Barnes v. Illinois Fuel Co.
| Citation | 283 Ill. 173,119 N.E. 48 |
| Decision Date | 03 April 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 11691.,11691. |
| Parties | BARNES v. ILLINOIS FUEL CO. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Error to Appellate Court, Fourth District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; J. F. Gillham, Judge.
Action by Maggie Barnes, administratrix of Thomas Barnes, deceased, against the Illinois Fuel Company. There was a judgment of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant brings certiorari. Reversed and remanded.
R. J. Goddard, of Sparta, and H. Clay Horner, of Chester, for plaintiff in error.
A. E. Crisler, of Chester, for defendant in error.
Thomas Barnes received a serious injury in the coal mine of the Illinois Fuel Company on October 20, 1915. One leg was broken above the knee, and he was otherwise bruised and injured, by a large rock falling upon him from the roof of the mine. He was removed to his home, where he received medical treatment. About 5 or 6 days after the accident pneumonia set in, which ran its course in about 14 days, and Barnes began recovering from that disease. He remained in bad physical condition until his death, March 11, 1916. Before his death he commenced an action at law against the Illinois Fuel Company (hereafter called defendant) to recover damages for his injury. After his death this suit was brought by his administratrix (hereafter called plaintiff). The declaration by proper averments alleged the injury and that death resulted therefrom. The declaration also averred that defendant had elected not to comply with or be bound by the statute known as the Workmen's Compensation Act. To the declaration the defendant filed the general issue. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $1,500, upon which the court rendered judgment. That judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, and the case is brought to this court by writ of certiorari.
One of the errors assigned and relied on is that plaintiff failed to prove the allegation of the declaration that defendant had elected that it would not be bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The plea of not guilty put in issue the allegation of the declaration that defendant had elected not to comply with or be bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and placed the burden on the plaintiff to overcome by proof the conclusive presumption of the statute that defendant was bound by said act, unless it had elected to the contrary. Section 2 of the statute requires the employer, who is presumed to be under the act, if he desires not to be bound by its provisions, to file notice in writing of his election not to be bound by the act with the Industrial Board, and notify his employés of such election personally or by posting notice thereof at a conspicuous place in the plant, shop, office, room or place where his employés are employed. Plaintiff introduced in evidence at the trial a certified copy of a notice in writing filed by defendant with the Industrial Board on July 1, 1913, that defendant had elected not to be bound by the Workmen's Compensation Act. No proof was offered that notice was given any employé of such election or that notice of the election was posted as required by the statute. In the absence of any compliance with the requirements of the statute as to giving notice to its employés, personally or by posting, defendant could not claim it was not subject to and bound by the provisions of the statute. If it had assumed the burden of proving that it had elected not to be bound by the act, it would have been required to prove that, in addition to filing a written notice of its election with the Industrial Board, it had also, either personally or by posting notices, informed its employés of its election.
The burden was on plaintiff to prove the election, and in our opinion the same proof was required to be...
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