Barnes v. Stoddard

• Decision Date: 28 March 2023
• Docket Number: 1:14-cv-742
• Parties: JEFFERY TODD BARNES, Petitioner, v. CATHLEEN STODDARD, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

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JEFFERY TODD BARNES, Petitioner, v. CATHLEEN STODDARD, Respondent.

No. 1:14-cv-742

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

March 28, 2023

OPINION

Robert J. Jonker, United States District Judge.

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Jeffery Todd Barnes is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City Montcalm County, Michigan. On April 29, 2004, following a three-day jury trial in the St. Joseph County Circuit Court Petitioner was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b, and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c. Petitioner has been sentenced and then resentenced a couple of times. The sentences he is presently serving-life imprisonment for each CSC-I conviction and 15 years to 22 years, 6 months for the CSC-III conviction-were imposed by the trial court on November 14, 2011.

On July 7, 2014, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. The petition included unexhausted claims. Petitioner immediately sought a stay to permit him to exhaust his state court remedies with regard to those issues. This Court granted that relief. Petitioner pursued his claims in the state courts. He filed an amended petition on November 16, 2021.

The amended petition raises five grounds for relief, as follows:

I. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where defense counsel (A) failed to suppress Petitioner's post-arrest statement that was obtain[ed] in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right against self-incrimination, (B) failed to object to the improper hearsay statements that impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the complaining witness, (C) failed to properly handle expert witnesses, (D) failed to object to suppressed evidence, (E) failed to consult with or call an expert in the forensic interviewing protocol, (F) failed to move for the dismissal of the charge because the prosecutor intentionally delayed trial, (G) failed to move for the suppression of Petitioner's postarrest statement that was obtained in violation of (i) his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel and (ii) self-incrimination, and (iii) was the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation, (iv) [failed to] obtain evidence necessary for trial to be timely held, (v) [failed to] take actions to support the strategically chosen defense, and (H) failed to present evidence to show that Petitioner was only guilty of count five.

II. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to self representation and the right to represent himself under the Michigan Constitution.

III. Judicial fact-finding based on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt violated Petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

IV. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel where counsel failed to raise the claims presented above, and request and properly conduct an evidentiary hearing on these issues, which entitle[d] Defendant to a new appeal of right.

V. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel where Issues I-III were not raise[d] on direct appeal, which overcomes any applicable procedural bar.

(Am. Pet., ECF No. 15, PageID.587-595.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition (ECF No. 23) stating that the grounds should be denied because Petitioner may have failed to timely raise them, the Court's consideration of the grounds is barred by the doctrine of procedural default and/or the grounds are without merit. Upon review and applying the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA), Petitioner's habeas grounds lack merit accordingly, the petition will be denied.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

Petitioner was charged with sexually penetrating his daughter-penetrating her mouth with his penis and her vagina with his mouth or tongue. The nature of the charged conduct is explained by the prosecutor during his opening statement. (Trial Tr. II, ECF No. 24-4, PageID.1947-1949.) The victim's testimony was brief. (Id., PageID.2003-2024.) The victim did not want to testify against her father-she testified that she still loved him a lot-she was compelled to appear by subpoena. (Id., PageID.2003.) Although it was not part of the conduct charged in this trial, the victim testified that Petitioner supplied her with marijuana and methamphetamine during the relevant time period and that she became an addict.

Petitioner was convicted of one instance of each type of penetration before the victim was 13 years old (Counts I and III, CSC-I because of the victim's age) and one instance of each type of penetration after the victim was 13 years old (Counts II and IV, CSC-I because of Petitioner's relationship with the victim). Petitioner was also convicted of sexually touching his daughter after she was 13 years old (Count V, CSC-II because of Petitioner's relationship with the victim).

The prosecutor presented testimony from seven witnesses: an expert in the area of child abuse; the victim; the victim's younger sister; the victim's drug rehab counselor; the detective who arrested Petitioner on drug charges; the victim's therapist; and the detective sergeant who investigated the charges, observed the interview of the victim, and interviewed Petitioner. The prosecutor put on his entire case in about four hours. The defense called five witnesses over the course of about an hour: three Family Independence Agency (FIA) workers who had contact with Petitioner's family; a family friend; and Petitioner's mother. Petitioner chose to not testify. The jurors deliberated for a few hours before returning their verdict.

Trial testimony disclosed that Petitioner sexually abused the victim for years. The prosecution's expert, Dr. Jim Henry, described the victim's living situation as a “very disruptive home history until May of 2002 and going from place to place in and out of foster care, in and out of placement with various homes, back to home, back with dad, back to mom, back to foster care and that sort of thing.” (Trial Tr. II, ECF No. 24-4, PageID.1974.) Yet, despite several opportunities, including FIA investigations of sexual abuse accusations, the victim never disclosed the abuse.

After Petitioner was arrested on drug charges during the spring of 2002, the victim and two siblings-a younger sister and a younger brother-were placed in foster care. The victim ended up in a residential drug rehabilitation program. While the victim was in that program, during February of 2003, her younger sister disclosed that she suspected Petitioner had sexually abused the victim.

The victim was interviewed by police during February of 2003. She initially did not disclose. Then, after a time, she indicated a willingness to disclose, but not to police. The victim's drug rehab counselor, who had traveled to the police station with the victim, talked to the victim in the interview room. The police were not present, but they observed the disclosure and it was videotaped. Thereafter, during March of 2003, the victim was assessed by Dr. Jim Henry at the Children's Trauma Assessment Center in Kalamazoo, Michigan.

Not long after the victim's disclosure, Petitioner was transported to St. Joseph County for a hearing regarding his parental rights. While he was at the sheriff's office, he was arrested and interviewed by Detective Mohney regarding the victim's allegations. The nature of that interview is set out in more detail below, but during the interview, Detective Mohney showed Petitioner the videotape of the victim's disclosure. Afterwards Detective Mohney asked Petitioner if there was anything on the tape of the victim's disclosure that was not true. According to Detective Mohney, Petitioner responded that “pretty much everything that [the victim] stated was true.” (Trial Tr. II, ECF No. 24-4, PageID.2079.)

The trial occurred almost 19 years ago. Since that time, Petitioner's case has traveled up and down the Michigan court system several times. The tortuous procedural path is interesting, but it does not illuminate the habeas grounds that Petitioner has raised. To the extent the procedural elements are important, they are discussed below with respect to specific grounds.

As discussed above, the presentation of proofs took only a few hours. Petitioner's unending challenges to the result have consumed much more time. The brief in support of the amended petition is 130 pages long, accompanied by 200+ pages of exhibits. The state court record spans almost 4,000 pages, in large part because of Petitioner's voluminous filings. Winnowing out weaker arguments is the hallmark of effective advocacy. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986). There is certainly no constitutional right to have every possible colorable issue raised. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Petitioner has quite obviously disregarded those principles in presenting his habeas claims.

II. AEDPA standard

The AEDPA “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials'” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or...