not timely under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525. The trial court agreed with the School Board and followed Second District precedent holding that rule 1.525 creates a bright-line requirement that, to be timely, the motion for fees and costs must be served within the thirty-day window after a judgment, not preceding it. Barco appealed to the Second District, resulting in the decision now before the Court, in which the district court adhered to its precedent in Swann v. Dinan, 884 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and certified conflict with the four other district courts in Martin Daytona, Byrne-Henry, Swift, and Norris.

We first discuss the impetus for the adoption of the rule at issue setting a time requirement for service of motions for attorneys' fees or costs. We then discuss how the conflict cases have interpreted and applied the rule at issue. Finally, we analyze the language and intent of the rule, applying it to the instant case and concluding that the rule does not create a limited thirty-day window following the judgment in which the motion for attorneys' fees or costs must be served in order to be timely.

ANALYSIS

The version of rule 1.525 at issue in this case states:

Rule 1.525. Motions for Costs and Attorneys' fees

Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.

The 2004 version of the rule is identical in its text to the 2001 rule. Prior to the adoption of rule 1.525 in 2001, "Florida case law permitted motions for attorney's fees to be filed within a reasonable time of the plaintiff's abandonment of the claim or within a reasonable time after final judgment is entered." E & A Produce Corp. v. Superior Garlic Int'l, Inc., 864 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citing Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1991)). We are unable to locate any case that has held under the law in effect before the 2001 rule that a motion filed before judgment would be untimely or unreasonable. Furthermore, under Stockman, a unanimous Court held that, despite the requirement that motions for attorneys' fees be filed within a reasonable time after the entry of judgment, a party seeking attorneys' fees also had to plead entitlement to fees in the complaint or answer. Id. at 838. As this indicates, the overriding intent of the filing and pleading requirements appeared to be provision of timely, adequate notice to the opposing party. It was for this same reason that the "reasonable time" standard came under criticism — because in some cases it did not provide prompt enough notification of the specifics of the claim for fees. In adopting rule 1.525, this Court did not overrule Stockman's pleading requirement or the underlying objective of early, detailed notification of claims for fees and costs.

Rule 1.525 was adopted to establish an explicit time requirement for service of fee and cost motions in order to resolve the uncertainties caused by the "reasonable time" standard. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598, 600 (Fla.2006). The Court is now asked to decide whether the time requirement of rule 1.525 established only a narrow window of thirty days following the judgment in which to serve the motion for fees and costs or whether, instead, it prescribed only the latest point at which the motion may be served.

THE CONFLICT CASES

The Second District held in Barco that a motion served before entry of the judgment was not timely under rule 1.525, based on the premise that the rule sets forth only a thirty-day window following the judgment in which the motion may be served. In so doing, the Second District certified conflict with decisions of the First District in Norris, the Fourth District in Swift, the Third District in Byrne-Henry, and the Fifth District in Martin Daytona. Each of these decisions involves the service of a motion for fees and costs before the filing of the judgment in the case. Importantly, each court found the early motion to be timely according to its interpretation of the intent of the rule.

In Norris, the First District held that a motion for fees and costs served after the jury verdict but before the personal injury judgment was timely under the 2004 version of rule 1.525, reasoning:

In our view, the primary evil to be addressed by the supreme court's adoption of Rule 1.525 was the uncertainty created by excessive tardiness in the filing of motions for fees and costs [under the pre-2001 "reasonable time" requirement]. Decisions in which the courts found a motion untimely under the "reasonable time" standard generally note prejudice or unfair surprise.

In contrast, we have found no cases where an appellate court applied the "reasonable time" standard to a motion served before entry of judgment, and found prejudice or unfair surprise to a party, so as to conclude the motion was untimely. In fact, it is hard to imagine a situation where a motion for fees and costs, filed after an adverse jury verdict, but before filing the judgment, could ever be prejudicial or cause unfair surprise to the losing party.

. . . .

We conclude the purpose of Rule 1.525 is fully accomplished by an interpretation that establishes the latest point at which a prevailing party may serve a motion for fees and costs. The party seeking fees may serve a motion as soon as entitlement is established. The motion, however, must be served no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment.

Norris, 907 So.2d at 1218-19 (citations omitted). The First District went on to certify conflict with the Second District's decision in Swann and this Court initially...

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