Barland v. Eau Claire County

Citation575 N.W.2d 691,216 Wis.2d 560
Decision Date13 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-1607,96-1607
Parties, 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2799 Thomas H. BARLAND, Paul J. Lenz, Gregory Peterson, Benjamin Proctor, and Eric Wahl, Circuit Court Judges for Eau Claire County, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. EAU CLAIRE COUNTY, Defendant-Co-Appellant, AFSCME Local 2223, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in the Court of Appeals) by Bruce F. Ehlke and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield Ehlke, Hawks and Domer, Madison and oral argument by Bruce F. Ehlke.

For the defendant-co-appellant there were briefs (in the Court of Appeals) and oral argument by Keith R. Zehms, Corporation Counsel, Eau Claire.

For the plaintiffs-respondents the cause was argued by David C. Rice, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the brief (in the Court of Appeals) was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

Amicus curiae brief (in the Court of Appeals) was filed by Thomas G. Cannon and O'Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., Milwaukee, for Wisconsin Trial Judges Association, Inc.

Amicus curiae brief (in the Supreme Court) was filed by Robert Horowitz and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, for Wisconsin Counties Assocation.

¶1 JON P. WILCOX, Justice

This case is not about powers that are explicitly set forth or described in our constitution, or even mentioned in our statutes. Rather, it is about powers that "[f]rom time immemorial ... have been conceded to courts because they are courts. Such powers have been conceded because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their existence. These powers are called inherent powers." State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928). Inherent powers allow the judiciary to maintain their status as a separate and co-equal branch of government.

¶2 Indeed, the inherent powers of the courts have been referred to as the "sword and shield of the judiciary." Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts: Sword and Shield of the Judiciary, National Judicial College (1994). Using these tools to protect its constitutional independence as a third branch of government, the judiciary should be able to shield against intrusions into its domain of exclusive judicial authority, while using its sword to cut away the constitutionally defective portions of a legislative enactment. Today we must determine whether circuit court judges have the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the unilateral removal of their judicial assistants by way of a collective bargaining agreement between county government and its employees. We hold that they do.

¶3 This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1995-96). 1 The circuit court granted the plaintiff judges' (the judges) motion for summary judgment and declared that a circuit court has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its judicial assistant regardless of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the county and its employees under the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA), Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70-111.77. defendants eau claire county (the county) and afscme lOCal 2223 (AFSCME) appealed from the circuit court's decision and order.

¶4 On certification, we consider whether a circuit court judge has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove his or her judicial assistant, regardless of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. As stated, we hold that a circuit court judge has the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the unilateral removal of his or her judicial assistant despite the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. However, we do not address a circuit court judge's power to appoint that assistant. 2 Therefore, we affirm the order of the circuit court granting the judges' motion for summary judgment on the basis that circuit court judges have the exclusive, inherent authority to remove their judicial assistants. 3

I.

¶5 Five Eau Claire County circuit court judges filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04 4 requesting the court to declare that a circuit court has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its judicial assistants, and that such authority cannot be modified by a collective bargaining agreement.

¶6 The circuit court made certain findings of fact based upon the parties' pleadings, briefs, and oral arguments, including the following. The County is a municipal employer within the meaning of MERA. AFSCME is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the Eau Claire County courthouse clerical employees bargaining unit. AFSCME and the County were parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("the agreement") in force for the period of January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1995. Collective bargaining agreements covering courthouse employees have been in effect in Eau Claire County since 1972. See County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME Local 2223, 190 Wis.2d 298, 301, 526 N.W.2d 802 (Ct.App.1994).

¶7 Section 4.02 of the agreement provides that in the event of a layoff, an affected employee has the right to invoke his or her seniority and move or "bump" into a position held by an employee with less seniority within the same bargaining unit, provided that the bumping employee possesses the "necessary qualifications" for that position.

¶8 In Eau Claire County, judicial assistant or legal secretary 5 vacancies have always been posted pursuant to the terms of the agreement, and filled through a posting procedure. 6 The last time that a judicial assistant position in the county was filled by posting was on July 13, 1981--14 years before the layoff here.

¶9 There are five judicial assistant positions within the courthouse clerical employees' bargaining unit. Three of those five positions provide clerical assistance to the circuit court. Ms. Shanan Melland serves as the judicial assistant to Eau Claire County Circuit Court Judge Paul J. Lenz and to the family court commissioner/court commissioner. Although the three judicial assistants for the five Eau Claire County circuit judges have specific responsibilities, they will, if the need arises, assist one another in their assignments.

¶10 The circuit court also made findings describing the procedural history of this action. On November 15, 1995, the County Board of Supervisors for Eau Claire County adopted Ordinance No. 95-96/237 which abolished certain positions effective January 1, 1996. Ms. Penny Walske, a member of the courthouse clerical bargaining unit, held a position that would be affected by the new ordinance. On November 30, 1995, Ms. Walske, a more senior employee, elected to bump Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz. The circuit court found that Ms. Walske meets or exceeds all the judicial assistant job qualifications required by the agreement. 7

¶11 The five Eau Claire County circuit court judges expressed their objection to the bumping of Ms. Melland to the County Board Committee on Personnel. The judges claimed to have exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants, under the doctrines of inherent judicial authority and separation of powers. Despite these arguments, the Committee on Personnel rejected the judges' arguments. Ms. Melland was notified by both the County and AFSCME that if she did not abandon her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz and report for work in the Office of the Clerk of Courts, she might be disciplined for insubordination. Further, a failure to comply meant that Ms. Melland would not be paid by the County after December 31, 1995.

¶12 On December 28, 1995, the judges filed a complaint seeking a declaration that they have the exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants, and that such authority may not be modified by a collective bargaining agreement. The judges also requested an order enjoining the County from bumping Ms. Melland and from refusing to pay her. On December 29, 1995, the circuit court heard arguments of the parties and issued a temporary injunction to enjoin the County and AFSCME from removing Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz. Then, on March 18, 1996, the judges filed a motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory relief and a permanent order to enjoin the County and AFSCME from bumping Ms. Melland.

¶13 On May 1, 1996, the court entered a declaratory judgment that circuit court judges have the exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants under the doctrines of inherent judicial authority and separation of powers. The court held that such authority may not be modified by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the County and AFSCME under MERA. Even if there were joint authority to appoint and remove, the circuit court concluded that the deliberate removal of a trained, trusted, and compatible employee would significantly impair the efficiency of the court and would irreparably harm the circuit judges as well as the public.

¶14 Having reached these conclusions, the circuit court permanently enjoined the County and AFSCME from removing Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz, from refusing to pay her, and from disciplining her for remaining in her judicial assistant position. Thereafter, the County and AFSCME timely appealed from the decision and order of the circuit court. We granted the court of appeals' request for certification.

II.

¶15 In this declaratory judgment action, we must decide whether the County's unilateral act to remove a judicial staff member, albeit pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, intrudes upon the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority of the circuit court. This is a question of first impression...

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