Barker v. International Paper Co., 96-231-B.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-231-B.,96-231-B.
• Citation: 993 F.Supp. 10
• Parties: Dennis BARKER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

993 F.Supp. 10

Dennis BARKER, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 96-231-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

January 22, 1998.

Jeffrey N. Young, McTeague, Higbee, Topsham, ME, for Plaintiff.

James R. Erwin, Pierce Atwood, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Dennis Barker ("Barker"), brings this action against Defendant, International Paper Company ("IP"), for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Counts I, IV), 42 U.S .C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act (Counts II, V), 29 U .S.C. § 701 et seq., the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA") (Counts III, VI), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., and for tortious interference with prospective advantageous economic relationship. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). From July 1987 to October 1994, Plaintiff worked for Defendant at its Androscoggin mill in Jay, Maine. Plaintiff started at IP as an hourly power plant trainee, and was promoted several times to other positions in the mill. In January 1993, Barker transferred laterally from the utilities area into construction and began reporting to Robert Michaud, manager of construction. Michaud reported directly to Rick Dorey, manager of plant engineering, who reported to Shawn Kilpatrick, manager of capital projects and plant engineering. In his performance evaluation for 1993, the last before his discharge, Plaintiff was classified as a "quality contributor,"¹ and in January 1994, he was promoted to department engineer.

Plaintiff's wife, Denise Barker, is an insulin-dependent diabetic with a diabetic retinopathy. Among other things, Denise Barker's condition limits her vision and mobility. This "impairment to her vision and mobility substantially limits Ms. Barker's ability to engage in activities in areas which are not well lit, including in particular driving at night." Amended Compl. ¶ 11.

From July 1993 to November 1993, Denise Barker provided nursing services to the mill's Health Services Department under a contract with Defendant. Although originally hired to work days, in October 1993, during a plant shutdown, Defendant requested that Denise Barker work nights, something she could not safely do because of her limited vision and inability to drive at night. Plaintiff attempted to help his wife avoid this change to her schedule by speaking with her supervisor, Lois Feith, about her need for an accommodation. Feith changed Denise Barker's hours as requested, but Plaintiff's advocacy allegedly angered Feith who told Michaud that she would go to the mill manager to have Plaintiff fired if he continued advocating on behalf of his wife.

After the shutdown Defendant again requested that Denise Barker work night shifts. She refused, and in November 1993, Defendant terminated Denise Barker's contract. In April 1994, Denise Barker filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Maine Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"), based upon her termination by Defendant. On or about May 11, 1994, Defendant received notice of Denise Barker's allegations.

In midyear 1994, Plaintiff met with Kilpatrick to discuss a possible transfer to a position on the paper machine side of the mill, for the purposes of career advancement. Kilpatrick indicated that he would support Plaintiff's attempts to advance, and over the following few months, while continuing to work in construction, Plaintiff actively pursued a transfer. Plaintiff reiterated his desire to transfer out of construction in a meeting with Kilpatrick on or about September 29, 1994, at which he also allegedly discussed concerns he had about working with Michaud.

In spring 1994, around the same time Defendant received notice of Denise Barker's discrimination charge, Michaud evidently began having performance problems with Plaintiff. After meeting with David Osgood, the mill's human resource person for salaried personnel, Michaud drafted a memo dated September 30, 1994, documenting his alleged problems with Plaintiff and recommending that he be terminated. After receiving Michaud's termination memo, Kilpatrick met with Osgood and Michaud to discuss the recommended termination. According to Michaud's deposition testimony, the meeting "was a consensus type situation." Michaud Dep. at 83.

On October 10, 1994, Kilpatrick met with Michaud and Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's employment with IP was terminated effective at the end of the shutdown. At the meeting, Kilpatrick made statements indicating that he believed Plaintiff was refusing to work in construction after the shutdown. Plaintiff allegedly did not respond to these statements because he was "stunned by the termination," and at no point during the meeting affirmatively stated that he was "all done in construction," that he would no longer work for Michaud, or words to that effect. Plaintiff further alleges that he never made these or similar statements to Michaud or Osgood at any other time.

On October 27, 1994, Plaintiff attended an exit interview with Osgood. Prior to this meeting, Plaintiff provided Osgood with a memo in which he emphasized that it was Kilpatrick's position, not his position, that he was "all done in construction." At his exit interview, Plaintiff expressly stated that it was not his intention to quit his job. When Osgood asked him why he had not made this position clear earlier, Plaintiff told him it was because he "was completely caught off guard with the termination, and [] didn't know how to respond." Barker Dep. at 166. Osgood indicated, however, that it was "too late, it's over, and that there were no positions within the company or within the mill." Id. Osgood further told Plaintiff that he was "one of the best engineers that the company had had," but that he was "a difficult employee to manage." Id. at 166-67. When Plaintiff asked for examples of his poor interpersonal skills, Osgood suggested that "[the] per[fect] example is when your wife was in trouble with the company." Id. at 167; Barker Dep. Ex. 12.

Following his termination, Plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination against Defendant with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Maine Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"). Plaintiff received a statement of findings from the MHRC dated August 14, 1994, and a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC dated October 10, 1996.

In 1995, Plaintiff sought employment with the Willamette Paper Company in Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania. Willamette flew Plaintiff to Pennsylvania to visit the mill twice, once by himself, and then with his family. On the second trip, Plaintiff alleges that William Keswick, Willamette's engineering manager, told him that Willamette would be making him an offer the following Wednesday. When Keswick did not contact Plaintiff on that day, Plaintiff called Keswick. Keswick initially informed Plaintiff that Willamette would not be making him an offer of employment because he was seeking a salary that was a few thousand dollars more than what Willamette was willing to offer. When Plaintiff asked Keswick what was "really happening," however, Keswick responded that Jim Watson, Willamette's mill manager, had called someone at IP, and that "based upon that conversation they decided not to make the offer." Barker Dep. at 212. Keswick subsequently indicated that he had no recollection of this conversation with Plaintiff or Watson's comments about the alleged phone reference.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine for summary judgment purposes, if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is one that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law." Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993). Facts may be drawn from "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that: (1) IP unlawfully terminated his employment because of his association with his wife in violation of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and MHRA (Counts I-III); (2) IP unlawfully terminated his employment in retaliation for his advocacy on behalf of his wife in violation of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and MHRA (Counts IV-VI); and (3) IP tortiously interfered with his attempt to find employment with the Willamette Paper Company (Count VII). While Plaintiff's first two claims allege violations of three separate statutes, the analysis of each claim is the same under each statute. See Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Winston v. Maine Technical College Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 74 (Me.1993)) ("[I]nterpretation of the ADA and of the Maine Human Rights Act have proceeded hand in hand...."); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) ("The standards used to determine whether this section [ § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990....") Therefore, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's first two contentions under the ADA.

A. Association

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), an employer may not:

exclud[e] or otherwise den[y] equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known...