Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., MCA 85-2003-RV.

Citation654 F. Supp. 193
Decision Date10 March 1986
Docket NumberNo. MCA 85-2003-RV.,MCA 85-2003-RV.
PartiesGrady Allen BARNES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHWEST FOREST INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Florida

Benjamin R. Patterson, Patterson and Traynham, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Richard Smoak, Sale, Brown & Smoak, Panama City, Fla., G. Thomas Harper, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VINSON, District Judge.

The six plaintiffs in this case (Grady Allen Barnes, Bill Blount, M.C. Hatcher, Ben Pickles, James Seaborn, and M.E. Swindell) allege in their complaint that the defendant discriminated against them on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), Title 29, United States Code, Section 621, et seq. Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment (docs. 27, 33) and, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have submitted various affidavits, documents, and materials in support of their respective motions. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 626, and Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1331 and 1337. For the following reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. FACTS

Prior to May 1, 1984, each of the plaintiffs was employed by Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. ("Southwest") as a security guard at Southwest's paper mill, located in Panama City, Florida. Effective May 1, 1984, however, Southwest eliminated all of its in-house security force and contracted with Wackenhut Security Services, Inc. ("Wackenhut"), for Wackenhut to perform the security function that was being performed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, each of the plaintiffs was terminated from his position as a security guard with Southwest on May 1, 1984. According to Southwest, the decision to terminate the plaintiffs and to contract with Wackenhut was based on the cost savings which would result. Stewart Affidavit, doc. 29 At the time of their terminations, the plaintiffs were each over the age of forty years and fell within the protected age category under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) ("The prohibitions of this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age, but less than 70 years of age.") An additional security guard, Nadine Hines, was also terminated along with the plaintiffs. Hines, however, was under forty years of age at the time and is not a party to this action.

After May 1, 1984, each plaintiff reapplied for employment with Southwest, and then proceeded to file employment discrimination charges with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR").1 During the period between June 5, 1984, and July 24, 1984, Southwest did not hire any new operations employees at its Panama City paper mill. During that period, in fact, the only person hired at the facility was a temporary employee in the Administrative Services Department, hired as a substitute for a vacationing employee. Taylor Affidavit, doc. 29

After withdrawing their claims with FCHR, the plaintiffs filed, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, timely notices of their intentions to sue under the ADEA. This action was subsequently filed on January 2, 1985. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claim: (1) that they were terminated while younger employees of Southwest were retained; and (2) that after they were terminated, Southwest hired younger persons in positions for which the plaintiffs were qualified. According to the complaint, Southwest discriminated against the plaintiffs in violation of the ADEA by either intentionally premising personnel decisions on the basis of age, or applying personnel practices that disparately impacted upon the plaintiffs and others within the protected age group. Other relevant facts will be developed further in the context of the legal framework set forth below.

II. ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER THE ADEA

In order to evaluate whether the plaintiffs or the defendant is entitled to summary judgment in this case, it is necessary to consider the burdens of proof borne by each side in an age discrimination suit, as well as the various models of proof available. The first step is to insure that the plaintiffs' claims are properly characterized in order to invoke the appropriate set of rules. While it is not altogether clear from the complaint, the plaintiffs' memoranda in support of their motion for summary judgment clearly indicate that the gravamen of their claim is that, even though Southwest was reorganizing the paper mill because of economic conditions, it nonetheless acted discriminatorily by failing to retain or reemploy the plaintiffs in favor of younger individuals. Consequently, this case is most akin to the "reduction-in-force" cases which have become quite prevalent within the past five years. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville Railroad Co., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.1985); Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C.Cir.1983); Fink v. Western Electric Co., 708 F.2d 909 (4th Cir.1983); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.1983); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.1982); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.1981); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F.Supp. 1384 (N.D.Ill.1985); Capps v. Southeast Packing Corp., 612 F.Supp. 419 (N.D.Ga.1984).

There is a relationship between the parties' respective burdens of proof and the plaintiffs' obligation of establishing a prima facie case. Although this circuit has held that "failure to establish a prima facie case warrants summary judgment" Pace v. Southern Railway System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78 L.Ed.2d 724 (1983), it needs to be clearly understood that the test for summary judgment, whether there is a material factual issue, is the equivalent of the plaintiffs' obligation to establish the minimal particular elements of a prima facie employment discrimination case. In this type of case, therefore, the failure to establish a prima facie case generally means that there are no material facts at issue. See Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 641 N. 8, 9 (5th Cir.1985). Therefore, a brief review of the development of the prima facie case in these kinds of cases may be helpful in this summary judgment analysis.

Section 623 of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) Recognizing that a plaintiff will rarely be able to demonstrate discrimination through direct evidence, the courts have adopted various hybrids of the analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a race discrimination case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In McDonnell Douglas, Green had been "laid off in the course of a general reduction in the petitioner's work force." Id. at 794, 93 S.Ct. at 1820. The employer's refusal to rehire Green precipitated the lawsuit. The Court held that, in light of the difficulty of directly proving discrimination, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by demonstrating:

(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 (footnote omitted).

If the plaintiff is able to comply, a prima facie case is made out, which creates a "legally mandatory inference of discrimination" that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 297 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 597 (1978).

If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden of production shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. By meeting this burden of production, the employer essentially rebuts the presumption and dissolves the plaintiff's inference of discrimination. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10. The defendant need not persuade the trier of fact that it was actually motivated by proper reasons; instead, its burden is merely one of production. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25, 99 S.Ct. 295, 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978).

Finally, if the employer meets its burden of production, the plaintiff "must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. The plaintiff may carry its burden by showing either that the defendant was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason, or that the defendant's proferred reasons are not credible. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. At all times, however, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that he was the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093.

The various circuits have recognized the efficacy of the McDonnell Douglas model in the context of age discrimination suits. See, e.g., Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, Inc., 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir....

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