Barksdale v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 1494,1494 |
| Parties | Santwan BARKSDALE v. STATE of Maryland. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Tonya Smith, Student Atty. (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender and Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Emmet Davitt, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Marna McLendon, State's Atty. for Howard County, Ellicott City, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before DAVIS, HARRELL and EYLER, JJ.
Appellant, Santwan Barksdale, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County, non-jury (Dennis M. Sweeney, J.), of criminal contempt for failure to make child support payments to Serleste Holbrook for the support of their minor child. Appellant was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment in the Howard County Detention Center. On appeal to this Court, appellant contends that he was entitled to a trial by jury, that the trial court erred in admitting prior civil contempt orders, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The State, acting through the State's Attorney for Howard County, filed a petition to hold appellant in criminal contempt for failure to obey a child support order. The order in question was dated June 27, 1995, and provided for child support in the amount of $672.96 per month, plus $67.29 per month on an arrearage. At trial, the State introduced the June 27, 1995 order, a civil contempt order dated February 12, 1996, a civil contempt order dated May 14, 1996, and an order dated June 26, 1996, which entered judgment against appellant for an arrearage in the amount of $10,114.40. The State also introduced a certified letter from the Department of Social Services, dated September 26, 1997, showing an arrearage as of that date in the amount of $19,891.85, and a certified "wage screen" from the Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation that showed appellant earned $1,159 in the first quarter of 1996, $1,513 in the second quarter of 1996, and $75 in the last quarter of 1996.
Appellant testified as follows. He was 30 years old and, at the time of trial, was living with his grandparents. On June 12, 1995, he resigned from a position of employment, at which he earned $2,072.55 per month gross wages. He stated that he resigned because his salary was inadequate to meet his obligations. He then began a landscaping business, which he pursued during the day, and assumed ownership of his family's delicatessen, which he pursued during the evening. Neither business succeeded. He made no child support payments from June through December, 1995, because he had no income. By November, 1995, the truck used in his landscaping business had been repossessed, and the landlord had canceled the lease on his delicatessen.
Appellant next found work in March, 1996, when he was employed by Dollar Rental Car. He made a child support payment the following month. By this time, the condominium in which he lived was in a foreclosure proceeding. He filed bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code to reorganize his debt, but his plan was rejected by the United States Bankruptcy Court. He lost his job at Dollar Rental Car because of excessive absenteeism and, subsequently, tried to obtain a commercial driver's license. In September, 1996, he was hired as a waiter for a restaurant in Glen Burnie, which did not open until November. He earned $2 an hour plus tips at the restaurant, and he left that job at the end of the year. He was evicted from his condominium in November. He paid $60 child support in December.
After leaving the restaurant, appellant and a partner began unloading trucks at warehouses, and he earned approximately $150 per week. He made child support payments in January, February, and March, 1997. Appellant's partner cut him out of the business in April, 1997. He began employment with Kinko's in Gaithersburg in June, 1997, earning $8 per hour, and he was so employed at the time of trial. He made support payments after being employed there.
Appellant presents the following questions:
1. Whether a defendant in a criminal contempt case is entitled to trial by jury in circuit court under the constitution and laws of Maryland, whether or not he has a federal constitutional right to trial by jury, and whether the failure of the record in this case to show a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right requires reversal.
2. Whether prior judgments of civil contempt are admissible in a prosecution for criminal contempt.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove criminal contempt.
Federal constitutional law provides that a defendant facing imprisonment in excess of 180 days has a right to a trial by jury. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Wilkins v. State, 293 Md. 335, 338-39, 444 A.2d 445 (1982). With respect to criminal contempt, when there is no maximum authorized penalty, the actual sentence determines whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right to a jury trial. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511-12, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); Wilkins, 293 Md. at 338-39, 444 A.2d 445. Because appellant was sentenced to 180 days, he concedes that he was not entitled to a jury trial under the Federal Constitution. Appellant argues, however, that a defendant charged with criminal contempt in circuit court is entitled to a jury trial under the State Constitution and other State laws. He contends that, because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial, his conviction should be reversed. While appellant acknowledges a number of Maryland precedents that support the proposition that a criminal contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial unless he is imprisoned for more than six months, see, e.g., Whitaker v. Prince George's County, 307 Md. 368, 514 A.2d 4 (1986) and Wilkins, supra, appellant argues that such cases were decided on federal constitutional principles only.
Citing Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 359 A.2d 203 (1976), appellant first argues that, "where a defendant is charged with a crime in a court of general jurisdiction, [such as the circuit court,] and where no legislative enactment restricts his right to jury trial, ... [the defendant] is entitled to the common law mode of trial, i.e., trial by jury." Id. at 49, 359 A.2d 203. Without further elaboration, appellant indicates that the Court noted an exception to the general rule for summary proceedings. Appellant concludes that, given that there is no statute restricting the right to trial by jury in cases of constructive criminal contempt, and charges of constructive criminal contempt are not subject to summary proceedings under the Maryland Rules, see Rule 15-205 and former Rule P4, defendants charged with constructive criminal contempt in the circuit court are entitled to trial by jury.
Thompson did not involve criminal contempt. Instead, that case was concerned with application of a statute regarding district court jurisdiction, § 4-302 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1975 Cum.Supp.). The defendant in Thompson was charged with three violations of the motor vehicle laws, one of which was punishable by a fine and imprisonment of up to one year, one of which was punishable by a fine and imprisonment of up to two months, and one of which was punishable by a fine only. Id. at 44, 359 A.2d 203. Pursuant to § 4-302, which provides that a defendant may demand a jury trial and have his case removed to the circuit court if he is charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than 90 days, the defendant demanded a jury trial and his case was removed to the circuit court. While the case was pending in the circuit court, the prosecutor nolle prossed the most serious charge and then argued that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the remaining charges. Id. at 45, 359 A.2d 203. The circuit court agreed and tried the defendant without a jury. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed.
The Court of Appeals noted that § 4-302 is not a limitation upon the right to jury trial in circuit court but, instead, is a statute dealing with the "circumstances whereby jurisdiction attaches in the circuit courts over offenses 'otherwise within the District Court's jurisdiction.' " Id. at 47-48, 359 A.2d 203 (quoting CJ § 4-302). Tracing back to early English law, the Court went on to note that, at common law, all crimes, serious or petty, were tried by jury in courts of general jurisdiction. The Court noted that this right was restricted only when authority to try minor crimes was conferred upon justices of the peace, predecessors to the district court. More specifically, the Court stated that
[u]nless an offense was specifically entrusted by statute to the summary jurisdiction of the justices it could not be tried in summary fashion, since the common law was a "stranger" to such proceedings.
Id. at 51, 359 A.2d 203 (citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 356 (W. Hammond ed. 1890)). The Court stated that, while it may be constitutional to restrict the right to jury trial in those cases involving petty offenses, there is no indication that the legislature intended to restrict such right in those cases tried in the circuit courts, the highest common law courts of record in the State, exercising full common law powers and jurisdiction in criminal cases. Id. at 52-53, 359 A.2d 203. Consequently, a defendant charged with a crime in the circuit court is entitled to the common law mode of trial, trial by jury.
Appellant's reliance upon Thompson is misplaced. As noted above, the Thompson decision was not based upon any peculiarity of Maryland law, but instead, was based upon the common law, as it developed in England, and subsequently, in this country. At common...
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Ashford v. State
...(Emphasis added) 13. We decline the State's invitation to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals in Barksdale v. State, 122 Md.App. 392, 712 A.2d 562 (1998). There, the intermediate appellate court held that the defendant, who had been charged with and tried in the Circuit Cour......
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