Barker v. Municipal Court of Salinas Judicial Dist. of Monterey County

• Decision Date: 06 July 1966
• Docket Number: S.F. 22253
• Citation: 415 P.2d 809,64 Cal.2d 806,51 Cal.Rptr. 921
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 415 P.2d 809 Paul Dean BARKER and Houston Hubert Barker, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF SALINAS JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTEREY COUNTY, Respondent, The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. In Bank

Page 921

51 Cal.Rptr. 921

64 Cal.2d 806, 415 P.2d 809

Paul Dean BARKER and Houston Hubert Barker, Petitioners, v.MUNICIPAL COURT OF SALINAS JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTEREY COUNTY, RespondentThe PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 22253.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 6, 1966.

Grupp & Grupp and Morris M. Grupp, San Francisco, for petitioners.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Michael J. Phelan, Deputy Attys.Gen., for respondent and real party in interest.

PEEK, Justice.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to compel the respondentcourt to dismiss a complaint charging them with attempted murder, or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition directing respondent to cease proceeding with the prosecution.

On December 26, 1947, a complaint charging petitioners with attempted murder was filed in the Justice Court of Alisal Township, Monterey County.In February 1948, they were apprehended in Texas where they were charged with the convicted of certain federal offenses.They were not returned to stand trial in this state.In March 1948they began serving their sentences in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.In May 1948 the then District Attorney of Monterey County requested the United States Attorney General to return petitioners to Monterey County for trial.The Attorney General replied that he would honor writs designed to bring petitioners to California for trial, but suggested that the district attorney might prefer to delay action as petitioners were soon to be transferred to California for confinement in the federal penitentiary at Alcatraz.

Thereafter in September 1948petitioners were transferred to Alcatraz.In July 1948 and at least on ten occasions after their transfer, petitioners and others on their behalf wrote to the district attorney.These letters variously requested that the district attorney act to remove his detainer warrants filed with the federal authorities, urged that he reveal his intentions as to petitioners' trial, and demanded that he bring them to trial or move to dismiss the charges.On at least seven occasions previous to the bringing of the instant proceeding, motions and petitions seeking a speedy trial or dismissal of the 1947 complaint were filed in local courts.Three such actions were filed while petitioners were at Alcatraz, prior to their return to Leavenworth Prison in September 1956.All the motions and petitions were denied.

Throughout the period during which petitioners were incarcerated, the federal authorities indicated their willingness to cooperate in producing petitioners for trial in California.In September 1950 the then warden at Alcatraz Prison wrote to the district attorney to inquire as to whether he intended to bring petitioners to trial.On November 3, the district attorney wrote that he did intend to prosecute, that he would execute the necessary documents in the immediate future, and requested advice as to the procedures to be followed.He was informed that his request had been forwarded to the Director of Prisons in Washington, D.C., and in November 1952 the Bureau of Prisons supplied the district attorney with the requested information.

Again, on July 30, 1953, another official at Alcatraz Prison inquired as to the district attorney's intentions in regard to petitioners.The latter replied, recommending that they not be transferred from Alcatraz.On March 11, 1955, the United States Director of Prisons telegraphed the district attorney to inform him that petitioners might be removed from Alcatraz, and asked as to present intentions concerning a trial.Five days later the district attorney answered that he had no intention of withdrawing the detainer warrants against petitioners, but indicated that he would not proceed to trial.Finally, in February 1958, the warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth was informed that the United States Attorney General would make petitionerPaul Barker(and presumably his brother) available to face the California charges 'if and when the California authorities desire to have the case pending against him disposed of.'A copy of this letter has been on file at the Monterey District Attorney's Office since March 10, 1958.

