Barnes v State
Decision Date | 27 September 2001 |
Docket Number | 00-1062 |
Citation | 55 S.W.3d 271 |
Parties | CHARLES BARNES, APPELLANT, VS. STATE OF ARKANSAS, APPELLEE.SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 27 September 2001 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHARP COUNTY, ARKANSAS, NO. CR98-167; HON. HAROLD S. ERWIN, JUDGE AFFIRMED TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice Charles Barnes was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the 1997 killings of Eula and Dorothy Whitlock. He raises nine points on appeal, none of which has merit. For his first issue, Barnes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending only that his conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence because it was based solely on the statement of an accomplice, Melanie Roberts, and his own inculpatory statements. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Branscum v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001). We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 12 S.W.3d 225 (2000). Where, however, the challenge is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence corroborating the defendant's confession, our review is governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(d) (1987), which provides that " confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed." Tinsley v. State, 338 Ark. 342, 993 S.W.2d 898 (1999). This requirement for other proof, sometimes referred to as the corpus delicti rule, mandates only proof that the offense occurred and nothing more. Id. In other words, under the corpus delicti rule, the State must prove (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Id. (citing Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996)). It is not necessary to establish any further connection between the crime and the particular defendant. Id.; Rucker |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
27 September 2001
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHARP COUNTY, ARKANSAS, NO. CR98-167; HON. HAROLD S. ERWIN, JUDGE AFFIRMED
Charles Barnes was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the 1997 killings of Eula and Dorothy Whitlock. He raises nine points on appeal, none of which has merit.
For his first issue, Barnes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending only that his conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence because it was based solely on the statement of an accomplice, Melanie Roberts, and his own inculpatory statements. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Branscum v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001). We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Carmichael v. State, 340 Ark. 598, 12 S.W.3d 225 (2000).
Where, however, the challenge is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence corroborating the defendant's confession, our review is governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(d) (1987), which provides that "[a] confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed." Tinsley v. State, 338 Ark. 342, 993 S.W.2d 898 (1999). This requirement for other proof, sometimes referred to as the corpus delicti rule, mandates only proof that the offense occurred and nothing more. Id. In other words, under the corpus delicti rule, the State must prove (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity. Id. (citing Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996)). It is not necessary to establish any further connection between the crime and the particular defendant. Id.; Rucker v. State, 320 Ark. 643, 899 S.W.2d 447 (1995)). Accordingly, we must determine whether, setting aside Barnes's extrajudicial confession, the evidence demonstrates that the crime of capital murder was committed by someone.
The evidence introduced at trial showed the following series of events. On August 10, 1997, the Sharp County Sheriff's Office received a call requesting a welfare check on Eula and Dorothy Whitlock, who were mother and daughter, at their mobile home located 6.2 miles south of Ash Flat. Deputy Sheriff Dwayne Holcomb went to the residence and found that both doors were locked, butthe bedroom window on the west end of the home was open. Holcomb went to one of the windows on the east end of the living room; when he looked in, he saw the furniture was turned over and the house was in disarray. He also saw the body of Eula, age 94, lying on the floor. Holcomb then forced the trailer door open and went inside, where he found the body of 70-year-old Dorothy in the hallway outside the bedroom. Both women had wounds on their heads and necks. Autopsies of both women showed that Dorothy had died of multiple blunt and sharp-force injuries to the head and neck, including a skull fracture caused most likely by a hatchet, as well as stabbing and cutting wounds to her neck. Eula died of blunt force injuries to her head and neck, including a fractured jaw and a "near complete transection" of the cervical vertebral body.
On May 7, 1998, investigators Dale Weaver and Joe Stidman went to interview inmates at the Van Buren County Jail. After the investigators left, Melanie Roberts asked fellow inmates Diana Gates, Susan Bowman, and Alexandria Fore if Weaver and Stidman had asked them about the murders of two elderly ladies at Ash Flat. Roberts then told Gates that she and her then-boyfriend, Charles Barnes, had committed the burglary and murders. She also told one of the matrons at the jail that she and Barnes had killed the Whitlocks. During her interview with Weaver and Stidman, Roberts provided details of the crime scene that the police had not made public, including the fact that one of the bodies had been covered with a blanket.
