Barnes v. American Fert. Co.

• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Chinn, J.
• Citation: Barnes v. American Fert. Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902 (1925)
• Decision Date: 17 December 1925
• Parties: LAURA E. BARNES, ET ALS. v. THE AMERICAN FERTILIZER CO.

Page 692

144 Va. 692

LAURA E. BARNES, ET ALS. v. THE AMERICAN FERTILIZER CO.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond.

December 17, 1925.

1. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Validity of Decrees Dependent upon Jurisdiction of Court Rendering it — Decrees for Divorce — Transfer to Wife of Property of Husband — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a proceeding by attachment to subject the property of a husband which had been transferred to his wife by decrees in an action of divorce, to which decrees both husband and wife had consented.

Held: That the decrees in question were valid and effective only insofar as the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter therein attempted to be adjudicated.

2. JURISDICTION — Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter — How Acquired. — It is fundamental that jurisdiction of the subject matter can only be acquired by the virtue of the constitution and some statute.

3. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Court Exceeding Jurisdiction — Void Decrees May be Attacked Directly or Collaterally. — To the extent that the court exceeds its authority or its jurisdiction over the subject matter embraced in its decrees, they are absolute nullities, and may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner; and may be declared void by every court in which they are called in question.

4. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Collateral Attack — Where Court had Jurisdiction of the Parties and the Subject Matter — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a proceeding by attachment to subject land, once belonging to a husband but transferred to his wife by decrees in a divorce suit, agreed to by both husband and wife. If the court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and the procedure was in the usual equity form, the decrees were plainly not void, however erroneous they may have been, and cannot be collaterally attacked by a third person, unless he shows they were procured through fraud of collusion for the purpose of defrauding him as to some preexisting right.

5. JUDGMENTS AND DECREES — Void Judgments — Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Parties — Character of the Judgment. — It is essential to the validity of a judgment or decree that the court rendering it shall have jurisdiction of both the subject matter and parties. But this is not all, for both these essentials may exist and still the judgment or decree may be void, because the character of the judgment was not such as the court had power to render.

6. DIVORCE — Jurisdiction Purely Statutory — Property of the Parties. — The jurisdiction of divorce causes is purely statutory, and the court possesses no powers in such cases involving matters of property beyond those conferred by statute, with the exception of awarding alimony, which is an incident of divorce and based upon the doctrine of the husband's duty to maintain and support his wife.

7. DIVORCE — Alimony — Decrees Transferring Husvband's Real Estate as Alimony — Validity of Decrees. — Without express statutory authority, and such authority is not to be found in section 5111 of the Code of 1919, a court has no power to transfer to the wife any specific portion of her husband's real estate as alimony; for the reason that alimony, in the commonly accepted meaning of the term, is an allowance to the wife out of the husband's earnings, or income from his estate, and not the estate itself.

8. DIVORCE — Transfer of Husband's Real Estate to Wife — Section 5111 of the Code of 1919 — "Estates". — The word "estates" as used in section 5111 of the Code of 1919, embraces the contingent rights of dower and courtesy. The statute intended to give the court the right to settle the rights of each party in the property of the other, and if need be to extinguish them. While there might possibly be some other property right than that of the contingent rights of dower and courtesy which the court is empowered by this section to settle in cases of divorce, it is clear, certainly in the absence of agreement, that the power of the court is limited to the settlement of these property rights of the parties which have arisen by operation of law out of the marital relation, and the protection of their respective estates.

9. DIVORCE — Jurisdiction of the Court to Approve Agreements and Settlements Between the Parties. — Although courts may have no authority, in the absence of statute, to allot to the wife any part of the husband's real estate as alimony, courts which have jurisdiction to grant divorces and award alimony also have the incidental authority to approve bona fide and valid agreements between the parties for the settlement of property rights and claims for alimony, though they have no jurisdiction in the divorce suit to enforce compliance with such contracts, or to alter their terms.

