Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 06-104-LPS |
| Parties | KAREN BARKES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Jeffery K. Martin, Esquire, MARTIN & ASSOCIATES, P.A., Wilmington, DE.
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Catherine Damavandi, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
Attorney for Defendants.
July 17, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware
STARK, U.S. District Midge:
Pending before the Court are: (1) a Second Motion for Reargument, filed by Plaintiffs Karen Barkes, Alexandra Barkes, and Brittany Barkes ("Plaintiffs") (D.I. 199); (2) a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Stanley Taylor and Raphael Williams ("Defendants") (D.I.226); (3) a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs (D.I. 230); (4) Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Designate an Expert (D.I. 262); and (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission to Supplement Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Reargument (D.I. 263). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny all of the motions except for Plaintiffs' request to supplement their motion for reargument.
Plaintiffs, the surviving family members of decedent Christopher Barkes ("Barkes"), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from Barkes' suicide at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institute ("HRYCI").2 Barkes committed suicide in his cell on November 14, 2004 while awaiting transport to the Violation of Probation ("VOP") Center in Sussex County the following day. (D.I. 51 at A152-53, Al 13) Barkes had been arrested on an administrative warrant on the previous day, arising from his having loitered in an attempt to purchase drugs, thus violating his probation. (Id. at A288) Barkes was on probation for a domestic abuse conviction in March 2004. (D.I. 246 at AA105)
Barkes was arrested on the afternoon of November 13, 2004. (D.I. 51 at A14, A288) That same day, at approximately 3 p.m, Barkes underwent a medical screening/intake procedure, conducted by a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN") employed by First Correctional Medical, Inc. ("FCM"). (Id. at A1-A4, Al 54) Included in this procedure was an intake form which contained questions about his mental health and suicidal desires. (Id. at Al45-47) Barkes indicated on the form that he had previously attempted suicide in 2003. (Id. at A148) Barkes did not, however, indicate on the form that he had additionally attempted suicide on three other occasions: in 1997, while incarcerated at the HRYCI (id. at A77); and twice on the same day in September 2004 (id. at A78) -just 65 days prior to his eventual suicide - all of which was known to the State probation office (id. at A22). Barkes also indicated on the form he had no current suicidal ideation. (Id. at A147)
Additionally, as this Court has previously explained:
The form lists 17 suicide risk factors for which each inmate is screened. If eight or more factors are checked, "yes," or if certain serious risk factors are present... the physician on call is notified and suicide precautions are initiated ... [I]n addition to the Mental Health/Suicide Prevention Screening Form, the FCM intake nurse completed FCM's standard medical intake form, which asks whether the inmate shows any obvious signs of "altered mental status ... or abnormal conduct." ... [T]he standard medical intake form also contains a series of questions regarding the inmate's health history.
(D.I. 60 at 5-6) (internal citations omitted)
At approximately 6 p.m. on November 14, Barkes called his wife, Karen Barkes, from the HRYCI. (D.I. 246 at AA226) According to Ms. Barkes, Barkes told her that he was going to kill himself and asked that she tell his daughters that he loved them. (Id. at AA225) It is undisputedthat Ms. Barkes did not contact anyone at the Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC") to advise them of the call she received from Barkes. (Id. at AA226)
Although there is no record evidence as to whether Defendants or DOC knew it on November 14, in the two months between Barkes' unsuccessful suicide attempts and his eventual suicide he had been under the care of two mental health professionals. (D.I. 246 at AA11-32, AA33-35) Nothing in the record indicates that either of these professionals regarded Barkes as suicidal as of mid-November 2004. Among other things, he had been released from Mirmont Treatment Center in Media, Pennsylvania by Dr. Richard Silver on October 15, 2004. (D.I. 246 at AA33-34)
FCM was the contract medical provider at HRYCI at the time of Barkes' incarceration. In this capacity, FCM was responsible for inmate intake and medical screening. (D.I. 233 at PA118) The provision of medical care to patients was periodically reviewed by the DOC in monthly Medical Committee Review meetings. (D.I. 246 at AA247) DOC Bureau Chief Joyce Talley oversaw and represented the DOC at these meetings. (Id.)
