Barnes v. Jones
| Decision Date | 30 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:14cv101/LAC/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | DENNIS A. BARNES, Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent. |
This cause is before the court on Petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 7). Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 32). Petitioner filed a reply (doc. 35).
The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a). It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see doc. 32).1 Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Jackson County, Florida, Case No. 2010-CF-0499, with one count of felony battery and one count of felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition (Ex. B). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of felonin possession of a firearm or ammunition (Exs. N1, N3, O). The State filed a nolle prosequi on the felony battery charge (Ex. U). On February 14, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender to thirty (30) years of imprisonment, with a minimum mandatory of ten years and with pre-sentence jail credit of 193 days (Exs. R, S).
Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"), Case No. 1D11-955 (Exs. T, V). The First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam on December 20, 2011, with the mandate issuing January 12, 2012 (Ex. Y). Barnes v. State, 75 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Petitioner did not seek further review.
On February 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. AA). In an order rendered March 26, 2012, the state circuit court struck the motion as facially insufficient, without prejudice to Petitioner's filing an amended motion within thirty days (Ex. BB). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D12-1720 (Ex. CC). On June 21, 2012, the First DCA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction (see Exs. DD, FF). Barnes v. State, 91 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Table). Petitioner filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. JJ). The state circuit court summarily denied it on October 3, 2012 (Ex. KK). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D12-5905 (Ex. NN). The First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion on February 11, 2013, with the mandate issuing March 11, 2013 (Ex. OO). Barnes v. State, 108 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Table).
On July 18, 2012, while the state post-conviction proceedings were pending, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this district court, Case No. 5:12cv220/MMP/EMT (Ex. PP). He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted on November 26, 2012, and dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice (id.).
On March 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Circuit Court in and for Columbia County, Florida, alleging he was entitled to immediate release form custody because his conviction was not supported by a viable charging document (Ex. QQ).2 The court transferred thepetition to the Jackson County Circuit Court (Ex. RR). On December 3, 2013, the Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed the pleading as procedurally barred, untimely, and successive (Ex. SS). Petitioner sought review in the First DCA, Case No. 1D14-67 (Exs. TT, VV). The First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion on May 19, 2014, with the mandate issuing June 16, 2014 (Ex. YY). Barnes v. State, 139 So. 3d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Table).
On November 9, 2013, Petitioner filed another Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. ZZ). He subsequently filed an amended motion (Ex. AAA). In an order rendered December 3, 2013, the state circuit court struck the successive Rule 3.850 motion as facially insufficient, without prejudice to Petitioner's filing an amended motion within sixty days (Ex. BBB).
On August 1, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to correct sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. CCC). The state circuit court summarily denied the motion on August 21, 2014 (Ex. DDD).
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on February 20, 2014 (doc. 1).
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 provides that "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" upon a showing that his custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. As the instant petition was filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the more deferential standard for habeas review of state court decisions under § 2254 as brought about by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. In relevant part, section 2254(d) now provides:
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).3 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2119-20, 147 L. Ed. 2d 125 (2000). In employing this test, the Supreme Court has instructed that on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal State court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" if Supreme Court precedent at the time "would have compelled a particular result in the case." Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 813, 835 (11th Cir. 2001).
Next, the court must determine whether the State court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law, either because "'the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or because 'the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). The Supreme Court has clarified that "[a]voiding these pitfalls does not require citation to our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). If the State court decision is found in either respect to be contrary, the district court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. Moreover, where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law. See Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890 n. 15 (11th Cir. 2003).
If on the other hand, the State court applied the correct Supreme Court precedent and the facts of the Supreme Court cases and the petitioner's case are not materially...
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