10. DIVORCE — Decree Approving Agreement and Settlement Between the Parties — Decree not a Decree for Alimony. — A decree entered in a divorce suit approving a contract between the parties for the settlement of alimony and property rights, is not a decree for alimony.

11. DIVORCE — Decree Approving Agreement and Settlement Between the Parties — Decree and one for Alimony — Case at Bar. — In the instant case decrees for divorce ratified and approved an agreement between the parties by which real estate of the husband was transferred to the wife. The decree recited that this was done in order to avoid protracted litigation concerning the property rights of the parties, and insofar as the decrees in question undertook to approve the agreement between the husband and wife, they were within the limits of the court's jurisdiction, and did not constitute an attempt on the part of the court to transfer to the wife title to her husband's real estate as alimony.

12. DIVORCE — Settlement Between the Parties — Ratification and Approval by Court. — In divorce proceedings the court has the right to set forth in its decrees an agreement between the parties as to their property rights; to determine whether such agreement was fair and equitable, and in good faith; and, upon so finding, to ratify and approve the same; and that action being within the jurisdictional powers of the court, the decrees are valid and binding to that extent if no other.

13. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Jurisdiction of Court — Valid in Part, Invalid in Part. — When a court has jurisdiction of the cause and the parties, its judgment, so far and within its powers, is valid, though it may be invalid in other respects. A judgment may be good in part, and bad in part. Good to the extent it is authorized by law, and bad for the residue.

14. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Recording Acts — Application of Section 5192 of the Code of 1919 to Contracts Embodied in Valid Decrees. — Section 5192 of the Code of 1919, providing that contracts not in writing, for the conveyance or sale of real estate, shall be void as to purchasers for value, does not apply to contracts embodied in valid decrees entered by courts of equity.

15. FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES — Recording Acts — Section 5192-5194 of the Code of 1919 — Divorce Decree Approving Agreement Transferring Real Estate of Husband to Wife — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, upon the application of the wife in a divorce suit for alimony, suit money and "other relief," the parties came before the court and laid before it a compromise agreement which they had entered into for the settlement of alimony and property rights; by which real property of the husband was transferred to the wife; whereupon the court, as it had a right to do, approved and adopted the agreement, and incorporated it in its decree.

Held: That the registry statutes (sections 5192, 5194 of the Code of 1919) did not extend to these decrees, and that the rights acquired by the wife and children, by virtue of the decrees, were not subject to the subsequent attachment lien of a creditor of the husband. Nor could it matter whether the agreement was or was not in writing.

16. CONTRACTS — Judgments and Decrees — Judgment as Contract. — Judgment and decrees are contracts of the highest character and especially is this so when entered by consent.

17. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Consent Decrees. — A consent decree is a contract or agreement between the parties to the suit entered of record in the cause with the consent of the court, and is binding unless secured by fraud or mistakes.

18. DIVORCE — Decrees Ratifying and Approving Transfer of Husband's Real Estate to Wife — Interest Vested in Wife by Decree — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a proceeding by attachment to subject land of husband transferred to his wife by agreement approved in divorce decrees, if the court had jurisdiction to approve the agreement such approval could have no less effect than to give the wife the right in the absence of fraud, collusion, or imposition upon the court, to enforce compliance with the terms of the agreement in the proper proceedings in the proper forum; and she was thereby vested with an equitable interest in the real estate in controversy, which not being within the operation of the registry statutes, is superior to the lien of the attachment in this case. After the entry of the divorce decrees, the husband had the bare legal title to the property as trustee.

19. ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT — Protection of Interest of Third Party — Section 6407 of the Code of 1919. — The evident purpose of section 6407 of the Code of 1919 was to protect the equitable as well as the legal rights and interests of third persons in the attachment proceedings, and the lien of an attaching creditor should be subordinated to all such rights and interests as exist at the time the attachment is levied.

20. JUDGMENT AND DECREES — Judgment Lien — Rights of Third Party. — A judgment lien is always subject to every possible description of equity held by a third party against the debtor at the time the judgment attached; and it is immaterial whether the...