Barnes v. City of Dothan

• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:11–cv–201–MEF.
• Citation: 842 F.Supp.2d 1332
• Parties: Sanjanetta BARNES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DOTHAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

842 F.Supp.2d 1332

Sanjanetta BARNES, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF DOTHAN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:11–cv–201–MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Jan. 31, 2012.

Mark Andrew Overall, Mark Overall & Associates, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Freddie Lenton White, II, The City of Dothan, City Attorney's Office, Dothan, AL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Nick McElveen's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 21). The underlying dispute has its genesis in Plaintiff Sanjanetta Barnes's arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct in 2008. This led to Barnes filing a complaint against the City of Dothan, Police Chief Gregory Benton, Judge Rose Gordon, Officer Dennis Sallas, City of Dothan employee Russell Hughes, Mayor Mike Schmitz, and Officer Nick McElveen. The other defendants have already filed motions to dismiss ( see Docs. # 4, 8, 9, 10, 11), which this Court granted as to Judge Gordon and granted in part and denied in part as to everyone else, except McElveen, because he did not join in those motions (Doc. # 20). For the reasons discussed below, Barnes's complaint is due to be DISMISSED without prejudice as to McElveen. And because the basis for McElveen's dismissal likely applies to all of the defendants, Barnes is ORDERED to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss her complaint as to the other defendants too.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343 (civil rights), and 1367 (supplemental). The parties do not contend that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, nor do they dispute that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

III. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss mainly tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It does not delve into disputes over the proof of the facts alleged—such a crucible is reserved for the summary judgment stage. With this in mind, the Court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2008); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir.2007). The Court will grant a motion to dismiss “when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Ed. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993).

A motion to dismiss also requires compliance with some minimal pleading standards. Indeed, although a plaintiff's complaint generally need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), the plaintiff must still allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). And “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Nor does it suffice if the pleadings merely leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery.” Id. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

IV. Background

As this is a motion to dismiss, the following facts, which the Court accepts as true at this stage of the proceedings, come from the allegations in Barnes's complaint.

On the night of August 8, 2008, Barnes was walking home from work when she was overcome with a bout of pain caused by ovarian cysts. She was sitting on the sidewalk recovering from the pain when Hughes, a passerby and City of Dothan employee, stopped to help her. He tried to load her into his car, but Barnes resisted, fearing that she was in danger. After this encounter, Hughes called the police. Officer Sallas responded to the call and interviewed Barnes after arriving on the scene. Barnes explained that she could walk home on her own and refused medical attention.

Observing Barnes, Sallas determined that, despite her protestations, she needed medical assistance. He physically restrained her while waiting for an ambulance. When the emergency workers arrived, Barnes signed a treatment waiver and the ambulance left the scene. Sallas then let Barnes continue on her way.

Soon after Barnes started to leave, Officer McElveen arrived at the scene, informed Barnes that she was being unruly, and placed her in his patrol car. He then called another ambulance. This time, the paramedics forced Barnes to get in, and she was taken to the mental ward of a local hospital.

Meanwhile, Officer McElveen filed a complaint alleging that Barnes had cursed at him. This led to prosecutors bringing a disorderly conduct charge against Barnes. SeeAla.Code § 13A–11–7. Barnes pled not guilty in district court, and Judge Gordon set her case for trial. The officers failed to appear for the first setting, so Judge Gordon reset the trial to give them another chance to appear. In between the first and second trial setting, Judge Gordon allowed the complaining officers to revise their complaint to add that Barnes pushed Officer McElveen.

After several delays, Barnes's case went to trial on January 14, 2010. And after listening to the 911 call made by Hughes, Judge Gordon called Barnes and her attorney into chambers and informed them that Barnes could either plead guilty or have the case sent immediately to the circuit court. Barnes told Judge Gordon that she wanted a jury trial in circuit court. Judge Gordon characterized this as a stipulation of guilt and sentenced Barnes to 180 days in jail, ordered her to pay a $500 fine, and charged her $176 in court costs. Barnes does not allege any facts about what happened in the circuit court, nor does she state whether she appealed her conviction to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or the Alabama Supreme Court.

Against this background, Barnes alleged that the City of Dothan, the officers involved with her arrest, and Judge Gordon conspired to violate her civil rights because of her race. More specifically, Barnes's complaint alleges, among other things, that McElveen violated her civil rights by filing a false report and by entering into a conspiracy to obstruct justice and violate her civil rights. She asserts these claims against McElveen under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201–2; a variety of federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3); and under Alabama law.

V. Discussion

Barnes brings most of her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute providing a remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See, e.g.,42 U.S.C. § 1983,¹Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“ § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred”) (internal quotes omitted); Cummings v. DeKalb County, 24 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir.1994). McElveen argues that Barnes's failure to allege that her state court conviction was overturned bars her claims. And to this end he cites Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), claiming that it requires a § 1983 plaintiff contesting a state court criminal conviction to allege a favorable termination of the matter. Barnes—or, more accurately, Barnes's counsel—failed to address this issue in the one-page response brief submitted to the Court to contest McElveen's motion to dismiss.

A. The applicability of the favorable termination rule

McElveen claims that Barnes cannot press a § 1983 claim because “any award in the plaintiff's favor would ‘necessarily impugn’ the validity of [her] conviction,” which would violate established precedent. (Doc. # 21.) It is true enough the Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey that a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 as a vehicle to attack collaterally her state court conviction and later imprisonment—at least not unless she had the conviction “reversed ..., expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal ..., or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). But Heck, unlike this case, dealt with an incarcerated prisoner with access to federal habeas corpus review. In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), five Justices agreed—albeit in dicta—that Heck's favorable termination rule does not apply to unincarcerated plaintiffs who, like Barnes, never realistically had recourse to federal habeas review. So the question becomes, does Heck's favorable termination rule have an exception for scenarios where plaintiffs, like Barnes, never had the opportunity to use the federal habeas statute?

The issue is a close question. The Heck rule, on the one hand, seeks to keep plaintiffs from using § 1983 as an end around 28 U.S.C. § 2254's more exacting procedural requirements. This suggests that the unavailability of habeas review creates an equitable exception to Heck that would allow a plaintiff to access federal court by way of § 1983. On the other hand, the Heck majority worried about the federalism concerns implicated by allowing plaintiffs to undermine state court criminal convictions with civil tort suits. With these worries in mind, the Court stated, “One element that must be alleged and proved in a...