Barham v. Ubs Financial Services

Decision Date02 August 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 07-0853(RMU).
Citation496 F.Supp.2d 174
PartiesMichael BARHAM et al., Plaintiffs, v. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Brian J. Markovitz, Steven M. Pavsner, Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A., Greenbelt, MD, Selim Ablo, Stephen A. Whinston, Berger & Montague, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey G. Huvelle, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

URBINA, District Judge.

GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER THE CASE TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court for consideration of the defendant's motion for transfer of venue. The plaintiffs bring suit against UBS Financial "Services ("UBSFS") under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that UBSFS subjected them to unlawful racial discrimination during their time of employment with UBSFS. The defendant moves to transfer, arguing that the District of Maryland is the proper venue for this action. Because the proposed transfer is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court grants the defendant's motion and transfers the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs are African-American former Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees of UBSFS. Compl. ¶¶ 2-8. All seven plaintiffs were previously employed in the defendant's Largo, Maryland office ("the Largo office"). Id. Two of the seven plaintiffs ("D.C. employees") were also employed at UBSFS's Washington, D.C. office after the Largo office closed. Id. All seven plaintiffs allege that the establishment, structure, staffing, operation and closure of the Largo office were discriminatory. Pls.' Opp'n at 2. The D.C. employees bring similar allegations of discrimination regarding UBSFS's D.C. office. Id.

On May 8, 2007, the plaintiffs initiated this suit, accusing the defendant of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The defendant moved to transfer venue on June 7, 2007. The court now considers that motion.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) controls venue, establishing that venue is proper in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In an action where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) nonetheless authorizes a court to transfer the action to any other district where it could have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests "discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to [an] individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). Under this statute, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is proper. Trout Unlimited v. Dep't. of Agric., 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.1996).

Accordingly, the defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiffs originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. As to the second showing, the statute calls on the court to weigh a number of case-specific private and public-interest factors. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239. The private-interest consideration include: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant; (2) the defendant's choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.1995), Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1125, 1129 (N.D.Ill.1989), 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3848). The public-interest considerations include: (1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Id.

B. The Court Transfers the Case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland

The defendant argues that the District of Maryland is a more appropriate venue because all seven plaintiffs worked in UBSFS's Largo office. Def.'s Mot. at 2. In support of this position, the defendant notes that all seven of the plaintiffs allege that UBSFS unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race while they worked in Largo. Id. Five of the plaintiffs, in fact, exclusively challenge actions in the Largo office. Id. Furthermore, a "closely related" case filed against UBSFS by two of the plaintiffs' co-workers in the Largo office has been pending in the District of Maryland since early 2006. Id. Finally, the defendant argues that this suit has only a "tenuous connection" to the District of Columbia because five of the seven plaintiffs do not make a claim that they were subjected to racial discrimination while working in the District of Columbia. Id. The defendant asserts, therefore, that transfer is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Id. The court agrees.

1. The Plaintiffs Could Have Brought this Case in the Transferee District

The court first considers whether the plaintiffs could have brought this case in the District of Maryland. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16 (citing Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805). In cases involving a federal question, a plaintiff may properly bring an action in a judicial district where a defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). A corporate defendant is considered a resident in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). To prove that the Maryland district court may assert personal jurisdiction, (1) a statute or rule must authorize service of process on the defendant in the District of Maryland, and (2) service of process on the defendant must comport with the requirements of due process. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir.1993). As to the service of process requirement, Maryland's long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that personal jurisdiction exists over a party who "(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the state; (2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in the State; ... [or] (5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the State." Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.Code § 6-103(b) (1989 & Supp.1992). As to the due process requirement, personal jurisdiction exists when a corporation purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471. U.S. 462, 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

The parties agree that the defendant conducted business in its Largo, Maryland office prior to that office shutting down in approximately June 2003. Compl. ¶ 2; Def.'s Mot. at 3. The defendant also operates and conducts business out of its Washington, D.C. office. Compl. ¶ 9. The operation of the Largo office and the D.C. office establish that the courts in both fora have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c); see also Schmidt v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 322 F.Supp.2d 28, 32 (D.D.C.2004) (noting that when corporate defendants reside in multiple jurisdictions, more than one venue may be proper) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c)). Because Maryland has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the District of Maryland is a proper venue for the plaintiffs' claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

2. The Private and Public-Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer

Having established that the plaintiffs originally could have brought this case in Maryland, the court turns to whether the defendant has demonstrated that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice support a transfer to the District of Maryland. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Based on an examination of private and public-interest factors, the court concludes that the defendant has met its burden.

a. Private-Interest Factors

The private-interest factors include:

(1) the plaintiffs choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant; (2) the defendant's choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, Heller Fin., Inc., 713 F.Supp. at 1129, 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3848).

In support of its motion, the defendant argues that the private-interest factors justify transfer to Maryland. Def.'s Mot. at 12. In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that the court...

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