Barnes v. Bosley

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Citation: 828 F.2d 1253
• Parties: Shirley BARNES, Appellee, Frances J. McElroy and Murrell Thomas, v. Freeman (Teek) BOSLEY and Paula Carter, Appellants. Shirley BARNES, Appellant, Frances J. McElroy and Murrell Thomas, v. Freeman (Teek) BOSLEY and Paula Carter, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1253

828 F.2d 1253

Shirley BARNES, Appellee, Frances J. McElroy and Murrell Thomas, v. Freeman (Teek) BOSLEY and Paula Carter, Appellants.

Shirley BARNES, Appellant, Frances J. McElroy and Murrell Thomas, v. Freeman (Teek) BOSLEY and Paula Carter, Appellees.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 1987.

Decided Sept. 8, 1987.

Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.

Thomas E. Bauer, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal and cross-appeal involve the remedial aspects (reinstatement and backpay) of litigation previously before us. An understanding of the issues now before us requires a review of the history of this case. In Barnes v. Bosley, 568 F.Supp. 1406 (E.D.Mo.1983), the District Court held that plaintiff Shirley Barnes's discharge on January 3, 1983 from her position as a Unit Manager I in the St. Louis City Circuit Court Clerk's office was politically motivated, that political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for her position, and that her discharge therefore violated her First Amendment rights. Id. at 1413. The District Court granted Barnes declaratory and injunctive relief and ordered her reinstated with full backpay and benefits (without specifying the amounts thereof) from January 3, 1983. Order of July 27, 1983 at 1-2. On November 29, 1983, the District Court granted defendants' motion to stay the judgment pending appeal. This Court affirmed the District Court's judgment as to Barnes (but reversed as to another plaintiff) in Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 2022, 85 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985).

On June 10, 1985, on remand, the District Court modified its prior judgment to comply with this Court's decision reversing that judgment as to another plaintiff. The prior judgment remained unchanged insofar as it applied to Barnes. Record of Pleadings (Record) at 38. Barnes was reinstated to a Unit Manager I position in the Circuit Clerk's office on July 1, 1985. The parties were unable to agree, however, on either the amount of backpay that Barnes was due or whether the position to which Barnes was reinstated complied with the court's order. On July 3, 1985, Barnes filed a motion for enforcement of the judgment and a motion to determine the amount of backpay. Record at 52-64. Defendants, now represented by the Attorney General's office, filed suggestions in opposition to Barnes's motions on July 19, 1985, claiming, among other things, that the backpay award should be reduced by the amount of Barnes's interim earnings from her employment in the St. Louis City Circuit Attorney's office from October 11, 1983 to July 1, 1985, and that the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity precluded any award of backpay prior to the District Court's original order of July 27, 1983. Record at 65-74.

In its August 28, 1985 opinion, Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F.Supp. 81 (E.D.Mo.1985), the District Court did not rule on the reinstatement issue, stating that an evidentiary hearing was necessary before the court could determine whether defendants had complied with its prior order of reinstatement. Id. at 84, 87. As to the backpay issue, the court refused to consider the merits of defendants' claim that Barnes's interim earnings should be deducted from the backpay award. The court construed defendants' July 19, 1985 pleading as a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) alleging judicial inadvertence and held that, because it was not filed within the thirty-day period for filing notice of appeal from the court's June 10, 1985 order, it was untimely. Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F.Supp. at 84. The court, however, did consider defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity argument under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) (providing for relief from a void judgment). Id. at 84 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-67, 65 S.Ct. 347, 352, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945) (holding that the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional in nature and thus may be raised for the first time on appeal)). The court agreed with defendants that the Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of backpay prior to the court's original order dated July 27, 1983. Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F.Supp. at 85. ¹ The court further held that the Eleventh Amendment precluded an award of backpay for the period of time during which the court's stay order was in effect. Id. at 85-86. The court reasoned that during such time defendants were not under a judicially imposed duty to reinstate Barnes, and, thus, a subsequent award of backpay for that period would be retrospective relief prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 85. The court, however, went on to hold that defendants' counsel (who then was a private attorney retained to represent defendants pursuant to a state statute so authorizing) had waived the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity in seeking a stay of the court's July 27, 1983 judgment. ² Id. at 86 (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982)). The court concluded that Barnes therefore was entitled to compensation for wages, without deduction for interim earnings, from July 27, 1983 (the date of the court's original order) through July 1, 1985 (the date on which Barnes was reinstated), less deductions of appropriate federal and state income taxes, plus medical insurance payments and interest. Barnes v. Bosley, 625 F.Supp. at 86-87. ³

The District Court thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on the reinstatement issue. At the time of her discharge, Barnes was a Unit Manager I and supervised approximately 50 employees in the civil case processing department. Barnes was reinstated on July 1, 1985 to a position with the same title and salary level. Her new duties entailed the supervision of part-time employees in the microfilm department, one of several departments under her supervision prior to her discharge. In a March 17, 1986 order, the District Court found that because of a reorganization in the Circuit Clerk's office Barnes's former position was no longer available, and that defendants therefore had to reinstate Barnes to a substantially similar position in terms of duties and responsibilities, as well as title and salary. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court concluded that Barnes's new position was not substantially similar to her former position in terms of duties and responsibility (even though she had the same title and salary level). The court granted defendants until March 31, 1986 to reinstate Barnes to a substantially similar position in compliance with its order. Order of March 17, 1986.

Defendants thereafter proposed to divide supervisory responsibility over the reorganized civil case processing department between Barnes and the current supervisor, Kathy Grillo. In its July 14, 1986 order, the District Court noted that computer automation of part of the civil case processing department in order to streamline office procedures and functions and increase efficiency had been a major objective of defendant Bosley's reorganization plan. Order of July 14, 1986, at 2. Ms. Grillo had been instrumental in the design and implementation of the computer system and, consequently, was assigned to supervise those areas of the civil case processing department in which computerization was vital. In view of this reorganization, the court concluded that although Barnes would supervise fewer employees (approximately 20) and functions within the department than she had previously, her new position (as proposed by defendants) was comparable in terms of duties and responsibilities and therefore complied with the court's order of reinstatement. Id. at 3.

In 86-1957, defendants appeal from the District Court's August 28, 1985 order awarding Barnes backpay from July 27, 1983 until her reinstatement on July 1, 1985 without a reduction of interim earnings from other employment. In 86-2038, Barnes appeals from the District Court's March 17, 1986 order holding that plaintiff's old position was no longer available and, therefore, that defendants need only restore plaintiff to a position substantially similar to her former position, and from the court's July 14, 1986 order holding that the position which Barnes currently holds is comparable to her former position and complies with the court's order of reinstatement.

86-1957

Defendants challenge the District Court's order of backpay on two grounds. ⁴ First, they argue that the Eleventh Amendment precludes an award of backpay during the period from November 29, 1983 through June 10, 1985 when the District Court's original order of July 27, 1983 was stayed pending appeal. Defendants challenge the District Court's holding that defendants' private attorneys waived the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, defendants argue that under traditional remedial principles the backpay award must be reduced by the amount of interim wages earned by Barnes from other employment.

It is a well-known principle that "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1362, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Thus, the Supreme Court has established a bright line Eleventh Amendment test between permissible prospective and impermissible retroactive relief, with the effective date of the District Court's order requiring future compliance being the operative date. The resolution of the issue here turns on the effective date of the District Court's order granting Barnes prospective relief (i.e., reinstatement and payment of salary). Defendants maintain that during the time the stay was in effect they were not under a judicially...