Barnes v. City of Gadsden, Alabama
Decision Date | 04 September 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 17534.,17534. |
Citation | 268 F.2d 593 |
Parties | E. F. BARNES, J. C. Carson, J. Jelks and J. Robertson, Appellants, v. CITY OF GADSDEN, ALABAMA, et al., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Arthur Burns, Gadsden, Ala., for appellants.
John A. Lusk, Jr., W. B. Dortch, Gadsden, Ala., Dortch, Allen & Meighan, Lusk, Swann & Burns, Gadsden, Ala., of counsel, for appellees.
Before RIVES, CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.
A careful study of the record and exhibits has convinced me that there are controlling additional facts, themselves either undisputed or conclusively established, which were not noted in the district court's findings of fact. Recognizing the importance of this litigation to the public, as well as to the litigants, I have set forth those facts at considerable length in an appendix to this opinion. Excluding those items of doubtful value or of questionable admissibility, but otherwise carefully considering the entire record, I cannot escape the conclusion that actual segregation is contemplated. So long as that is voluntary, rather than governmentally enforced, there can be no constitutional objection. As we said in Cohen v. Public Housing Administration, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 73, 78:
That governmentally enforced segregation in housing is unconstitutional has now been settled beyond controversy.1 The cases just cited in footnote 1 make clear that a State agency has no constitutional power to oust persons of one race from their homes and thereafter forcibly to restrict the land to the exclusive occupancy of persons of another race. Ultimately then, the issue on its merits must turn upon whether the contemplated actual segregation is to be voluntary or governmentally enforced. At the present stage the plaintiffs and the defendants face real, though different, dilemmas in reaching that issue. The plaintiffs feel that they cannot wait longer. As their attorney stated to the district court:
In its conclusion of law the district court recognized, if it did not resolve, the plaintiffs' dilemma 174 F.Supp. 67:
The defendants, on their part, stoutly deny that any enforced segregation is contemplated. Their brief states:
The defendants point out that the plaintiffs may not, when the time comes, want to move back into either of the Areas:
I agree that the serious injury which the public may suffer from the stoppage of the slum clearance projects, and the desire to afford every opportunity for the voluntary cooperation of the members of all races for their common welfare and betterment are potent factors tending to cause the Court to exercise its discretion to deny an injunction at the present stage of development of the plans. As said by Judge Sibley, speaking for this Court in Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, 5 Cir., 1935, 75 F.2d 331, 333, 334:
"* * * and when a public improvement is sought to be stopped, the inconvenience to the public, as weighed against a slight or remediable wrong to the plaintiff, may determine the court of equity against this discretionary remedy."
The injury which the plaintiffs anticipate, namely, that they may be forced to dispose of their homes for an unconstitutional purpose, cannot be called slight. Rather, the questions are whether the plaintiffs will suffer a legal wrong and whether, at the present stage, their plight is irremediable. If irreparable injury to the plaintiffs will ensue, and if such injury cannot be otherwise prevented, then a suit for injunction restraining the carrying out of the plans is appropriate to present the question of a proposed unlawful exercise of the power of eminent domain for the purpose of subjecting the property taken to a racially discriminatory and unconstitutional use.2
The "Controls on Redevelopment," including the requirement of an anti-racial covenant, go a long way to protect the plaintiffs from governmentally enforced segregation. They do not, however, afford adequate protection if the redeveloper is free to restrict sales in the Birmingham Street Area to white people and in the North Fifth Street Area to Negroes. Enforced segregation might well be the practical result, whether or not so intended by the defendants. The plaintiffs might derive some small comfort from hearing a court tell them that their segregation was privately enforced rather than governmentally enforced. They might still feel that they stood equal before the law.
While the district court entered formal judgment for the defendants, it did not in fact decline to make any declaration of the rights of the parties, but in those parts of its conclusions of law which I have quoted, 174 F.Supp. at page 68, as construed in connection with the cases cited, it held that the redeveloper is a mere private individual and as such free to discriminate in sales to persons of different races. For reasons presently to be stated, I do not agree with that conclusion, but, by the same...
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