Barnes v. Combs
| Decision Date | 16 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:11-CV-14484 |
| Parties | JOHN BARNES, Plaintiff, v. TOM COMBS, et. al., Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
On October 12, 2011, Plaintiff John Barnes, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Thumb Correctional Facility in Lapeer, Michigan, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, members of the Michigan Parole Board and the director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, violated his constitutional rights by failing to adequately consider his parole eligibility. After reviewing Plaintiff's complaint, the court will sua sponte dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct in 1979. As part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor and Plaintiff agreed that Plaintiff would receive a life sentence with parole eligibility consideration after ten calender years.
In 1993, Plaintiff was given a face-to-face interview with a parole board member, but received a "no interest" notice from the Michigan Parole Board and a review date ofhis case in five years. Plaintiff's parole eligibility was reviewed by the Parole Board again in 1998 and 2004. On both occasions, the Parole Board informed Plaintiff that they had no interest in releasing him on parole. In August 2008 and again in August 2009, Plaintiff was given in-person interviews in compliance with Judge Marianne O. Battani's decision in Foster-Bey v. Rubitschun, No. 05-71318 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2007). Plaintiff was given "no interest" notices each time. On April 28, 2011, Plaintiff was again given"no interest" notice by the Parole Board.
Plaintiff claims that the plea bargain he entered into with the prosecutor in 1979, in which the parties agreed that he would receive a life sentence with parole eligibility consideration after ten years in prison, created a liberty and property interest in Plaintiff receiving parole eligibility consideration. Plaintiff further claims that the Parole Board's refusal to prepare a parole eligibility guidelines score to determine whether Plaintiff should be released on parole is cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff asserts his claims against members of the Parole Board and the director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, in their individual and official capacities, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.
Plaintiff paid the $350 filing fee, thus rendering inapplicable this court's authority to screen such complaints for frivolity or maliciousness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As a general rule, a district court may not sua sponte dismiss a complaint where the filing fee has been paid unless the court gives the plaintiff the opportunity to amend the complaint. Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). However, a review of a prisoner's civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is appropriateregardless of whether the prisoner has sought in forma pauperis status when the claim is brought against a governmental entity. Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, if a prisoner's complaint seeks relief from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, Congress has directed that the district court must dismiss it, or any part thereof, which (a) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (b) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit for monetary damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Furthermore, "a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion." Apple, 183 F.3d at 479 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if it . . . is based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). A complaint fails to state a claim "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Brown, 207 F.3d at 867. Sua sponte dismissal is appropriate if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore v. Wigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997).
A pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Middleton v. McGinnis,860 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D. Mich.1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); that is, the complaint is held to a "less stringent standard" than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Such complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a legal wrong has been committed from which plaintiff may be granted relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (E.D. Mich.2001). Because the court finds that Plaintiff's claim is devoid of merit and seeks relief from government officers, the court will sua sponte dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants: (1) a "procedural due process claim" arguing that the Parole Board's alleged failure to prepare a parole evaluation report in his case constituted deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest; (2) a "cruel and unusual punishment claim" averring that Defendants' failure to consider Plaintiff's parole eligibility "made plaintiff's parolable life sentence cruel and unusual punishment"; and (3) a claim arguing that the Parole Board's alleged violation of Plaintiff's plea bargain deprived him of a constitutionally protected property interest in his plea bargain.
Where a prisoner is not claiming immediate entitlement to parole, he may challenge the procedures used by a parole board to deny him or her parole under § 1983,. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 83 (2005); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2007) (). Here, Plaintiff does not seek immediate release, and instead asks the court to: (1) issuea declaratory judgment finding Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional right; (2) issue an injunction barring Defendants from issuing future "no interest" notices and requiring Defendants to honor the plea agreement; and (3) impanel a jury to decide compensatory damages.
There is no constitutional right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377, n.8 (1987). Stated more succinctly, there is no federal constitutional right to be paroled. See Gavin v. Wells, 914 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1990); Lee v. Withrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
In Michigan, a prisoner's release on parole is discretionary with the Michigan Parole Board. Lee, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (citing to In Re Parole of Johnson, 596 N.W. 2d 202, 204 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)). The Michigan parole statute therefore does not create a right to be paroled. Id.; see also Hurst v. Dep't of Corrs. Parole Bd., 119 Mich. App. 25, 29; 325 N.W. 2d 615 (1982). Because the Michigan Parole Board has the discretion whether to grant parole, a prisoner does not have a protected liberty interest in being paroled prior to the expiration of his or her sentence. Crump v. Lafler, _ F.3d _, 2011 WL 4359901 at *9 (6th Cir. 2011) . Accordingly, Plaintiff does not "have a sufficient liberty interest in his future parole release to be entitled to due process in his parole release proceedings." Id. (quoting Sharp v. Leonard, 611 F.2d 136, 137 (6th Cir. 1979)). Because Petitionerhas no legitimate expectation of, and thus no liberty interest in, receiving parole, the Michigan Parole Board's alleged failure to set his release date in accordance with parole guidelines does not give rise to a due process claim. Johnson, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (citation omitted); see also Coleman v. Martin, 63 Fed. App'x. 791, 792-93 (6th Cir. 2003) (). Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff's related claim that the Parole Board violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is also without merit. The denial of an inmate's parole does not implicate the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. App'x. 79, 81 (6th Cir. 2003); Lee, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 792. In fact, "requiring a prisoner to serve even his maximum sentence works no constitutional violation upon an inmate." Lee, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
Plaintiff also claims that the Michigan Parole Board violated the plea bargain entered into between Plaintiff and the prosecutor by allegedly failing to calculate a parole evaluation report. "Plea...
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