Barndt v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections

Citation902 A.2d 589
PartiesMichael Aloysius BARNDT, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Decision Date28 June 2006
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Philip D. Lauer, Easton, for petitioner.

Debra Sue Rand, Asst. Counsel and Michael A. Farnan, Chief Counsel, Camp Hill, for respondent.

BEFORE: PELLEGRINI, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and KELLEY, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Senior Judge KELLEY.

Before this Court are the Preliminary Objections in the Nature of a Demurrer (Objections) filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) to the Petition for Review (Petition) filed by Michael Aloysius Barndt (Barndt). As set forth below, we grant DOC's Objections, and dismiss Barndt's Petition.

On August 31, 2002, Barndt was serving a period of supervised release from a federal sentence previously imposed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On that date, Barndt was arrested following a traffic stop in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, in the wake of the discovery of his possession of illegal drugs. Barndt was released on bail three days later, on September 2, 2002, and following that release, Barndt became a fugitive with regard to both his prior federal charges, and to his then-pending state charges.

Subsequently, Barndt was apprehended, incarcerated by the federal authorities effective April 22, 2003, and sentenced to serve an additional period of confinement on federal charges with a maximum release date of December 13, 2004. On May 12, 2003, the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (Trial Court) issued a bench warrant for Barndt relating to his state charges, and the warrant was served on the United States Marshall Service. Subsequently, Barndt was committed to Northampton County Prison in Easton, Pennsylvania.1

A trial on the state charges was held in the Trial Court on May 10, 2004, and on August 13, 2004, the Trial Court sentenced Barndt to serve time in a state correctional institution on the following relevant convictions:

(1) possession of heroin: 11 months to 3 years;

(2) furnishing false identification to law enforcement: 3 months to 12 months, concurrent with (1);

(3) unlawful possession of cocaine; 8 months to 3 years, consecutive to (1) and (2);

(4) possession of drug paraphernalia; 3 months to 12 months, concurrent with (1) and (2).

In the sentencing forms completed by the Trial Court for the above-listed sentences, the Trial Court specifically checked the boxes marked "Credit Time Served" in the section devoted to the "Sentence Imposed" for each sentence.

Thereafter, DOC sent a letter to the Trial Court sentencing Judge, dated March 30, 2005, requesting assistance in clarifying and applying the terms of the Trial Court's state sentencing in relation to Barndt's credit for time served. See DOC Objections, Exhibit A.2 DOC asserted to the Trial Court that, notwithstanding Barndt's incarceration in Northampton County Prison, he was serving the previously imposed federal sentence until that sentence's maximum date on December 13, 2004, which time cannot be duplicatively counted as credit towards his state sentence. The DOC letter included a brief synopsis of sentencing credit law on the asserted point, and further noted that DOC had not credited Barndt's state sentence for the period of confinement for his federal sentence.3 DOC further requested that the Trial Court clarify its sentencing order language indicating that Barndt should receive credit for time served, and indicated that it would apply the credit as advised by the Trial Court following the Trial Court's consideration of DOC's letter.

The Trial Court, by letter dated April 4, 2005, stated that its intent was only that Barndt receive "any credit that he was entitled to receive", and that it did not intend for Barndt to receive any duplicate credit. See Objections, Exhibit B. The Trial Court's letter further stated that, after reading DOC's letter to the Trial Court, it advised that Barndt not receive the additional duplicative credit as described in DOC's letter.

Barndt has now filed his Petition, in the nature of mandamus, in this Court's original jurisdiction, requesting an order that DOC recalculate Barndt's sentence to reflect credit towards his state sentence for time served for the period from May 13, 2003 (the date on which the Trial Court issued its bench warrant for the state charges), to December 13, 2004 (the date on which Barndt's federal sentence expired). DOC has filed herewith its Objections to Barndt's Petition, which are currently before the Court for disposition.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which seeks to compel official performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty, as opposed to a discretionary act. Griffin v. Department of Corrections, 862 A.2d 152 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). Because the sentence imposed by a court involves a question of law and involves no discretion on the part of DOC, a writ of mandamus will lie to compel DOC to properly compute a prisoner's prison sentence. Id.

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer admit as true all well and clearly pleaded material, relevant factual averments, and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Griffin. However, conclusions of law and unjustified inferences are not so admitted. Id. A demurrer will not be sustained unless the face of the pleadings shows that the law will not permit recovery, and any doubts should be resolved against sustaining the demurrer. DeHart v. Horn, Com'r of Department of Corrections, 694 A.2d 16 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).

DOC first argues that any time spent in pre-sentence detention cannot be credited to an unrelated sentence being actively served by an inmate. DOC cites to Section 9760(1) of the Sentencing Code,4 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), which permits credit "for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed. . ." DOC emphasizes that the pre-state-sentence custodial period for which Barndt seeks credit was time in which Barndt was actively serving his unrelated federal sentence, and that period of confinement was not spent as a sole result of the state criminal charge.

Barndt argues that his Petition alleges that he was serving a period of supervised release imposed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, at the time of his commission of the state offenses on which he is incarcerated, and that he thereafter became a fugitive with respect to both the state charges and the federal supervised release. It was following that fugitive period, Barndt asserts in his Petition, that he was thereafter incarcerated and sentenced to serve a period of additional confinement. Barndt argues that, although his Petition does not address this point, the additional period of confinement ordered by the federal authorities related directly to the conduct which forms the basis for the state prosecution.

We disagree that Barndt's federal sentence for which he now seeks credit5 towards his state sentence was "a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence [was] imposed" for purposes of computing credit for time served under Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code. We are aware of no precedent — and Barndt is unable to assert any applicable authority — for such a reading of Section 9760, or, more saliently, for the application of credit for time served towards both a prior original federal sentence, and to a new state sentence imposed in the wake of a state criminal charge.

We first note that both Barndt's Petition is silent as to the precise cause and/or charges that formed the basis for his federal detention following the state criminal charges at issue sub judice. In relation to this issue, Barndt's Petition states:

8. At the time of the commission of the [state] offenses on which [Barndt] is incarcerated, he was serving a period of supervised release imposed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

9. Following his release on bail on the aforementioned [state] charges, [Barndt] became a fugitive with respect to both those [state] charges and the Federal supervised release.

10. [Barndt] was thereafter incarcerated by Federal Authorities, and sentenced to serve an additional period of confinement.

Petition at 3 (emphasis added). Beyond those Petition allegations, Barndt has provided no documentation, or any evidence or argument whatsoever, as to precisely what charges his federal confinement was predicated upon. Admitting Barndt's factual averments as true for our instant purposes,6 the only inference fairly deducible therefrom in regards to this issue is that supported by Paragraph 9 of his Petition; namely, that the "[state] charges and the Federal supervised release" comprise two distinct and separate grounds for Barndt's subsequent state and federal sentences. Stated otherwise, and as implicitly stated by Barndt, Barndt's federal sentence and confinement can only be inferred to have been for violations of the conditions of his prior supervised release, while his state sentences and confinement where unquestionably for violations of our Commonwealth's Criminal Code. See also Petition, Exhibits A-E, G. Simply put, since the only reasonably inferable facts herein are that Barndt was again placed in federal custody as a result of violations of the conditions of his federal supervised release, Barndt has failed to allege that any federal charges have directly resulted from the acts that resulted in his state criminal charges.

Notwithstanding this lack of specificity and fact assertion within his Petition, we find no authority for the application of Section 9760 to the instant unique set of facts, and further find no authority whatsoever for the double credit for time served that Barndt seeks herein. Our precedents have not directly addressed Barndt's current situation, wherein he seeks pre-state-sentence credit for...

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