Petitioners' requests made directly to the district attorney were generally ignored as were several letters from their attorney.On July 26, 1954, the district attorney for the first time replied to petitioners' attorney.This was in response to his fifth letter requesting that petitioners be granted a speedy trial.'I have no intention,' the district attorney wrote, 'of bringing the Barkers to trial at the present time.* * * (i)t is my intention to let the matter remain in status quo as long as it is possible.* * * When the Barkers come within the jurisdiction of the State of California and the statute of limitations begins to run out, some effort undoubtedly will be made to bring them to trial.* * * As far as I am concerned * * * (they) can sit and rot in prison for the rest of their lives.'

Petitioners had been in federal prisons for almost eighteen years, and had repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought to have the local charges pending since 1947 adjudicated, when, on October 4, 1965, the District Attorney of Monterey County filed the instant amended complaint in respondentcourt.The complaint again charges petitioners with attempted murder, and asserts in addition that 'from on or about March 19, 1948, to date * * * the said (defendants) * * * were outside of the State of California, in that they were under the exclusive control and custody of the United States Department of Justice in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas * * * and * * * at Alcatraz, California. * * *'Petitioners moved for an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that their constitutional right to a speedy trial had been denied.The instant petition was filed promptly after the motion was denied.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. * * *'Article I, section 13, of of California Constitution states that 'In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial * * *.'(See alsoPen.Code, § 686.)The California provision for a speedy trial "reflects the letter and spirit of' the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.* * * ' (People v. Wilson(1963)60 Cal.2d 139, 144, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 48, 383 P.2d 452, 456.)

The right to a speedy trial is a 'fundamental right granted to the accused, and * * * the policy of the law since the time of the promulgation of Magna Charta and the Habeas Corpus Act.'(Harris v. Municipal Court(1930)209 Cal. 55, 60--61, 285 P. 699, 701.)The function of this vital constitutional provision is 'to protect those accused of crime against possible delay, caused either by willful oppression, or the neglect of the state or its officers.'(In re Begerow(1901)133 Cal. 349, 354--355, 65 P. 828, 830, 56 L.R.A. 513;People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 139, 148, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452.)

The Legislature has enacted specific provisions declaratory of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.(Pen.Code, §§ 1381--1389.7.)By section 1381 of the Penal Code, prisoners incarcerated in California institutions are entitled to a trial of outstanding criminal complaints within ninety days of a written demand upon the district attorney of the county in which the charge is pending.If the prisoner is not brought to trial within the time provided, and he has not consented to a further delay, 'the court in which such action is pending must, on motion or suggestion of the district attorney, or of the defendant or * * * his counsel * * * or on its own motion, dismiss such charge.'In 1963, the Legislature provided similar formal procedures for those imprisoned in sister states signatory to the interstate agreement on detainers (Pen.Code, §§ 1389--1389.7), and for those incarcerated in federal prisons (Pen.Code, § 1381.5).

Section 1381.5 of the Penal Code now provides: 'Whenever a defendant has been convicted of a crime and has entered upon a term of imprisonment therefor in a federal correctional institution, and at the time of entry upon such term * * * or at any time during such term * * * there is pending in any court of this State any indictment, information, or complaint charging such defendant with the commission of a crime, it is mandatory that the district attorney of the county in which such charge is pending, upon receiving from such defendant a request that he be brought to trial on such charge, promtly inquire of the warden or other head of the federal correctional institution in which such defendant is confined whether and when such defendant can be released for trial.If an assent * * * for release of the defendant for trial is received by the district attorney he shall bring him to trial within 90 days after receipt of such assent, unless the federal authorities specify a date of release after 90 days.* * * If an action is not brought to trial as provided by this section, the court in which the charge is pending shall, on motion or suggestion of the district attorney, or representative of the United States, or the defendant or his counsel, dismiss the charge.'

Had section 1381.5 been in effect at any time during which petitioners made a demand to be brought to trial on the 1947 complaint, they would be entitled to dismissal of the charges under its provisions.The fact that the section was not in effect during the greater part of petitioners' federal incarceration and at none of the times when they made requests for trial does not mean, however, that they are denied a remedy.

While the courts have regularly adopted and enforced legislative interpretation of the constitutional provision for speedy...