Barnes v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 09 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 106. September Term 2007.,106. September Term 2007. |
| Citation | 181 Md. App. 390,956 A.2d 770 |
| Parties | Le`Etta Johnson BARNES v. Patrick Ivan BARNES. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Josephine Scarlett of Suitland, for appellant.
Jan M. Hauser (Phyllis A. Hotchkiss on the brief), Riderwood, for appellee.
Argued before HOLLANDER, DEBORAH S. EYLER and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR., (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
This case arises from divorce proceedings between Le'Etta Johnson Barnes, appellant, and Patrick Ivan Barnes, appellee, litigated in the Circuit Court for Charles County. Appellant challenges an Order issued by the circuit court on February 15, 2007, which incorporated the terms of a settlement agreement that the parties entered on the record at a hearing on August 1, 2006. Thereafter, appellee's counsel prepared the Order and submitted it to the court, without appellant's signature, because appellant refused to sign it.
Appellant presents three issues for our review, which we quote:
I. Whether the Circuit Court committed clear error by issuing a consent order to dispose of contested marital property issues without requiring the Appellee to file a financial statement and without considering evidence that the terms of the order did not designate the specific retirement benefits to be distributed.
II. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence that the parties had not reached an agreement on terms of the proposed settlement agreement represented by the consent order during the settlement hearing, and evidence that the Appellant had not consented to the terms as intended by the Appellee.
III. Whether the Consent Order issued by the Circuit Court should be overturned as null and void because it is unenforceable as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, the settlement hearing upon which it is based did not result in a meeting of the minds between the parties, and the settlement negotiations were not entered into in good faith by the Appellee.
For the reasons that follow, we shall dismiss the appeal.
The parties were married on August 15, 1992, and separated in February of 2005. No children were born to their union. According to the briefs, appellee is employed by Verizon and appellant is a "sole proprietor nail technician."
Appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce on April 17, 2006, based on a one-year separation. He alleged that the parties had resolved issues pertaining to the division of marital property and spousal support, and that no property or support issues remained for the court to resolve.
In her Answer, appellant denied that the separation was intended to end the marriage. She also denied that the parties had resolved all issues pertaining to spousal support and the division of marital property. Appellant subsequently filed a Counterclaim for Absolute Divorce on grounds of adultery and constructive desertion, in which she detailed the property issues that she contended were unresolved. In her Counterclaim, which appellant personally signed in accordance with Maryland Rule 9-202(a), appellant averred:
16. During the course of their 13-year marriage, [appellant] has been self-employed and has relied on [appellee] for financial support and maintenance, including pension and health insurance. During their discussions of financial planning, [appellee] discouraged [appellant] from opening a retirement account or IRA stating continuously that the two would be able to live off his pension from Verizon. [Appellant] relied to her detriment on [appellee's] representation that he would take care of her and did not open a retirement account.
17. In March 2006, during a telephone conversation [appellee] informed [appellant] that they could stay married so she would be able to continue her medical insurance coverage.
Accordingly, appellant requested a judgment of absolute divorce as well as other relief, including spousal support of $850 per month, an order that appellee continue appellant's health insurance, and half of the funds from two real estate transactions involving the parties. Of import here, appellant also sought entitlement to "her share of [appellee's] retirement account with Verizon and any and all other retirement accounts, IRA, 401-K, pension plans, stock or profit sharing plans held or obtained during the course of the marriage. ..." Along with her Counterclaim, appellant filed a long-form financial statement in the form prescribed by Md. Rule 9-203(a).
Appellee filed an Answer to the Counterclaim on July 11, 2006, requesting its dismissal. But, appellee did not file a financial statement. On the same date, appellant filed an Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce, seeking a division of marital assets. In relevant part, the Amended Complaint requested:
C. That the Court order a division in kind or, if appropriate, a sale of all real and personal property jointly owned by the parties, including the Defendant's business, Nails N Flight, and if sale be decreed, distribute the proceeds equitably.
D. That the Court, pursuant to Md. Code, Family Law, Section 8-205(a) transfer to the Plaintiff his marital share of any and all of the assets from the Defendant's business, Nails N Flight.
On August 1, 2006, the parties and their lawyers attended a status conference before a domestic relations master. Prior to the conference, the parties and their attorneys engaged in settlement negotiations in the courthouse, which are not a part of the record. In their briefs, the parties present differing accounts of that meeting.1
In any event, it is undisputed that, after their negotiations, the parties and counsel came before the domestic relations master. The following colloquy is relevant:
That Mr. Barnes will give Mrs. Barnes three thousand dollars within thirty days of today.
That Mrs. Barnes will receive the marital share of Mr. Barnes's pension with Verizon if, as, and when he receives it pursuant to the Bangs Formula.
And, Mr. Barnes will continue Mrs. Barnes on his health insurance through Verizon through the marriage. And ... will cooperate with Mrs. Barnes if Verizon is inclined to allow her to continue to stay on the health insurance ... with the understanding that Mrs. Barnes will be responsible for payment of the health insurance following divorce.
All other property has been divided to the marital [sic] satisfaction of the parties.
And, each party will keep all other property which is in their possession with no right of claim to any property ... not otherwise mentioned.
It is also my understanding that Mr. Barnes will file what will be a Second Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce based on a one year mutual and voluntary separation.
And, we will then move forward filing ... once that it is answered [sic], filing a motion to refer the case to an examiner to take uncontested testimony.
The domestic relations master then asked the attorneys to voir dire their clients. The following colloquy is pertinent:
The master made one observation concerning the agreement:
[Y]ou may be well aware of this, but my understanding is that if there is an order for Mr. Barnes to keep insurance on Ms. Barnes after a divorce ... I guess what I'm saying is do you want to give effect to that provision? I think it does need to be part of the order. But, obviously it will be so, I just wanted to make sure of that.
There was no objection to the master's suggestion. Appellant's counsel then advised the master that "[t]here is one other matter." She explained: "Mrs. Barnes would like to have stated in the order that she has the right to use her maiden name."
The master gave the parties until October 6, 2006, to prepare and sign a proposed order incorporating the terms of the agreement. Appellee's attorney agreed to draft the proposed order. The master then concluded the hearing, stating:
The merits hearing of October 6, 2006, was rescheduled to November 17, 2006, as a result of a medical emergency on the part of appellee's attorney. It was then rescheduled to January 5, 2007, due to maternity leave for appellant's attorney, and was apparently postponed again because of a conflict on the part of appellee's...
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