Barnes v. McQueen

Decision Date07 March 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 14-2636 SECTION: "E" (3)
PartiesJOSHUA BARNES Plaintiff v. KEITH MCQUEEN, et al. Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Nicholas Knight, Rockwell McClellan, Keith Bowman, and the City of Slidell.1 For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joshua Barnes ("Barnes") filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 19, 2014, against Defendants Keith McQueen ("McQueen"), Nicholas Knight ("Knight"), Rockwell McClellan ("McClellan"), Keith Bowman ("Bowman"), and the City of Slidell ("City").2

Barnes avers that on November 27, 2013, he went to his ex-wife's residence to pick up his children.3 At all relevant times, Barnes' ex-wife was married to and lived with McQueen, a police officer with the Slidell Police Department.4 Barnes alleges that when he was waiting for one of his children, McQueen "ran at [Barnes] knocking him to the ground" and "struck [Barnes] and repeatedly hit him with his knees all over his body."5 Barnes' 13-year-old son called 9-1-1.6 McQueen's neighbor came out, and McQueenallegedly told the neighbor that Barnes was violating a protective order and instructed the neighbor to help arrest Barnes.7 McQueen and his neighbor handcuffed Barnes.8

McQueen then called the Slidell Police Department on a non-emergency line and requested assistance, according to the second amended complaint.9 Slidell Police Officer Knight, Sergeant Bowman, and Lieutenant McClellan arrived, took Barnes into their custody, and transported him to the Slidell lock-up, where he was charged with violating a protective order and simple assault.10 The complaint alleges that the officers failed to verify that a protective order was in place, as there was none.11 The complaint states, however, that a permanent injunction was in place.12 The complaint also alleges that "[a]t no time did Mr. Barnes strike, attempt to strike, or intend to strike anyone involved in the attack against him."13

Barnes brings claims against McQueen in his individual capacity because, Barnes alleges, McQueen "acted out of malice when he attacked Mr. Barnes and publicly berated him over child support payments in front of Mr. Barnes children."14 Barnes also brings claims against McQueen in his official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing McQueen violated his rights "by beating him and falsely arresting him in front of [Barnes'] children."15 Barnes also brings § 1983 claims for false arrest and excessive force,16 andBarnes asserts state-law claims against McQueen for false arrest, excessive force, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, intentional misrepresentation, and defamation.17

Barnes alleges that Knight, McClellan, and Bowman conspired with McQueen to deprive Barnes of his rights under color of law.18 Barnes also brings § 1983 claims for false arrest and excessive force19 against Knight, McClellan, and Bowman for their individual actions.20 Barnes asserts state-law claims against the officers for false arrest, excessive force, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, intentional misrepresentation, and defamation.21

Barnes asserts vicarious liability claims against the City under § 1983 and under state law and alleges the City is liable under § 1983 for the negligent hiring and retention of employees, the negligent training and supervision of its employees, and the failure to adopt sufficient policies to deter or prevent the violation of Barnes' civil rights, and for allowing the conspiracy and cover-up of the unlawful arrest and prosecution of Barnes.22

On January 9, 2015, Defendants Knight, McClellan, and Bowman filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim.23 The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on March 16, 2015.24 On May 21, 2015, the Court denied these motions without prejudice, ordering Barnes tofile an amended complaint by June 19, 2015.25 Barnes filed his amended complaint on June 16, 2015.26

On June 24, 2015, Defendants Knight, McClellan, Bowman, and the City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.27 The motion asserts that Knight, McClellan, and Bowman are entitled to qualified immunity and that Barnes fails to state a claim against Knight, McClellan, Bowman, and the City.28 Barnes filed a response in opposition on July 7, 2015.29 Defendants filed a reply on July 22, 2015.30

On January 25, 2016, Barnes filed a Second Supplemental and Amended Complaint naming Southern Fidelity Insurance Company, McQueen's homeowner's insurer.31 Knight, McClellan, Bowman, and the City filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on February 8, 2016, adopting the memorandum of support in their June 24, 2015, motion to dismiss.32 Barnes filed a response in opposition on March 1, 2016, adopting his July 7, 2015, opposition and reiterating various allegations from his complaint.33

STANDARD OF LAW

When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.34 The Court may consider only the pleadings, the documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the plaintiff's complaint, the facts of which judicial notice may be taken, matters of public record,35 and documents attached to a motion to dismiss "when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff's claims."36 If the Court accepts materials outside of the pleadings that do not fit within these parameters, the Court must treat the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.37

For the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the facts taken as true must state a claim that is plausible on its face.38 A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."39 "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."40 A complaint is insufficient if it contains "only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."41 The Court cannot grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that he could prove consistent with the complaint."42

DISCUSSION
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY—INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

Barnes asserts § 1983 claims of excessive force and false arrest against Knight, McClellan, and Bowman.43 Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these claims.44

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must first show a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the violation was committed by someone acting under color of state law."45 The qualified immunity defense serves to shield government officials performing discretionary functions "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."46 When considering a qualified immunity defense raised in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether "the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity."47 "Thus, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity."48

When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right and whether theofficer was acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged incident.49 If there is a constitutional violation and state action, the Court must then determine whether the right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case.50 For a right to be "clearly established," "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."51 Whether the right was clearly established at the time the defendant acted "requires an assessment of whether the official's conduct would have been objectively reasonable at the time of the incident."52

A. "Under Color of State Law"

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show the alleged violation of the Constitution or of federal law was committed by someone acting under color of state law.53 As a threshold matter, the Court addresses whether Knight, McClellan, and Bowman were acting under color of state law during the incident.54

Whether an officer acted under color of state law depends on (1) whether the officer misused or abused his official power, and (2) whether there is a nexus between the victim, the improper conduct, and the officer's performance of official duties.55 "If an officer pursues personal objectives without using his official power as a means to achieve his private aim, he has not acted under color of state law."56 However, "[i]f an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is stateaction. It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private capacity."57

Barnes alleges the officers were dispatched to McQueen's home after McQueen called the Slidell Police Department requesting assistance, the officers took...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT