Barnes v. 3/12 Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV410-178 |
| Parties | JUNIOR HENRY BARNES, Plaintiff, v. 3/12 TRANSPORTATION, INC., and CASTLEPOINT FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Before the Court are Defendants 3/12 Transportation, Inc. and Castlepoint Florida Insurance Company's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26), Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31), and accompanying Daubert Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Witness John D. Bethea (Doc. 27).1 For the reasons outlined below, Defendant's Daubert motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Mr. Bethea may not offer testimony to speed of Plaintiff's truck or the rear taillights on Plaintiff's trailer; however, Mr. Bethea mayoffer testimony concerning the contours of southbound Interstate 95 at the approximate location of the accident and concerning Brown's response time. Additionally, Defendants' original and amended motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.
At some time around midnight on March 10 or early morning of March 11, 2 010, Plaintiff Junior Henry Barnes was traveling south in his vehicle-hauler tractor trailer on Interstate 95 near Pooler, Georgia.2 (Doc. 31 at 1.) 3/12 Transportation employee Norshan Brown ("Brown") was also traveling south on Interstate 95 in his tractor trailer at the same time and place. (Doc. 3 3 at 1.) After Plaintiff slept for eight hours at the truck stop, he conducted an inspection and began driving south on Interstate 95. (Doc. 26, Ex. 3 at 28.) Soon after Plaintiff started to drive, he noticed transmission problems. (Doc. 33 at 1; Doc. 26, Ex. 3 at 29-30.) Plaintiff contends that he had just passed the inspection station and decided to continue to the nearest truck stop. (Doc. 33 at 31.) According to Plaintiff, he "activated his four-way emergency flashers and proceeded toExit 90 in the outermost lane of travel at a speed of approximately 4 0-45 miles per hour." (Doc. 33 at 2.)
At some point soon thereafter, Brown's truck struck the rear of Plaintiff's trailer. (Doc 33 at 2; Doc. 31 at 2-3.) Both Plaintiff and Brown testified that Plaintiff continued to drive after Brown's truck collided with Plaintiff's trailer. (Doc. 26, Ex. 3 at 33, 35; Id., Ex. 1 at 23, 55-56.) Initially, Brown stated that Plaintiff's trailer lights were not working at the time of the incident. (Doc. 26, Ex. 1 at 4 5.) Later, Brown remarked that he was not sure whether Plaintiff's trailer lights were working or not. (Id. at 49-50.) Still later, Brown remarked that Plaintiff's trailer had "two teeny lights on the back," but that he could not see them. (Id. at 50-51.) Brown also told police officers immediately following the incident that Plaintiff applied his brakes right before collision. (Doc. 26, Ex. 2.) However, during his deposition, Brown testified that Plaintiff had not applied his brakes, but later corrected his statement to say that Plaintiff, indeed, did slam on his brakes. (Doc. 26, Ex. 1 at 55-56.) Brown stated that he could not see Plaintiff's truck until just prior to impact and that he could not avoid the collision because there were nearby and adjacent vehicles. (Id. at 45.) Plaintiff disputes this, however, claiming there wereno nearby vehicles impeding Brown from changing lanes.3(Doc. 26 , Ex. 3 at 32.)
Four days later, Plaintiff first sought medical attention from his primary care physician, Dr. Chitra Rajpal, at Clinch Medical Practice in Homerville, Georgia. (Doc. 26, Ex. 5} According to Plaintiff, he suffered "severe neck pain following the wreck and underwent surgery to repair the damage caused by the wreck." (Doc. 33 at 2; Doc. 26, Ex. 3 at 44-46.) Plaintiff was referred by Dr. Rajpal to Dr. Hitham Khalil, a neurosurgeon in Valdosta, who performed surgery on Plaintiff's neck in August 2010. {Doc. 26, Ex. 3 at 46.) Plaintiff plans to have Dr. Khalil testify that "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, [the] March 2010 collision exacerbated [Plaintiff's] pain symptoms and precipitated the need for [Plaintiff] to undergo surgery." {Doc. 33 at 3.)
As a result of the collision, Plaintiff filed this action, asserting negligence and negligence per se claims based on Brown's failure to exercise ordinary care in colliding with Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, through Brown, violated the duties owed to Plaintiff by failing to exercise due care, following tooclosely, failing to keep a vigilant lookout ahead, failing to avoid collision with Plaintiff's trailer, traveling too fast for conditions and being otherwise negligent and careless. (Id. ¶ 15.) Due to Brown's negligence, Plaintiff alleges he suffered injury and damages. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff has engaged John Bethea as an expert witness to testify that Plaintiff's vehicle hauler was traveling at a speed of 40-45 miles per hour, the rear taillights on Plaintiff's trailer were operational, and Brown had a clear view of the rear of Plaintiff's trailer. (Doc. 25 at 4.) Defendants have filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Bethea. (Doc. 27.) Defendants argue his testimony should be excluded because it is unreliable and not based upon sufficient facts or data.4 (Doc. 27 at 2-3.) Plaintiff objects to the exclusion of Mr. Bethea's testimony and avers that Mr. Bethea's methodology and analysis meet Daubert standards and is reliable. (Doc. 2 9 at 5-6.) Defendants did not depose Mr. Bethea.
In conjunction with the motion to exclude, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 26) and a corrected, amended motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31).In their motion. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence concerning whether Brown violated any duty or standard of care owed to Plaintiff. (Id. at 7.) In the alternative, Defendants allege that Plaintiff's contributory negligence warrants summary judgment in favor of Defendants. (Doc. 31 at 12-14.) Plaintiff contends that issues of material fact and jury questions exist, thereby precluding summary judgment. (Doc. 33 at 1, 7.)
The admission of expert testimony is controlled by Federal Rule of Evidence 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
"As the Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Daubert, Rule 702 compels district courts to perform the critical gatekeeping function concerning the admissibility of expert scientific evidence." United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
Id. While there will often be some overlap between these concepts of qualification, reliability, and helpfulness, they are distinct concepts that courts should be careful not to conflate. Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois, UK, Ltd. , 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). The burden of establishing that these requirements are met rests with the proponent of the expert testimony, and not the Daubert challenger. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002).
When a court considers the reliability of a particular expert's opinion, it considers, to the extent possible, (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1341 (citing McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256). These factors "do not constitute a 'definitive checklist or test.' " Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)). Rather, the applicability of these factors "depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Id.
Defendants argue that Mr. Bethea's testimony should be excluded because his opinions concerning the speed of Plaintiff's truck, the rear taillights on Plaintiff's trailer, and Brown's view of the rear of Plaintiff's trailer are unreliable and based on insufficient facts.5 (Doc. 25 at 4.) Specifically, Defendants contend that Mr. Bethea "relied solely upon documentary evidence such as photographs and the accident report, and the deposition testimony of the drivers involved in the collision." (Doc. 2 7 at 2.) Defendants also seek exclusion because Mr. Bethea did not "examine either one of the vehicles in the accident, or the scene of the collision" and did not interview any witnesses. (Id. at 2-3.)
After review of Mr. Bethea's report (Doc. 25), the Court concludes that Mr. Bethea's opinions as to the speedof Plaintiff's vehicle and the functioning of Plaintiff's trailer lights will not assist the trier of fact to further understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Both of these opinions merely parrot relevant, admissible evidence that does not require any technical or specialized analysis or expertise....
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