Bardos v. Spoklie

• Decision Date: 24 January 2023
• Docket Number: DA 22-0128
• Citation: 2023 MT 16 N
• Parties: PAUL PHILLIP BARDOS AND MARY L. BARDOS REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROBERT L. SPOKLIE, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

2023 MT 16N

PAUL PHILLIP BARDOS AND MARY L. BARDOS REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROBERT L. SPOKLIE, Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 22-0128

Supreme Court of Montana

January 24, 2023

Submitted on Briefs: November 30, 2022

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-21-1490 Honorable Dan Wilson, Presiding Judge

For Appellant:

Kimberly S. More, Crowley Fleck, PLLP, Kalispell, Montana

For Appellee:

Marcel A. Quinn, Thomas A. Hollo, Hammer, Quinn & Shaw PLLC Kalispell, Montana

OPINION

Ingrid Gustafson Justice

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) appeal from the Eleventh Judicial District Court order denying Bardos' motion for preliminary injunction. We affirm.

¶3 Bardos and Robert L. Spoklie (Spoklie) own abutting properties in Flathead County. The parties entered into an easement agreement in 2018 in which Bardos granted Spoklie a 60-foot-wide easement for ingress and egress travel across Bardos' property. Spoklie sought the easement so he could access his upper adjacent property, improve and develop it and then, as the developer, sell parcels of it to others. On December 30, 2021, Bardos filed a motion for preliminary injunction, show cause hearing, and temporary restraining order seeking to prevent Spoklie from engaging in various activities he alleged to be in violation of the easement agreement, including expanding the width of the easement, using and parking heavy construction equipment on and beyond the easement, and altering and/or disturbing the easement.

¶4 On December 31, 2021, the District Court denied the motion for temporary restraining order and set a show cause hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction for January 11, 2022. The District Court later granted Spoklie's motion to continue the hearing, resetting it for February 16, 2022, on which date both parties appeared and presented evidence. Bardos presented evidence showing tire tread and surface damage from bulldozers and similar heavy equipment driving and staging on and around the easement, as well as surface damage (upturned earth) from boulders being moved- boulders Bardos admitted to placing for the express purpose of preventing Spoklie from parking on the easement. Spoklie offered his own testimony contending the infrequent parking of equipment within the easement was incidental to ingress and egress. Mr. Wyant, Spoklie's employee, also testified. He described parking heavy construction equipment on the easement on fewer than a dozen instances, and never for an extended period of time. Mr. Wyant further testified he moved the boulders Bardos placed in the easement only as far as necessary to continue parking and staging vehicles as before the boulders appeared, any damage to the land from moving the boulders was minimal due to the frozen winter ground, and repairing such damage was possible. At the close of the hearing, the District Court denied Bardos' motion for preliminary injunction.

¶5 We review a district court's grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for manifest abuse of discretion, and "district courts are afforded a high degree of discretion to grant or deny preliminary injunctions." BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman, 2019 MT 67, ¶ 7, 395 Mont. 160, 437 P.3d 142. A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is obvious, evident, or unmistakable. Shandrock v. DeTienne, 2010 MT 237, ¶ 13, 358 Mont. 175, 243 P.3d 1123.

¶6 The rule governing preliminary injunctions contained in § 27-19-201, MCA, sets forth five disjunctive conditions under which a preliminary injunction may be granted. We note the plain language of the rule ("An injunction order may be granted in the following cases . . .") is permissive rather than mandatory. Bardos relies on the statute's first three subsections in contending the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by failing to enter a preliminary injunction because (1) Bardos established a prima facie case he was entitled to the relief requested because the undisputed evidence shows Spoklie's conduct exceeds the scope of the easement, (2) Bardos has and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, and (3) Bardos established that without a preliminary injunction Spoklie's actions will continue...