Barefield v. City of Parkersburg, Civil Action 2:19-cv-00396
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:19-cv-00396 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | CORTEZ L. BAREFIELD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARKERSBURG, et al., Defendants. |
PROPOSED FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
This matter is assigned to the Honorable John T. Copenhaver, Jr. Senior United States District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 3.) Before this Court are the complaint filed by Plaintiff Cortez L. Barefield (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 2) and the motions to dismiss that complaint filed by Defendants Michael A. Pifer (“Pifer”) (ECF No. 12) and C.S. Waldron (“Waldron”) (ECF No. 15). For the reasons explained more fully herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants City of Parkersburg, City of Vienna, and City of Williamstown be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted and that Pifer's and Waldron's motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 12, 15) be GRANTED.
This action stems from Plaintiff's arrest and conviction-which was later overturned and the underlying criminal case dismissed-for second-offense possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. (ECF No. 2.) He alleges that on January 12 and 16, 2015, Pifer, a Vienna, West Virginia police officer, orchestrated two controlled purchases of heroin at a residence in Parkersburg, West Virgnia. (Id. at 2-4.)[1] He further alleges that based on those controlled purchases, Pifer secured a search warrant for the residence, which was executed on January 21, 2015. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff avers that he and three other men were in a bedroom at the home when the search warrant was executed, and he “was handcuffed, patted down, and removed to the front yard, ” where Pifer searched him and “seized approximately $865 in cash, a pay stub, an Ohio ID card belonging to Plaintiff, a social security card, wallet, and a VISA debit card.” (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, the police also searched the home and found “three separate controlled substances” in the bedroom where Plaintiff and the three other men were present. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, he “was then detained at North Central Regional Jail on a felony charge of Possession with Intent to Deliver . . . filed by Officer Pifer in Wood County Magistrate Court that same day.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Pifer testified at his preliminary hearing before a magistrate on January 30, 2015, that Plaintiff was located in a bedroom at the residence, “where crack cocaine was found behind a couch incident to execution of the warrant, and that Plaintiff possessed a large sum of cash on his person.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that this testimony “caused [his] detention at North Central Regional Jail to be unduly extended pending indictment, based upon a preliminary finding of probable cause.” (Id. at 6.) He alleges that his counsel challenged the magistrate's probable-cause finding, but “The petition was never decided.” (Id.)
Plaintiff avers that he was indicted on May 13, 2015, for three counts of second-offense possession with intent to deliver cocaine, methamphetamine, and oxycodone. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Waldron, a deputy with the Wood County Sheriff's Department, provided testimony to the grand jury about the January 12 and 16, 2015 controlled purchases and the execution of the search warrant. (Id. at 7.)
While it is unclear from the complaint when Plaintiff was convicted, he alleges that his conviction was reversed on May 18, 2018, based on “a lack of probable cause to justify both the arrest and search of the Plaintiff on January 21, 2015, and prejudice resulting from the Circuit Court's erroneous admission at trial of the $865” and the other items seized from him that day. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff avers that his criminal case was dismissed on August 30, 2018, upon the prosecutor's motion. (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff alleges “Illegal Arrest” and “Illegal Search” claims, in violation of the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) He also brings claims for “Conspiracy to Interfere” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and “Neglect to Prevent Conspiracy” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Id. at 8-9.) He asserts “Illegal Arrest” and “Illegal Search” claims pursuant to Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, as well as West Virginia common law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault/battery, invasion of privacy, negligence, and civil conspiracy. (Id. at 9-11.) He seeks a declaration that the defendants' alleged actions were unlawful, an injunction “compelling [them] to register all their surreptitious electronic or mechanical devices used in controlled drug purchases, ” and “$7, 000, 000 in compensatory, punitive, exemplary, treble damages.” (Id. at 11-12.)
Pifer filed his motion to dismiss on December 22, 2020. (ECF No. 12.) Waldron filed hers on January 13, 2021. (ECF No. 15.) Although Plaintiff did not respond to either motion, Pifer and Waldron each filed replies (ECF Nos. 18, 20). Generally, when a party is given an opportunity to respond to a motion to dismiss but fails to do so, this Court may proceed “to rule on the [opposing party's] motion and dismiss [the] suit on the uncontroverted bases asserted therein.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). However, as there is some evidence that Plaintiff may not have received one or more of this Court's orders (see ECF No. 19), in fairness to Plaintiff, the undersigned nonetheless addresses the merits of Pifer's and Waldron's motions to dismiss.
Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court has a duty to “screen initial filings . . . to independently assess the merits of in forma pauperis complaints” and “exclude suits that have no arguable basis in law or fact.” Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1995)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This Court must “dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis ‘at any time if [it] determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.'” Eriline Co., 440 F.3d at 656 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). When reviewing an in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim, this Court applies the same standards that it applies to review a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003)).
In general, a pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (). However, to withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that alleges enough facts “to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by [the relevant] statute” will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 648 (quoting McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585). This Court construes a pro se plaintiff's allegations “liberally, ” but the complaint must nonetheless “contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Thomas, 841 F.3d at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[] veracity” of the complaint's “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Review of the complaint is “a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged.” Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff's complaint purports to allege four federal claims: 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims for “Illegal Arrest” and “Illegal Search, ” a 42 U.S.C. § 1986 clai...
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