On the basis of this information, Arkansas State Police officers went to interview Barnes at the Brickey's Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, where he was serving time on an unrelated charge. Although Barnes denied any involvement in the killings, he admitted that he had been with his girlfriend, Roberts, on the day in question. He also said that it was possible he had been inside the Whitlocks' trailer, but if he had been, he had to have been sleepwalking.
In addition to the above evidence, the State also introduced the testimony of Charles Dunn, a fellow inmate at the Brickey's Unit. Dunn testified that Barnes told him that he and a girl named Melanie got away with the murders of two elderly ladies. Dunn stated, Dunn's testimony was corroborated by evidence found at the crime scene: both women's purses had been emptied, and rooms, closets, and jewelry boxes had been ransacked.
Barnes contends only that his conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence because it was based solely on the statement of an accomplice, Melanie Roberts, and his own inculpatory statements. He also argues that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (Repl. 1997), a "conviction cannot be had ... upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense."
Clearly, when considered in light of the corpus delicti rule, this argument is without merit. In a case with similar facts, Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995), the appellant Mills argued that, other than his uncorroborated confessions to two fellow inmates, there was no proof that he fired the fatal shots. This court rejected his argument, holding that under the corpus delicti rule, the State needed only to have proved that Mills confessed and the victim died as a result of a homicide. In the instant case, we have Barnes's confession to Dunn, Melanie Roberts's confession and implication of Barnes, and the medical examiner's testimony that the victims died as a result of homicide. The evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts.
For his second point on appeal, Barnes argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when, during opening statements, the State made a reference to a statement Barnes gave to police in which he made the curious remark that he had a "vision" about "the bloody murder of two older ladies near Ash Flat." Barnes's counsel objected to the prosecutor's comment during opening statements, noting that he had a pending motion to suppress and that the court had not yet held a Denno hearing on that motion. The court overruled the motion and told counsel that they would have the suppression hearing the following morning.
The judge held a Denno hearing during the next day of trial. Barnes contended that his "vision" statement was inadmissible because he was represented by counsel when he made the statement. The State responded that Barnes had initiated the contact with the officers, and as such, there was no need for counsel to have been involved. At that time, the judge ruled that the comment about the "vision" was inadmissible because it was "[his] understanding . . . in Arkansas that if he's got a lawyer, you got to notify the lawyer." The judge made no inquiry as to whether Barnes had initiated contact with the officers before making the comment.
On appeal, Barnes argues that he was prejudiced by the fact that the jury heard the prosecutor's statement about his "vision," and even though the trial court later suppressed the statement, the damage had already been done.1 The State responds with the following three arguments: first, there was no prejudice because the statement actually was admissible; second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial because the most to which Barnes would be entitled would be a remand for another Denno hearing; and third, any error which resulted from the prosecutor's opening statement was harmless.
While the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the statement's admissibility is questionable, we decide the issue under the harmless-error rule. A similar situation presented itself in Landreth v. State, 331 Ark. 12, 960 S.W.2d 434 (1998). There, the defendant, Landreth, had confessed to three people the fact that he had murdered Daisy Galaher; the State also had physical evidence linking Landreth with the crime. On appeal, Landreth argued that the prosecutor, during closing arguments, improperly made reference to the fact that he had not testified in his own defense. Noting that the prosecutor's comment was impermissible, this court nevertheless affirmed Landreth's conviction, stating as follows:
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court declared that references to a defendant's failure to testify violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but can be harmless error if it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. [Citation omitted.] Practical application of the Chapman test involves excising the improper remarks and examining the remaining evidence to determine if it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 266, 773 S.W.2d 413 (1989).
Landreth, 331 Ark. at 18 (quoting Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995)). The...
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