Barnes v. Bernini
Decision Date | 30 July 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 2 CA-SA 2018-0029,2 CA-SA 2018-0029 |
Citation | 426 P.3d 313 |
Parties | Jarrad Trevor BARNES, Petitioner, v. Hon. Deborah BERNINI, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent, and The State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
James L. Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender, By James L. Fullin, Legal Defender, and Stephanie Ryan, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Petitioner
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney, By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Counsel for Real Party in Interest
¶ 1 In this special action, petitionerJarrad Barnes challenges the respondent judge’s order scheduling a jury trial to determine whether his conviction for negligent homicide is punishable as a dangerous offense.He maintains empaneling a new jury to determine a fact necessary to enhance his sentence violates double jeopardy principles.He also contends the state waived the issue pursuant to Rule 19.1, Ariz. R. Crim. P.For the following reasons, we accept jurisdiction but deny relief.
¶ 2 While our acceptance of special-action jurisdiction is highly discretionary, Randolph v. Groscost , 195 Ariz. 423, ¶ 6, 989 P.2d 751(1999), Arizona courts"have held that ‘a petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.’ "State v. Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 22, 94 P.3d 1119(2004), quotingNalbandian v. Superior Court , 163 Ariz. 126, 130, 786 P.2d 977, 981(App.1989).Although the claim may also be raised on appeal after retrial, seeState v. Minnitt , 203 Ariz. 431, ¶ 24, 55 P.3d 774(2002), special-action review is appropriate "[b]ecause the Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees the right to be free from subsequent prosecution" and, if applicable, "the clause is violated by the mere commencement of retrial."Moody , 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 22, 94 P.3d 1119.Furthermore, the issues raised here are of first impression in Arizona, another important factor in granting special action review.SeeState ex rel. Romley v. Martin , 203 Ariz. 46, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142(App.2002).Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction of Barnes’s interlocutory double jeopardy claim.
¶ 3 According to the state’s recitation of the facts, in May 2016, Barnes was driving at excessive speeds with both marijuana and Clonazepam in his bloodstream when he lost control of his car, hit a center median, and was "launched into oncoming traffic," colliding with victim A.D.’s car head-on.A.D. died as a result of her injuries, and the state indicted Barnes on seven charges, including manslaughter, based on A.D.’s death (Count One), and endangerment, a count "relating to [E.F.], who was driving behind [A.D.]"(Count Three).The indictment apparently did not include dangerous-nature allegations,1 but, on the day it was returned, the state filed an "Allegation of Dangerous Nature of the Offense(s) Charged," alleging both counts one and three were of a dangerous nature.Anticipating the possibility of jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, this filing also provided, "[T]he State alleges the lesser included offense is of a dangerous nature."2
¶ 4 At the close of trial in April 2018, the respondent judge instructed the jury on manslaughter and endangerment, and, consistent with jury instructions proposed by the state, advised the jury, "The State has alleged that the offenses in Count One, Manslaughter[,] and Count Three, Endangerment[,] are of a dangerous nature."The jury was also instructed on negligent homicide, as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter, but not that the state had alleged dangerousness as to that offense.Similarly, although the verdict forms included interrogatories on the issue of dangerousness for the offenses of manslaughter and endangerment, there was no dangerousness interrogatory for negligent homicide.
¶ 5 The jury found Barnes not guilty of manslaughter, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide and some of the other charges alleged.It also found the offense of endangerment "to be of a dangerous nature involving the use and/or discharge and/or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to wit a motor vehicle."
¶ 6 After reading the verdicts, the respondent judge asked the jurors, "[A]re these your verdicts and the verdicts of each of you?" to which they collectively responded, "Yes."The respondent then asked whether either side wished to have the jury polled, and the prosecutor responded that the state did not, but asked to approach the bench, where the following discussion ensued:
¶ 7The respondent judge then reviewed the jury instructions to determine whether the jury had been instructed about dangerousness for the negligent homicide offense, even though the dangerousness interrogatory was missing from the verdict form.She then stated, The respondent then asked if the defense wished to have the jury polled and, after defense counsel said he did not, she discharged the jury.
¶ 8 The following week, the state filed a "Request for Trial on Aggravating Factors," asking the respondent to "empanel a jury in order to make a Dangerousness finding as to the Negligent Homicide conviction."Citing Rule 19.1, Ariz. R. Crim. P., State v. Patterson , 230 Ariz. 270, 283 P.3d 1(2012), andState v. Larin , 233 Ariz. 202, 310 P.3d 990(App.2013), the state argued that "Arizona law supports the Dangerousness finding being made separately, and specifically after, the jury renders its verdict."
¶ 9 In his response to the state’s request, Barnes acknowledged that bifurcated consideration of dangerousness was the "usual procedure" set forth in Rule 19.1, but he cited a revision to Rule 19.1(a)(2), effective January 1, 2018, that provides, "With permission of the court, the parties may agree to a different method of proceeding than described in this rule."SeeAriz. Sup. Ct. OrderR-17-0002(Aug. 31, 2017).According to Barnes, the state waived "the option of requesting a separate trial to determine sentencing allegations" because "the parties and the Court tried the case with an understanding that the interrogatories for dangerousness ... would be presented to the jury for consideration at the same time as they were to decide guilt."
¶ 10 Barnes maintained this procedure "was with the agreement of the parties, and thus permitted by Rule 19.1[ (a)(2) ],"the respondent judge "correctly ruled that the State’s requested remedy" of presenting the question to the jury after guilty verdicts were returned "was impermissible," and the state"is now collaterally estopped from securing a different procedure after the jury was released."Citing State v. Choate , 151 Ariz. 57, 725 P.2d 764(App.1986), he also argued convening "a second trial with a new jury" to determine whether the negligent homicide was a dangerous offense "would constitute a violation of double jeopardy."
¶ 11 After hearing argument, the respondent judge granted the state’s request and scheduled a trial "as to the allegation of dangerous nature on the lesser of Negligent Homicide."Barnes filed this petition for special action, and the respondent stayed further proceedings pending our decision.
¶ 12 In his petition, Barnes asks us to consider whether the state waived bifurcated consideration of dangerousness, and whether a trial to determine dangerousness of the negligent homicide conviction is barred by double jeopardy.We address these issues in order.
¶ 13We review decisions regarding requested jury instructions and proposed alterations to verdict forms for an abuse of discretion but we review questions of law de novo.Larin , 233 Ariz. 202, ¶ 29, 310 P.3d 990.In Larin , we considered somewhat similar circumstances, albeit before amended Rule 19.1(a)(2), which would appear to permit modification of the procedure for bifurcated consideration of aggravating factors with the court’s permission and by agreement of the parties.3
¶ 14 In that case, the state argued on cross-appeal "the trial court erred by ‘refusing to submit dangerous offense enhancement interrogatories after the jury returned guilty verdicts.’ "Larin , 233 Ariz. 202, ¶ 29, 310 P.3d 990.There, as here, allegations of dangerousness had inadvertently been omitted in jury instructions and...
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