Barnes v. State, SC12–875.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 124 So.3d 904
• Parties: James Phillip BARNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. SC12–875.,SC12–875.
• Decision Date: 17 October 2013

124 So.3d 904

James Phillip BARNES, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC12–875.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 27, 2013.
As Revised on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 17, 2013.

[124 So.3d 907]

Ali Andrew Shakoor, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel–Middle Region, and Richard E. Kiley and James Viggiano, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsels, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

James Phillip Barnes, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the order of the circuit court denying his initial motion to vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Barnes was convicted of the 1988 first-degree murder of Patsy Miller in Melbourne, Florida. He was not arrested for that murder and other related charges until some years later when, while in prison for another murder, he confessed to the Miller murder. He subsequently waived counsel and, with standby counsel, entered a guilty plea to all the charges. After Barnes waived mitigation and waived a penalty phase jury, the trial court appointed court counsel to investigate and present mitigation. After the penalty phase, Barnes was sentenced to death and to terms of imprisonment for the related charges of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery, two counts of sexual battery by use or threat of a deadly weapon, and arson of a dwelling. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence in Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010 (Fla.), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 234, 178 L.Ed.2d 155 (2010).

The facts of the murder, based upon Barnes' written and tape-recorded statements and upon the forensic evidence at the penalty phase, show that on the night of April 20, 1988, Barnes went to Miller's condominium unit in Melbourne, Florida. Once there, he took off his clothes and entered the apartment after removing a window screen. Barnes admitted that he went there with the intent to both rape and kill Miller. Once inside, Barnes armed himself with a knife and, after secretly watching Miller go about her normal activities for a short period of time, confronted her and forced her at knife-point to the bedroom where he sexually battered her. He then bound her hands behind her back with shoelaces, tied her feet together, and sexually battered her again. Barnes admitted that he tried to strangle her with a terrycloth belt but was not successful, so he bludgeoned her in the back of her head with a hammer that he found in her bedroom.

After taking a bank card from Miller's wallet and collecting everything he touched, Barnes then set fire to the bed where Miller's body lay. Shortly after 11

[124 So.3d 908]

p.m., firefighters responded and found Miller's burned body face down on the bed with her hands bound behind her back. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was blunt-force trauma from multiple blows to Miller's head. Signs of attempted strangulation, including a fractured hyoid bone, were also discovered in the autopsy. The medical examiner determined that Miller's body was set ablaze after she died.

After Barnes confessed, an indictment was issued charging him with first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery, two counts of sexual battery by use or threat of a deadly weapon, and arson of a dwelling. Barnes immediately sought to waive counsel and a Faretta hearing was held.¹ He then represented himself throughout the proceedings with standby counsel available at all times. Immediately after the first of many Faretta hearings, Barnes entered an open plea of guilty and waived a sentencing jury. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report and also ordered that Barnes' school records be obtained. In addition, the court appointed Dr. William Riebsame, a board-certified forensic psychologist, to provide a psychological evaluation of Barnes.

After presentation of aggravating circumstances at the penalty-phase Spencer hearing, Barnes refused to present any evidence of mitigation and announced that he would rely only on the fact that he came forward and took responsibility for the murder. Over Barnes' objection, the court appointed special mitigation counsel to investigate and present any mitigation at a second Spencer hearing. After mitigation was presented, the sentencing order was entered on December 13, 2007, finding that the six aggravating factors ² outweighed the one statutory mitigator and nine nonstatutory mitigators.³ The court imposed a death sentence for the murder, separate life sentences for each of the burglary with battery and sexual battery counts, and a thirty-year sentence for the arson.

Barnes raised two issues on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court violated Barnes' Sixth Amendment right to represent

[124 So.3d 909]

himself when it appointed special court counsel to develop penalty-phase mitigation; and (2) whether the trial court reversibly erred in considering the PSI report over Barnes' objection that it contravened his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. We held that the trial court did not violate Barnes' right of self-representation by appointing special court counsel to investigate and present mitigation, which was a proper procedure under Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 364 (Fla.2001) (holding that where a defendant waives mitigation, the trial court has discretion to appoint counsel to present mitigation). Barnes, 29 So.3d at 1023. We also held that Barnes' claims concerning the PSI were procedurally barred and without merit. Id. at 1026.

Barnes filed his initial motion for postconviction relief on September 21, 2011, raising two claims, both of which were summarily denied: (1) whether his standby counsel or the trial court sua sponte should have ordered a competency hearing before allowing him to plead guilty,⁴ and (2) whether he may be insane at the time of execution. After a Huff hearing, the circuit court summarily denied Barnes' claims.⁵ In its order entered on January 23, 2012, the circuit court set forth the facts of the case and then concluded in pertinent part as follows:

b. The Defendant represented himself pro se throughout the guilt and penalty phases in this case in which he was charged with Ms. Miller's murder. The Honorable Judge Lisa Davidson presided over the guilt and penalty phases in this case. Judge Davidson appointed the Office of the Public Defender as standby counsel. Assistant Public Defender Phyllis Riewe served as standby counsel for the Defendant during the guilt phase and Assistant Public Defender Randy Moore served as standby counsel for the Defendant during the penalty phase.

c. On May 2, 2006, the Defendant entered an “open” plea of guilty to the charged crimes of first-degree premeditated murder (Count I)....

d. On May 2, 2006, the Defendant waived his right to a jury recommendation and requested that the Court proceed to sentencing without the benefit of the jury's recommendation as to the imposition of life or death on Count I—First Degree Premeditated Murder. Judge Davidson found that the Defendant knowingly, freely, and voluntarily chose to forego a jury for the penalty phase. The Defendant explained that he was making a strategic decision to have a judge alone determine his sentence. (See Exhibit “A,” pgs. 45, 53).

e. The Defendant represented himself pro se at the sentencing hearing and specifically chose not to present mitigating evidence or argument at the penalty phase, other than the fact that he came forward and took responsibility....

....

g. On May 11, 2006, Judge Davidson ordered that a comprehensive pre-sentence investigation (PSI) be conducted, and on February 7, 2007, Judge Davidson appointed attorney Sam Baxter

[124 So.3d 910]

Bardwell as special mitigation counsel to investigate and present any other mitigation evidence because the Defendant refused to present any mitigating evidence on his behalf other than that evidence already placed on the record....

h. On November 16, 2007, the Court held a hearing at which Mr. Bardwell presented alleged mitigating evidence to the Court....

....

l. On January 12, 2012, the case management conference was held before the undersigned judge. The purpose of a case management conference was to hear argument on purely legal claims not based on disputed facts and to schedule an evidentiary hearing on claims requiring a factual determination. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A). The Court concludes as a matter of law that the claims in the subject motion for postconviction relief do not require an evidentiary hearing, and should be summarily denied.

The order further recited that the trial judge conducted an extensive Faretta hearing before allowing Barnes to appear pro se and enter his plea. In that hearing Barnes disclosed that he had thirteen years of school, including one year of college, was a certified law clerk through the Department of Corrections, and had worked in the prison law library. The circuit court noted that the trial judge found Barnes to be “extremely competent,” that he understood what was happening, that he understood the advantages and disadvantages of self-representation, and that he was waiving future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction order emphasized that the trial judge found Barnes to be “alert, competent, and intelligent,” “very definite” in his speech, and “extremely alert,” and that on direct appeal, this Court found the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Barnes, 29 So.3d...