Barnes v. Joyner
Decision Date | 05 May 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13–5.,13–5. |
Citation | 751 F.3d 229 |
Parties | William Leroy BARNES, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Carlton JOYNER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ARGUED:Milton Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Rudolf, Widenhouse & Fialko, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Porter Babb, Sr., North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:George B. Currin, Currin & Currin, PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge THACKER wrote the opinion, in which Judge FLOYD joined. Judge AGEE wrote a dissenting opinion.
Petitioner William Leroy Barnes (“Barnes”), an inmate on North Carolina's death-row, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus against Carlton Joyner, Warden of the Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina (hereinafter, the “State”). In 1994, after a jury trial in North Carolina state court, Barnes was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Immediately after the jury returned its sentencing recommendation, Barnes alleged to the state trial judge that one of the jurors discussed the death penalty with her pastor the previous day. The trial court denied Barnes' request to inquire further into the matter. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Barnes' conviction and sentence on direct appeal, concluding, among other things, that Barnes had not proven that the alleged contact between the juror and her pastor prejudiced Barnes or denied him the right to an impartial jury.
In February 1999, Barnes sought state post-conviction relief on various grounds by filing a Motion for Appropriate Relief. In his Motion for Appropriate Relief, Barnes reasserted his claim of juror misconduct and presented additional evidence to demonstrate that a sitting juror improperly communicated with her pastor about the death penalty during the sentencing phase of Barnes' trial and then relayed the information to other jurors. Despite this additional information, the state post-conviction court summarily denied Barnes' claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing, adopting the same analysis as the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
After considering the various arguments raised in Barnes' federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the state court's adjudication of Barnes' juror misconduct claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), on the issue of whether a juror's contact with her pastor violated Barnes' Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the state post-conviction court's failure to apply a presumption of prejudice and failure to investigate Barnes' juror misconduct claim, which was based on an external influence on the jury, was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state court's failures had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict.
On October 30, 1992, at around 12:30 a.m., police officers from Salisbury, North Carolina, found B.P. and Ruby Tutterow shot to death in their home. The house was ransacked, and a number of the Tutterows' belongings were missing. Later that day, Barnes and his co-defendants, Frank Junior Chambers and Robert Lewis Blakney, were arrested in connection with the killings. Each defendant was subsequently indicted on two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of first-degree burglary. After a joint capital trial, the jury returned verdicts finding Barnes and his co-defendants guilty of all charges, including first-degree murder on the theory of premeditation and under the felony murder rule. Barnes' guilt is not at issue here.1
This capital trial proceeded to the sentencing phase, where the jury was charged with determining whether the crimes committed by Barnes and his co-defendants warranted a sentence of death or of life imprisonment. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–2000. During the closing arguments of the sentencing phase, an attorney representing co-defendant Chambers stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
If you're a true believer and you believe that Frank Chambers will have a second judgment day, then we know that all of us will too. All of us will stand in judgment one day. And what words is it that a true believer wants to hear? [“]Well done, my good and faithful servant. You have done good things with your life. You have done good deeds. Enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. [”] Isn't that what a true believer wants to hear? Or does a true believer want to explain to God, [“]yes, I did violate one of your commandments. Yes, I know they are not the ten suggestions. They are the ten commandments. I know it says, Thou shalt not kill, but I did it because the laws of man said I could.[”] You can never justify violating a law of God by saying the laws of man allowed it. If there is a higher God and a higher law, I would say not.
To be placed in the predicament that the State has asked you to place yourself in, is just that. To explain when your soul is at stake. [“]Yes, I know the three that I killed were three creatures of yours, God. And that you made them in your likeness. I know you love us all, but I killed them because the State of North Carolina said I could.[”] Who wants to be placed in that position? I hope none of us. And may God have mercy on us all.
J.A. 1532–33.2 The prosecution did not object at any point during this argument.
The next day, the jury recommended that Barnes and Chambers be sentenced to death for each murder and that Blakney be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for each murder. After the jury returned its sentencing recommendations and exited the courtroom, the following colloquy took place between the court and defense counsel:
J.A. 1601–03. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defense's post-sentence motions and rejected their request to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to juror misconduct.
On March 10, 1994, the court sentenced Barnes and Chambers to death, and Blakney to life imprisonment, for their first-degree murder convictions. In addition, each defendant was sentenced to two terms of forty years' imprisonment for armed robbery and one term of forty years' imprisonment for burglary. All sentences were to be served consecutively.
Barnes appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of North Carolina on various grounds. Relevant here is Barnes' Sixth Amendment juror misconduct argument, which was based on two alleged occurrences: first, that a “juror called a minister to ask a question about the death penalty;” and second, “that a juror had taken a Bible into the jury room and read to the jury members from it before deliberations.” State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44, 66 (1997). Barnes argued that “the trial court erred in failing to conduct an investigation to determine what, if any, prejudice resulted from the alleged events.” Id. at 67. The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed, offering the following reasoning:
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel's assertions were accurate, there still was no assertion that the juror's reading from the Bible was accomplished in the context of any discussion about the case itself or that it involved extraneous influences as defined by this Court. The issue, therefore, is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire further into the alleged Bible-reading incident when faced with the mere assertion that a juror read the Bible aloud in the jury room prior to the commencement of deliberations and prior to the trial court's instructions to the jury. As there is no evidence that the alleged Bible reading was in any way directed to the facts or governing law at issue in the case, we cannot say that the trial court's actions were an abuse of discretion.
With respect to a juror's alleged actions in calling a clergy...
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