Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 75-1975
| Decision Date | 18 February 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1975,75-1975 |
| Citation | 547 F.2d 275 |
| Parties | Jerry Ray BARNES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
W. Swan Yerger, Jackson, Miss., for defendant-appellant.
Stephen L. Beach, III, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before COLEMAN and HILL, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, * District Judge.
This is a products liability case involving an injury sustained by the plaintiff, Jerry Ray Barnes, when his 1968 Z-28 Camaro automobile manufactured by the defendant General Motors Corporation, left the wet blacktop of Clinton Boulevard just outside the city limits of Jackson, Mississippi, and crashed into a gas meter, tree and concrete culvert at approximately 5:00 a. m. on March 21, 1970. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the accelerator pedal stuck causing him to lose control of the automobile and that this was due to negligent design of the accelerator linkage, spark plug wire bracket and engine mounts. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff from which this appeal has been prosecuted. We reverse.
Plaintiff's evidence was, in brief, as follows: He was alone driving east on Clinton Boulevard at a speed of approximately 50 miles per hour until he approached the point where the road makes an "S" curve. Plaintiff slowed down, shifted into second gear and proceeded through the "S" curve at a speed of about 20 miles per hour. As he came out of the "S" curve at a point where Clinton Boulevard straightens out to head east, plaintiff pressed down hard on the accelerator. When the car reached a comfortable speed, plaintiff removed his foot from the accelerator pedal but the car continued to accelerate rapidly. Plaintiff attempted to raise the accelerator pedal with his foot but was unable to do so. While he was looking down to see what was wrong, the car left the road, hit obstructions and turned over. Plaintiff's theory was that the left engine mount separated and that the engine acceleration was sufficient to cause the engine to lift up thus binding the accelerator linkage with the spark plug wire bracket. It appears that this theory was brought to the attention of the plaintiff by the defendant in a recall campaign conducted approximately two years after the occurrence of the accident.
There was also substantial evidence indicating that the plaintiff himself may have been negligent in causing the accident. Two witnesses testified that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident. In addition, the plaintiff stated on at least two occasions immediately following the accident that he had fallen asleep at the wheel. While the evidence was thus conflicting, the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $25,000. While the defendant raises numerous contentions on this appeal, we conclude that the admission of the evidence relating to an experiment conducted by the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Charles Carley, was error mandating a new trial.
It is undisputed that unless the left motor mount of the plaintiff's car separated prior to the time of the accident, the engine lift would have been insufficient to cause the accelerator linkage to bind. The plaintiff's expert testified that in his opinion the mount did separate prior to the accident. In addition, the plaintiff testified that the acceleration of the automobile increased prior to the time that the automobile left the road. Thus, a reasonable inference could be drawn from this evidence that the acceleration was caused by the constant pressure being applied to the accelerator linkage by the lift of the engine. On the other hand, the defendant's expert testified that in his opinion the motor mount on the car separated as a result of the impact of the accident itself.
However, uncontradicted evidence disclosed that the type of engine mounts on the plaintiff's car was so-called "roll-stop" mounts. The purpose of the roll-stop design was to prevent engine lift even though the mount itself might separate. The plaintiff's expert was allowed to testify, over objection, as to the results of a test which he performed on another Z-28 Camaro automobile. In the test car, which had been modified for use as a race car, there were no engine mounts. The engine mounts had been removed and the engine was bolted directly to the frame. During the course of the experiment the left engine mount was unbolted and the bolt on the right mount was loosened. Upon accelerating, the lift of the left side of the engine caused the engine to press against the accelerator linkage which stuck in place. Yet, since the engine mounts had been removed, the roll-stop feature, admittedly found on the plaintiff's automobile, could not be tested in order to determine whether, even though the engine mount might separate, the roll-stop feature would prevent the engine lift from binding the accelerator.
Upon a careful review of the evidence presented in this case we conclude that the admission of the results...
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...render his testimony irrelevant, so this fact goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. See Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1977). Finally, Pastor Green's testimony did not prejudice Bagnell. Bagnell's counsel adequately cross-examined Pastor ......
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Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc.
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...allow someone to testify as an expert witness is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1977). There was no abuse of discretion here. Cf. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1374 (5th Cir. 1......
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U.S. v. Spoerke, No. 08-12910.
...court has wide discretion to admit evidence of experiments conducted under substantially similar conditions." Barnes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 547 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir.1977). "Although the conditions of the demonstration need not be identical to the event at issue, `they must be so nearly the......
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Table of cases
...F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987), §11:93 Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru , 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985), §22:04 Barnes v. General Motors , 547 F.2d 275, 276-278 (5th Cir. 1977), §16:93 Barretto v. Akau , 51 Haw. 383, 393 (1969), §9:05 Basham v. General Shale , 180 W.Va. 526, 377 S.E.2d 830 ......
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Table of Cases
...F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987), §11:93 Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru , 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985), §22:04 Barnes v. General Motors , 547 F.2d 275, 276-278 (5th Cir. 1977), §16:93 Barretto v. Akau , 51 Haw. 383, 393 (1969), §9:05 Basham v. General Shale , 180 W.Va. 526, 377 S.E.2d 830 ......
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Table of cases
...F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987), §11:93 Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru , 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985), §22:04 Barnes v. General Motors , 547 F.2d 275, 276-278 (5th Cir. 1977), §16:93 Barretto v. Akau , 51 Haw. 383, 393 (1969), §9:05 Basham v. General Shale , 180 W.Va. 526, 377 S.E.2d 830 ......
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Table of cases
...F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987), §11:93 Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru , 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985), §22:04 Barnes v. General Motors , 547 F.2d 275, 276-278 (5th Cir. 1977), §16:93 Barretto v. Akau , 51 Haw. 383, 393 (1969), §9:05 Basham v. General Shale , 180 W.Va. 526, 377 S.E.2d 830 ......