Barger v. Brock
Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Writing for the Court | Abraham Caruthers |
Citation | 535 S.W.2d 337 |
Parties | Al S. BARGER et al. v. Ray L. BROCK, Jr., et al. 535 S.W.2d 337 |
Decision Date | 30 March 1976 |
Page 337
v.
Ray L. BROCK, Jr., et al.
This action involves the right or power of the Chancery Court to declare a Rule of the Supreme Court to be violative of the Constitution of Tennessee and enjoin its enforcement.
The plaintiffs, Al S. Barger, Leon W. Davis, Jr., U. L. McDonald, Joe M. Parker and Richard H. Winningham are practicing attorneys in Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee and are solicitors and officers of this Court.
The defendants, Ray L. Brock, Jr., Robert E. Cooper, William H. D. Fones, William J. Harbison and Joseph W. Henry, constitute the Supreme Court of Tennessee and are sued in their official capacity as such Court. There is no allegation or suggestion that they, or any of them, have any pecuniary or property interest in the issues here presented. 1
The defendant, R. A. Ashley, is sued in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee and is made a party 'in case the Court should find it necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of any statute of the State of Tennessee.'
I.
Inter alia, the Complaint filed over the signature of Thomas A. Harris, their solicitor of record, and also a solicitor and officer of this Court, alleges:
At some time unknown to the plaintiffs, and without notice to them, the
Page 339
defendant Justices as the Supreme Court of Tennessee undertook consideration of an original 'petition' presented to said Court Under circumstances not fully known to your plaintiffs, calling for the defendants to impose an annual 'license fee' or Tax upon the plaintiffs and all other attorneys practicing within the State of Tennessee. Your plaintiffs are advised that on December 18, 1975, the defendants adopted a So-called 'Rule of Court' called 'Rule 42,' which in Section 20 thereof purports to levy an annual fee or Tax upon all practicing attorneys in this State. (Emphasis supplied).It is further alleged with respect to this Court:
(T)heir Ex parte action in purporting to Levy a tax on lawyers is wholly without and beyond their authority and is an Exercise of arbitrary power which is prohibited by our Constitution . . . (Emphasis supplied).
They further allege:
The portions of 'Rule 42' purporting to impose a Tax or 'annual fee' on lawyers are void as an Affront to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee . . . (Emphasis supplied).
It is alleged that only Legislature has the power to tax, citing Article 2, § 28, Article 2, § 2, and Article 6, § 2.
The prayer is (1) 'that so much of Rule 42 as purports to levy a tax or 'annual license fee' on the plaintiffs, or to suspend them from the practice of law, be declared void as contravening the Constitution of this State'; (2) that 'the defendant Justices be enjoined from imposing the tax or license fee' and (3) for such other relief as 'the Constitution of the State and the preservation of liberty may require.' There is no prayer for process.
II.
On 9 May 1974, the Tennessee Bar Association filed a petition in this Court requesting and recommending the adoption of a Rule of Court establishing a comprehensive disciplinary procedure to be funded and maintained by an annual license fee payable by members of the Bar.
On 6 November 1974, thirteen (13) members of the Bar of this Court filed an intervening petition urging that this Court promulgate a Rule organizing, unifying or integrating the State Bar of Tennessee.
By supplemental petition filed 12 December 1974, the Bar Association asserted the inadequacy of the then Rule 42 and urged the Court to replace it with Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement exhibited with the petition.
This Court, being acutely aware of the impact of these recommendations upon the members of the Bar and their direct relationship to the public welfare, and being desirous of giving all concerned a full opportunity to be heard, and being unwilling to proceed on an Ex parte basis and without notice, entered an order on 22 November 1974, granting leave to all interested parties to file Amicus curiae briefs and gave notice that oral argument would be heard upon the issues thus presented. Pursuant to this solicitation, numerous briefs, affidavits and letters in support of or opposition to these proposals were filed.
We digress at this juncture to address the matter of whether the profession had notice of these proceedings. First, it should be pointed out that at all stages, the news media, be editorial comment and by news stories, gave these matters massive publicity.
The voluntary Tennessee Bar Association 2 kept its membership fully informed through its most excellent publications.
The December 1974 issue of the Tennessee Lawyer (Vol. 23, No. 4) devoted the entire front page to a story headlined INTERVENING PETITION TO UNIFY T.B.A. FILED BY GROUP OF LAWYERS.
Page 340
The ensuing story pointed out that this petition was filed 'in the pending matter of: In Re: The Petition of the Tennessee Bar Association, Ex Parte.' The concluding paragraph reads as follows:The Court has granted interested parties leave to file amicus curiae briefs. Those supporting the petitions are to be filed on or before December 27, 1974, those in opposition on or before January 17, 1975. The Court will hear oral arguments on Thursday, January 23, 1975. Proponents will be heard from 9:00 a.m. until noon. Those opposing will be heard from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Lawyers desiring to present oral argument should notify the Clerk of the Court at Nashville. 3
Oral argument was heard on 23 January 1975, and at this time the Court was the beneficiary of numerous presentations and all issues were fully and ably discussed. It is of significance that among those appearing at the Bar of this Court was the then President of the Chattanooga Bar Association. It is of further significance that the Chattanooga Bar Association filed an intervening petition.
Again realizing that these were issues of overriding professional and public concern, the...
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State v. Burton
...resolution of this issue. This Court, like the trial court, is required to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court. Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 340-341 (Tenn.1976); State v. Davis, 654 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). This Court does not have the authority to modify, revise, mod......
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Bush v. State, No. M2011–02133–SC–R11–PC.
...ch. 207, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 305. 8.Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 2013 WL 4430909, at *6 (quoting Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn.1976)). 9. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 724 (2d ed.1989). 10. Justice Harlan said he thought the writ ought always to lie for cla......
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Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC
...497, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ). In this context, "this [C]ourt is supreme in fact as well as in name." Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976).Based upon these principles, but taking into account considerations of comity among the three branches of government, this Cou......
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Windsor v. A Federal Executive Agency, Civ. A. No. 3-83-0509.
...v. Fones, 587 F.2d 850, 851-52 (6th Cir.1978); Petition of Tennessee Bar Association, 539 S.W.2d 805, 8071 (Tenn.1976); Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 3401 3 The affidavit bore the caption and title of a prior civil action brought by Mr. Windsor, Richard L. Windsor, plaintiff, v. The Tenn......
-
State v. Burton
...resolution of this issue. This Court, like the trial court, is required to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court. Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 340-341 (Tenn.1976); State v. Davis, 654 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). This Court does not have the authority to modify, revise, mod......
-
Bush v. State, No. M2011–02133–SC–R11–PC.
...ch. 207, 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 305. 8.Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 2013 WL 4430909, at *6 (quoting Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn.1976)). 9. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 724 (2d ed.1989). 10. Justice Harlan said he thought the writ ought always to lie for cla......
-
Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC
...497, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ). In this context, "this [C]ourt is supreme in fact as well as in name." Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976).Based upon these principles, but taking into account considerations of comity among the three branches of government, this Cou......
-
Windsor v. A Federal Executive Agency, Civ. A. No. 3-83-0509.
...v. Fones, 587 F.2d 850, 851-52 (6th Cir.1978); Petition of Tennessee Bar Association, 539 S.W.2d 805, 8071 (Tenn.1976); Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 3401 3 The affidavit bore the caption and title of a prior civil action brought by Mr. Windsor, Richard L. Windsor, plaintiff, v. The Tenn......