According to internal documents as well as the deposition testimony of former DOC Commissioner Stanley Taylor, the HRYCI suicide prevention procedures were modeled on the standards promulgated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care ("NCCHC"). (D.I. 269 at Ex. C; D.I. 200 at RA58, RA66-67) The NCCHC had issued model intake forms in 1997. (D.I. 233 at PA56, PA60-62) The forms used with Barkes were, in substance, the same as the 1997 NCCHC forms. (D.I. 200 at RA58-59) In 2003, the NCCHC revised its standards, including by eliminating the 1997 forms. (D.I. 269 at Ex. B) The same year, the NCCHC completed a periodic audit of HRYCI and accredited HRYCI. In 2005, DOC terminated its contract with FCM. (D.I. 258 at PA132-133)
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint (D.I. 1) on February 16, 2006. In that original Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged Eighth Amendment violations against DOC; Commissioner Taylor; Raphael Williams, Warden of the HRYCI; and FCM. Thereafter, on June 6, 2008, the Court entered a default judgment against FCM. (D.I. 74)
On February 27, 2008, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants Taylor and Williams on the original Complaint's Counts I, III, and IV. (D.I. 60) On April 18, 2008, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of this ruling. (D.I. 70) Following the Court's grant of leave to amend the pleadings (D.I. 73 at 3-4), Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on June 13, 2008 (D.I. 75). On March 30, 2009, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike the amended complaint, but permitted Plaintiffs to further amend their pleadings. (D.I. 81) On April 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. (D.I. 82) Plaintiffs were then permitted to file a Third Amended Complaint limited to a claim of failure to supervise. (D.I. 150 at 14-15; D.I. 158)
On April 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, solely seeking relief as to Count V, which alleges that Defendants violated Barkes' civil rights by failing to adequately supervise the medical treatment provided at HRYCI by FCM. (D.I. 152) Defendants' moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. (D.I. 153) Magistrate Judge Thynge's recommendation that Defendants' motion be denied (D.I. 165) was adopted by the Court on February 28, 2011 (D.I. 185).
On May 12, 2011, in conjunction with denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions relating to the purported late production by Defendants of Barkes' probation records, the Courtauthorized Plaintiffs to file a second motion for reargument relating to the Court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Count I, III, and IV. (D.I. 198) Plaintiffs filed their second motion for reargument shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2011. (D.I. 199)
Subsequently, in February 2012, Defendants and then Plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment on Count V. (D.I. 226; D.I. 230) On May 11, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their motion to extend the time to designate an expert and, on May 14, they filed their motion to supplement their motion for reargument. (D.I. 262; D.I. 263)
The Court heard oral argument on all pending motions on July 10, 2012. See Hr'g Tr. July 10, 2012 (D.I. 274) (hereinafter "Tr.").
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5, a motion for reconsideration should be granted only "sparingly." The decision to grant such a motion lies squarely within the discretion of the district court. See Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (D. Del. 1999); Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. 1990). These types of motions are granted only if the court has patently misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented by the parties, or made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. See Shering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D. Del. 1998); Brambles, 735 F. Supp. at 1241. "A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that a court rethink a decision already made." Smith v. Meyers, 2009 WL 51195928, at *1 (D. Del. Dec.30, 2009); see also Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough ofGlendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993). It is not an opportunity to "accomplish repetition of arguments that were or should havebeen presented to the court previously." Karr v. Castle, 768 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Del. 1991).
A motion for reconsideration may be granted only if the movant can show at least one of the following: (i) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) the availability of new evidence not available when the court made its decision; or (iii) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe by LouAnn, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). However, in no instance should reconsideration be granted if it would not result in amendment of an order. See Schering Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact...
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