Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist.
Decision Date | 06 November 2015 |
Docket Number | 3:12-CV-638 |
Citation | 143 F.Supp.3d 205 |
Parties | John Barna, Plaintiff, v. Board of School Directors of the Panther Valley School District, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Gary D. Marchalk, Jonathan P. Phillips, Law Offices of Gary D. Marchalk, LLC, Tamaqua, PA, for Plaintiff.
Mark Joseph Kozlowski, Robin B. Snyder, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Scranton, PA, Robert T. Yurchak, Nesquehoning, PA, for Defendants.
Robert D. Mariani
Before the Court are the cross-motions for summary judgment of the Defendants, Board of School Directors of the Panther Valley School District, and Plaintiff, John Barna (Docs. 49, 77). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the permanent ban imposed by Defendants upon Barna prohibiting him from attending public school board meetings of the Board of School Directors of the Panther Valley School District and from entering upon the property of the School District violates Barna's free speech rights under the First Amendment. The Court also finds, however, that Barna's constitutional right to be free of a permanent ban on attending and speaking at School Board meetings was not clearly established at the time of the events which gave rise to this suit and that accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, summary judgment will be entered in favor of the Defendants.
Plaintiff, John Barna, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in this case on April 5, 2012 and an Amended Complaint the following day (Doc. 2). Plaintiffs Amended Complaint against Defendants alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free speech pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988 (Count I) and violations of his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unconstitutional prior restraint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Count II). (Doc. 2)
On October 15, 2013, the Court denied Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 22) and denied without prejudice the individual defendants' request for qualified immunity (Docs. 28, 29). As a result, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28,2014 (Doc. 49). In November of 2014, this Court referred the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to Magistrate Judge Carlson for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). The Magistrate Judge submitted the R&R (Doc. 66) on January 26,2015, recommending that the Court grant Defendants' motion, to which Plaintiff timely objected (Docs. 67, 68). Defendants did not file a response to the Plaintiffs Objections.
In previously denying Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court stated that:
there is a serious and substantial question in the undersigned's mind as to whether a permanent ban on Plaintiffs attendance at all future Panther Valley School Board meetings and Panther Valley school property was "narrowly tailored" to serve the undoubtedly compelling government interest in assuring the safety of other citizens in attendance at School Board meetings and on school property.
(Doc. 28, at 11). Defendants recognized this concern in their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, but without reference to any case law wherein a Court had upheld a similar permanent ban and stated only that their actions in banning Barna were the "least restrictive, narrowly tailored way of insuring the safety and welfare of the public and District officials, and maintaining order at Board meetings." (Doc. 50, at 10-11). Plaintiffs brief in opposition to summary judgment (Doc. 51) did not address this Court's aforementioned concern at all and failed to specifically discuss the Constitutional issues that are present as a result of the imposition of a permanent ban. The Magistrate Judge's R&R also did not address this specific issue.1
Thus, this Court by Order dated March 2, 2015 (Doc. 69) required the parties to submit supplemental briefs "setting forth authority on the limited issue of whether a permanent ban on attendance and speech such as that imposed on the Plaintiff in this case can ever be considered sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant or compelling government interest and thereby avoid a violation of Plaintiffs free speech rights under the First Amendment." (ld. at 3).
Supplemental briefs were filed by Plaintiff and Defendants (Docs. 72, 73). Further, the Defendants requested oral argument on the limited issue of the constitutionality of a permanent ban on attendance and speech (Doc. 73-1), a request that this Court granted on March 30, 2015 (Doc. 74).
Oral argument was held before the Court on April 10, 2015.
At oral argument, the parties agreed there are no disputes of material fact in this case and that the issue to be resolved was a question of law with respect to the constitutionality of the permanent ban imposed upon Barna and the related claim of the Defendants of qualified immunity. (Off. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 24,26).
Barna filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 28, 2015. (Doc. 77). That motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition along with the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants.
As noted, at oral argument, counsel for the parties agreed that there was no genuine dispute of material fact so that the case was appropriately to be decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. That Barna's behavior at successive School Board meetings was inappropriate was conceded by Barna's counsel in the following exchange with the Court:
[T]he defendants have now offered substantial evidence to show that on numerous occasions, Barna engaged in conduct that included making comments that multiple people believed were threatening; cursed in the presence of students who were in attendance; got into, or nearly got into, physical altercations with Board members and Jack Ruzicka, a security guard in attendance at Board meetings; persistently interrupted the Board's conduct of its business; and even invited a Board member to fight during the October 2011 meeting, which seems to have been the last straw for the Board.
Counsel for the parties, at oral argument, agreed there were no other disputed issues of material fact:
(Off. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 24).
Further, counsel agreed that a school district school board meeting is considered a "limited public forum." (Id. at 4). Likewise, Defendants' counsel acknowledged that the ban placed upon Barna which prohibits him from attending and speaking at School Board meetings as well as entering upon the property of the Panther Valley School District is a permanent ban:
(Id. at 7-8).
And again, at the conclusion of oral argument the following exchange between the Court and counsel took place:
(Id. at 33).
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
. "As to materiality, ... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Li berty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
. Once such a showing has been made, the party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cole v. Goossen
...individuals, and the issue in the case was whether that particular ban was constitutional. See, e.g. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dist. , 143 F. Supp. 3d 205, 222-23 (M.D. Pa. 2015), aff'd in part, vacated in part 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussing the constitutionality of "the imposition on a......
-
Davison v. Plowman
...concern individuals banned from recurring public meetings for disruptive behavior. See, e.g. , Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist. , 143 F.Supp.3d 205 (M.D. Pa. 2015) ; Stevens v. Sch. City of Hobart, No. 2:13-CV-336-PRC, 2015 WL 4870789, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 6......
-
Warkevicz v. Berwick Area Sch. Dist.
...Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 76. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 77. 555 U.S. at 236. 78. Id. 79. 143 F. Supp. 3d 205, 207 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 80. For that matter, Defendants would be respectfully advised to consider that courts, in light of the foregoing precedents,......
-
Hirt v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 287
...public forum," but questioning whether "a sweeping and restrictive" ban was reasonable); Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 143 F. Supp. 3d 205, 213-14, 222-23 (M.D. Pa. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that school board meetings c......