Barnes v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5:17-CR-158-D, No. 5:20-CV-512-D |
| Citation | 577 F.Supp.3d 397 |
| Parties | Sean Trent BARNES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Bradford Knott, Rudy E. Renfer, Matthew Lee Fesak, Assistant US Attorneys, Sebastian Kielmanovich, Gabriel J. Diaz, United States Attorney's Office, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent.
JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge On September 29, 2020, Sean Trent Barnes ("Barnes" or "petitioner") moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and 360-month sentence [D.E. 167] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 168]. On November 30, 2020, the United States moved to dismiss Barnes's motion for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [D.E. 177] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 178]. The same day, the court notified Barnes of the motion to dismiss, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline [D.E. 179]. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). On January 11, 2021, Barnes responded in opposition [D.E. 182]. As explained below, the court grants the government's motion to dismiss and dismisses Barnes's section 2255 petition.
On August 21, 2017, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Barnes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. See [D.E. 16, 57, 58, 59]; Arraignment Tr. [D.E. 146]. On July 24, 2018, the court held Barnes's sentencing hearing, at which he appeared pro se. See [D.E. 125, 132, 133, 148]; Sentencing Tr. [D.E. 145]. At the hearing, the court adopted the facts set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") and resolved Barnes's objections. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)–(B) ; Sentencing Tr. at 4–68; PSR [D.E. 105]. The court calculated Barnes's offense level to be 40, his criminal history category to be III, and his advisory guideline range to be 360 months to life imprisonment. See Sentencing Tr. at 67–68. After thoroughly considering the prosecutor's and Barnes's arguments and all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Barnes to 360 months’ imprisonment. See id. at 76–80; [D.E. 136].
Barnes appealed. See [D.E. 138]. On June 7, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Barnes's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Barnes, 777 F. App'x 62, 64–66 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). On July 22, 2019, Barnes sought an extension of time to file a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On July 31, 2019, the Chief Justice granted Barnes an extension of time to file his petition. On October 30, 2019, Barnes timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of his conviction and sentence. On December 9, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Barnes's petition. See Barnes v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 610, 205 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019).
On September 29, 2020, Barnes moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence.1 Barnes alleges seven grounds for relief: (1) Barnes's guilty plea was involuntary because counsel coerced him to plead guilty and assured Barnes he would receive a ten-year sentence, (2) the district court accepted Barnes's guilty plea without a proper factual basis and without ensuring Barnes understood the nature of the conspiracy charge, (3) Barnes's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because counsel gave Barnes false information about pleading guilty, (4) the district court improperly applied an aggravating-role adjustment when it calculated Barnes's advisory guideline range, (5) the government failed to show what type of methamphetamine Barnes conspired to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute and thus the court miscalculated Barnes's base offense level, (6) the sentence exceeded the maximum allowed by law because a jury did not find the facts supporting Barnes's enhanced sentence, and (7) the government breached the plea agreement by failing to move for a downward departure under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 or U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. See [D.E. 167, 168]. Barnes also claims ineffective assistance of stand-by sentencing counsel and contests the court's denial of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea at sentencing. See [D.E. 168] 19–21, 32–36. The government moves to dismiss Barnes's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See [D.E. 177]. Barnes opposes the motion. See [D.E. 182].
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–63, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012) ; Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) ; accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court need not accept a complaint's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Similarly, a court "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) ; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) ; Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a section 2255 motion, the court is not limited to the motion itself. The court may consider "the files and records of the case." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) ; see United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 1993). Likewise, a court may rely on its own familiarity with the case. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ; United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359–60 (4th Cir. 2013).
The "Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel—that is, representation that does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms." Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including plea negotiations, trial, sentencing, and appeal. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964–65, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017) ; Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164–65, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) ; Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) ; Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001). "[S]entencing is a critical stage of trial at which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, and a sentence imposed without effective assistance must be vacated and reimposed to permit facts in mitigation of punishment to be fully and freely developed." United States v. Breckenridge, 93 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996) ; see Glover, 531 U.S. at 203–04, 121 S.Ct. 696. To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; United States v. Mayhew, 995 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2021).
When determining whether counsel's representation was objectively unreasonable, a court must be "highly deferential" to counsel's performance and must attempt to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, the "court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. A party also must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the party. See id. at 691–96, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A party does so by showing that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for the deficiency, "the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
When a defendant pleads guilty and later attacks his guilty plea, "to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ; see Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967. "Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task, and the strong societal interest in finality has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas." Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967 (citations and quotation omitted).
Grounds one, two, and three contest whether Barnes's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Ground one alleges counsel coerced Barnes to plead guilty because counsel was unprepared to take the case to trial and that counsel promised Barnes a ten-year sentence. See [D.E. 167] 4; [D.E. 168] 11–17. Ground two alleges the district court accepted Barnes's plea without a factual basis and without ensuring Barnes understood the nature of the charge. See [D.E. 167] 5; [D.E. 168] 22–24. Ground three alleges counsel gave Barnes false information about the consequences of pleading guilty. See [D.E. 167] 7; [D.E. 168] 25–32.
Barnes's sworn statements during...
To continue reading
Request your trial