Barnes v. Police Officer Joseph Carolan
| Decision Date | 02 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | 16 Civ. 6044 (GBD) (HBP) |
| Parties | EDWARD BARNES, Plaintiff, v. POLICE OFFICER JOSEPH CAROLAN, and POLICE OFFICER JOSEPH FRATTO Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Pro se Plaintiff Edward Barnes brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Police Officers Joseph Carolan and Joseph Fratto.1 (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely detained, searched, and arrested by Defendants while walking near his home on or about April 19, 2015. (Id. at 3.) On October 1, 2018, Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Notice of Mot., ECF No. 59.) Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman's July 8, 2019 Report and Recommendation ("Report"), recommending that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 72.) This Court adopts that recommendation.
Defendants stopped Plaintiff on or about April 19, 2015, on suspicion that he was consuming alcohol from an open container in violation of New York City Administrative CodeSection 10-125(b). (Report at 2; SAC ¶ III; Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("Def.'s SUF"), ECF No. 60, ¶¶ 1, 8-11.) Specifically, Officer Carolan "observed [P]laintiff holding a glass bottle in a bag on a public street." (Report at 2; Aff. of Police Officer Joseph Carolan ("Carolan Aff."), ECF No. 63, ¶ 6.) Officer Carolan then "observed [P]laintiff attempt to screw the top back on the bottle[]" and "throw the bottle, still inside the bag, out in a garbage." (Report at 2; Carolan Aff. ¶¶ 8, 10.) Defendants suspected that Plaintiff was drinking beer, stopped him, and patted him down. (Report at 3; SAC ¶ III; Def.'s SUF ¶¶ 22-27.) Plaintiff has maintained he was drinking a non-alcoholic beverage. (Report at 3; SAC ¶ III; R. & R. Objs. ("Objs."), ECF No. 73, ¶ 1; Decl. of Debra March ("March Decl."), Ex. A. (Pl.'s Dep. Tr.), ECF No. 62-1, at 79:23-80:5.) During the stop, Officer Carolan found a gravity knife in Plaintiff's back pocket. (Report at 3; SAC ¶ III; Def's SUF ¶¶ 28-33.) Plaintiff was arrested, transported to the 30th police precinct, and charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, a violation of New York Penal Law Section 265.02(1).3 (Report at 3; SAC ¶ III; Def.'s SUF ¶¶ 34-44.) Plaintiff received a desk appearance ticket and was released. (Report at 3; Def.'s SUF ¶ 45; March Decl., Ex. A at 92:17-25.)
The Report states that "Plaintiff does not dispute these facts and concedes that he was drinking from the open green glass bottle." (Report at 2-3; March Decl., Ex. A at 77:23-78:8.) In his objections to the Report, however, Plaintiff disputes that there was a brown bag on his bottle, and again insists that it was a non-alcoholic beverage. (Objs. ¶ 1.) He also denies that he was attempting to screw on the bottle's cap. (Objs. ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants lacked sufficient probable cause to stop, search, and arrest him. Plaintiff's sole argument in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion isthat the bottle he was drinking from contained a "non-alcoholic beverage." (Objs. ¶ 1.) Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's stop, search, and arrest was lawful because they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for an open container, and search and then further arrest Plaintiff upon finding that he possessed an illegal gravity knife. (Report at 3.)
A court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations" set forth within a magistrate judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If no party files objections to a report and recommendation, the court "need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." Kessler v. Colvin, 48 F. Supp. 3d 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Nelson v. Smith, 618 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). When a party has filed objections, the court must make a de novo determination as to those portions of the report to which objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Rivera v. Barnhart, 423 F. Supp. 2d 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The court need not conduct a de novo hearing on the matter. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980). Rather, it is sufficient that this Court "arrive at its own, independent conclusions" regarding those portions to which objections were made. Nelson, 618 F. Supp. at 1189-90 (internal citation omitted); see Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 675-76.
Though portions of the Report to which a party objects are reviewed de novo, see N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Forde, 341 F. Supp. 3d 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), "[w]hen a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error." Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Alaimo v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tri-Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 650 F. Supp. 2d 289, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same). Clear error is present when, "upon review of the entire record, [the court is] left with the definite and firm convictionthat a mistake has been committed." United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment may be granted where there is no "genuine dispute as to any material fact" such that "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." See Roberts v. Univ. of Rochester, 573 F. App'x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is "genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is "required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Phillips v. DeAngelis, 331 F. App'x 894, 894-95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must provide "hard evidence," D'Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998), "from which a reasonable inference in [its] favor may be drawn[.]" Binder & Binder PC v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). "Mere conclusory allegations, speculation, or conjecture will not avail a party resisting summary judgment." Calderon v. Yale Univ., 75 F. App'x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Conroy v. N.Y. St. Dep't of Correctional Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) ().
"It is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants [because pro se litigants] generally lack[] both legal training and experience and,accordingly, [are] likely to forfeit important rights through inadvertence if [they are] not afforded some degree of protection." Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, courts "liberally [construe] pro se submissions, interpreting them 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Bryant v. Wright, 451 F. App'x 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006)) (emphasis in original). "Nonetheless, even a pro se party's objections to a report and recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate's proposal, such that no party be allowed a second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior argument." Pinkney v. Progressive Home Health Servs., No. 06 Civ. 5023 (LTS) (JCF), 2008 WL 2811816, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008) (citation omitted), aff'd, 367 F. App'x 210 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, to the extent that a pro se party "makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error." Id.; see also N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 336.
This Court liberally construes Plaintiff's submissions to raise five objections: (1) the Report's factual finding that Plaintiff was consuming an alcoholic beverage is incorrect because it was a non-alcoholic beverage; (2) the Report's factual finding that Plaintiff was carrying a gravity knife is incorrect because it was a utility knife; (3) the Report's factual finding that both a brown bag and bottle cap were present is incorrect; (4) Defendants were not from the local precinct and therefore acted improperly because they did not build a relationship with Plaintiff's community; and (5) the Report's legal finding of probable cause is incorrect because Defendants should have "look[ed] and see[n]" that Plaintiff did not have an alcoholic beverage. (See generally Objs.)
The first and second objections are perfunctory because Plaintiff made the same arguments before Magistrate Judge Pitman. See Osborne v. Miller, 557 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) . Therefore, having reviewed those findings in the Report for clear error, these objections are overruled.
In his third objection, Plaintiff attempts to relitigate a factual issue that he...
To continue reading
Request your trial