Barefield v. Hillman
| Decision Date | 27 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:17-cv-01525,3:17-cv-01525 |
| Parties | Jessica BAREFIELD, Plaintiff, v. Jackie HILLMAN and Beverley Norment, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Mark J. Downton, Brazil Clark, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Stephanie A. Bergmeyer, Tennessee Attorney General's Office, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 58) ("Motion"). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 67) ("Response"), and Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 71).
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for the death of her son, TH, allegedly caused by Defendants in violation of the United States Constitution and federal law. Plaintiff alleged four Counts: (I) violation of substantive due process by failure to protect TH while he was in state custody; (II) violation of procedural due process; (III) violation of federal law, specifically the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("Adoption Assistance Act" or "AAA"); and (IV) violation of substantive due process through a state-created danger. (Doc. No. 27). The Court previously dismissed Count II (violation of procedural due process) and dismissed all claims against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS"). (Doc. No. 45). Before the Court now is a Motion filed by Defendants Hillman and Norment1 concerning the remaining substantive due process and AAA claims against them.
Plaintiff alleges that TH was placed into the custody of DCS in October 2016, when he was adjudicated delinquent by the Davidson County Juvenile Court.2 Plaintiff claims that TH had a history of running away from home for extended periods of time and associating with gang members. She avers that Defendants had direct knowledge of TH's gang connections and his history of dangerous runaway activities when he entered state custody. She claims that TH's runaway predilection and oppositional behavior were duly noted in the plan developed for TH by DCS. (Doc. No. 27).
The parties agree that TH ran from his first and second foster homes almost immediately, on October 23 and November 3, 2016, respectively. (Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 7). They likewise agree that a permanency plan meeting for TH was held on November 16, 2016, (Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 8), and that TH ran away again between the permanency plan meeting and the Juvenile Court hearing at which that plan was approved. (Doc. No. 68-14 at 32-33 of 80).3 Plaintiff contends that after consultation with her (Plaintiff), around the time of the Juvenile Court hearing, DCS moved TH to the Volunteer Youth Academy ("VYA"), a secure facility with heavy locked doors to prevent youth from "absconding." (Doc. No. 27 and Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 9.). The parties agree that TH ran away from VYA in April 2017. (Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 10). Plaintiff states that she was able to find TH about a week later and return him to state custody. (Doc. No. 27). Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendants’ "extremely deficient placement array for delinquent males," DCS was no longer able to place TH at VYA (Id. ). The parties agree that, instead, DCS placed TH temporarily into the foster home of Mr. Welbeck until it could get TH accepted into a Level 3 facility.4 (Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 22).5
It is undisputed that on May 17, 2017, two DCS family service workers went to Mr. Welbeck's home to transport TH for placement at the Deer Valley Residential Treatment Facility. (Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 32). It is further undisputed that when the DCS workers explained to TH that they planned to move him, TH objected and ran away, and that on June 9, 2017, TH was found shot to death. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-36, 41).
DCS Administrative Policies and Procedures provide that DCS "utilizes the building, preparing and maintaining Child and Family Teams (CFT)6 model to ensure that families and their support systems are engaged in the planning and decision-making process throughout their relationship with the Department." (Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 16; Doc. No. 68-3 at 1). The Family Services Worker ("FSW") has the primary responsibility for building, preparing and maintaining the Child and Family Team and is responsible for working with the family and team to coordinate the resources needed to meet the needs of the child and family. (Id. at 2 and 8). "A Child and Family Team Meeting (CFTM) is convened at certain critical junctures in the life of a case, as well as on an as-needed basis, to help the family and the department work together to achieve permanency for children as soon as possible." (Id. ) The FSW, birth parents/guardians and family members form the core of the CFT. (Id. at 5). The Team Leader for the case is required to participate in all Initial CFTMs and all Initial Permanency Planning CFTMs. (Id. at 8). Other CFT members may include foster parents, therapists, and others in the community. (Id. at 5-9).
Defendant Hillman was TH's assigned FSW from the time he entered state custody until approximately mid-May 2017. (Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 4). It is undisputed that TH did not incur any harm while Defendant Hillman was assigned as his FSW. (Id. at ¶ 27).7 Defendant Norment was, during the relevant time period, a Team Coordinator for DCS in the foster care division.8 (Id. at ¶ 5). Norment was the Team Coordinator on TH's case from the time he came into state custody until the unfortunate end. (Doc. No. 68-15 at 54 of 216).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In other words, even if genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant or unnecessary under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. On the other hand, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine[.]’ " Id.
A fact is "material" within the meaning of Rule 56(c) "if its proof or disproof might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Harris v. Klare , 902 F.3d 630, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2018).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Pittman v. Experian Info. Sol., Inc. , 901 F.3d 619, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018). If the summary judgment movant meets that burden, then in response the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 628.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or genuinely is disputed—i.e., a party seeking summary judgment and a party opposing summary judgment, respectively—must support the assertion by citing to materials in the record, including, but not limited to, depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
The court should view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pittman , 901 F.3d at 628. Credibility judgments and weighing of evidence are improper. Hostettler v. College of Wooster , 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018). As noted above, where there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. The court determines whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will be insufficient to survive summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks , 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to the constitutional claims against them. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil suits for damages, so long as their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, Tennessee , 959 F.3d 678, 695 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). Qualified immunity shields the official not only from liability but also from the burdens of litigating the suit altogether. Id. When defendants allege qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. ; see also Barton v. Martin , 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020) ().
The Court is required to employ a two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Rieves , 959 F.3d at 695. It must consider (1) whether the official's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established. Wright v. City of Euclid, Ohio , 962 F.3d 852, 864 (6th Cir. June 18, 2020) ; see also Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ().
Therefore, to survive a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff...
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